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Epistemic utility theory +
permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk⇒
permissivism about rational credences.
The longer abstract I argue that epistemic rationality is permissive.
More specifically, I argue for two claims. First, a radical version of
interpersonal permissivism about rational credence: for many bodies
of evidence, there is a wide range of credal states for which there is
some individual who might rationally adopt that state in response to
that evidence. Second, a slightly less radical version of intrapersonal
permissivism about rational credence: for many bodies of evidence
and for many individuals, there is a narrower but still wide range of
credal states that the individual might rationally adopt in response to
that evidence.
My argument proceeds from two premises: (1) epistemic utility
theory; and (2) permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk. Epis-
temic utility theory says this: What it is epistemically rational for you
to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you got
to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you cared only for their
purely epistemic value. So, to say which credences it is epistemically
rational for you to have, we must say how you should measure purely
epistemic value, and which decision rule it is appropriate for you to
use when you face the hypothetical choice between the possible cre-
dences you might adopt. Permissivism about attitudes to epistemic
risk says that rationality permits many different attitudes to epistemic
risk. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two
ways: in the way that you measure epistemic value; and in the deci-
sion rule that you use to pick your credences. I explore what happens
if we encode our attitudes to epistemic risk in our epistemic decision
rule. The result is the interpersonal and intrapersonal permissivism
described above: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different
choices of priors; given most bodies of evidence you might acquire,
different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your
attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a
range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they per-
mit. The essay ends by considering a range of objections to the sort of
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1 Introduction
It is good to be rational. It is better to think and reason and believe and act
rationally than to do so irrationally. The rationality that governs what we
believe and how strongly, and the reasoning that leads us to those beliefs,
we call theoretical or epistemic rationality. This distinguishes it from practical
or pragmatic or prudential rationality, which governs how we act. Epistemic
rationality will be my topic here. And, in particular, I want to know what
epistemic rationality demands of us. More specifically still, I want to know:
how strict are its demands? We can, of course, agree that it will make dif-
ferent demands of people who have different evidence. It might demand
that I believe I had Countess Grey tea with breakfast this morning, because
my evidence includes memories of doing exactly that; but, until I told you,
it might not have demanded the same of you, since perhaps you didn’t
have any evidence one way or the other. But once we fix the evidence we
have, what then does it demand? Is there always a single unique rational
response to that evidence? Or are there bodies of evidence I might have to
which there are a number of different rational responses? That’s the ques-
tion of this essay. My answer is that there is. Epistemic rationality, I will
argue, is permissive. In fact, I’ll argue that it is radically so.
As I write this, we are two days out from the US Presidential election of
3rd November 2020 to choose between the incumbent, Donald Trump, the
Democratic Party’s nominee, Joe Biden, and the Libertarian Party’s nom-
inee, Jo Jorgensen. A handful of states have yet to be called: Arizona,
Nevada, Georgia, and Pennsylvania. Biden could win with Pennsylvania
alone, or with Arizona and Nevada together, or with some other less likely
combination. To a decent approximation, I have the same evidence as most
of my friends. We are all watching the same data flow in from the counts
through the same news websites. But our reactions are markedly different.
Some believe Biden will win, while others withhold judgment. Some have
very high confidence that Biden will win—close to certainty, in fact. Some
assign a more middling credence to that eventuality. Of course, once the
result is finally determined, some will be right in their beliefs and some
will be wrong, and some will have more accurate credences, and some will
have less. But, at the moment, you might think that rationality permits each
response.
One way to argue for this is to note that the evidence that I share with
my friends is complex. Different parts of it point in different directions.
Professional election-watchers have told us the likely composition of the
districts whose votes remain to be counted, and that points towards a Biden
victory. But the past 48 hours have seen their other predictions refuted
again and again, and that makes us trust them less. Alongside that de-
tailed, local, particular information, I have some more general information:
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for instance, I know that it’s very unusual for the Democrats to win back
the Presidency after the Republicans have held it for only a single term—it
hasn’t happened since Grover Cleveland won against Benjamin Harrison
in the election of 1892. And alongside that, I also know that Trump will try
hard to challenge any count that favours Biden—he’s all but said he will.
How should I combine these different parts of my evidence to determine
my beliefs? You might well think that there are different ways to weigh
and combine these disparate parts of my evidence to determine my atti-
tudes to the three possibilities. And you might think that each is rationally
permissible. And, if you do, you’ll probably think that the different atti-
tudes that result from these different ways of combining the evidence are
all permitted by rationality.1
This is one motivation for a permissive conception of epistemic rational-
ity. When evidence is complex, it says, we must weigh parts of it against
each other to determine our beliefs. And, the argument goes, there is no
privileged way to do that. Therefore, rationality permits any number of
ways of doing it, and so it permits the many different outcomes of those
different ways of weighing evidence. What’s more, even if there were a
unique best way to weigh the different parts of our evidence and combine
them, it might be that it is cognitively very demanding to follow it to the
letter. And in that case, you might think that rationality doesn’t require
you to follow it perfectly, but only to approximate it to some degree. If
imperfectly following the unique best way to combine your evidence were
then to result in different attitudes, those different attitudes might all be
rationally permissible.2
So rationality might be permissive about how we should respond to
complex evidence. It might also be permissive about how we should re-
spond to very sparse evidence. It is my six year old godson’s first time
watching a US presidential election. He knows that there are three people
in the running and he knows their names; but he knows almost nothing
more. Sometimes, he’s a little more confident that Joe will win, some-
times a little more confident that Donald will; sometimes, he plumps for
Jo. Whereas some parts of my evidence point in one direction and other
parts point in another, his evidence doesn’t point in any direction. Again,
it seems that rationality is permissive. Each of his responses seems ratio-
nal.3
1Schoenfield (2019) and Titelbaum & Kopec (ms, Section 4) offer arguments for permis-
sivism of this sort.
2Jackson (2019) develops an argument of this sort.
3Elga (2010) offers another example of sparse evidence that seems to determine no
unique rational response:
A stranger approaches you on the street and starts pulling out objects from
a bag. The first three objects he pulls out are a regular-sized tube of tooth-
paste, a live jellyfish, and a travel-sized tube of toothpaste. To what degree
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Of course, we might say that, absent any evidence that tells them apart,
he should be equally confident in each of them winning. But that depends
on taking the three-way partition of the possibilities to be the relevant one.
After all, he might first divide up the possibilities into those in which Joe
wins and those in which Joe loses, and divide his credences equally over
those; and only then take the credence he assigns to Joe losing and divide
it equally between Donald winning and Jo winning. Does rationality really
demand that he divide his credences equally over the options in one par-
tition rather than the options in another? Remember: he knows nothing
more than that the three of them are running.4
This is another motivation for a permissive conception of epistemic ra-
tionality. When evidence is sparse, it says, there are many ways to respond
to it that respect that evidence, and there is no privileged way to choose be-
tween them. Therefore, rationality permits any number of ways of choos-
ing, and so it permits the many different outcomes of those different ways.
In this essay, I’d like to offer a different reason for thinking that epis-
temic rationality is permissive. The argument begins with a thesis about
what determines the rationality of doxastic attitudes, such as beliefs and
credences. The thesis is sometimes called epistemic utility theory.5 It is what
Selim Berker (2013) calls a teleological theory in epistemology. That is, ac-
cording to epistemic utility theory, the epistemic right—that is, what it is ra-
tional to believe—depends on the epistemic good—that is, what it is valu-
able to believe, epistemically speaking. Thus, according to epistemic utility
theory, beliefs and credences can have more or less purely epistemic value
given different ways the world is. For instance, according to the version of
the theory known as accuracy-first epistemology, which combines epistemic
utility theory with the axiological thesis of veritism, a belief or credence is
more valuable, epistemically speaking, the more accurately it represents
the world. Thus, a belief or higher credence in a truth is more valuable
than a disbelief or lower credence in it; and a disbelief or lower credence in
a falsehood is more valuable than a belief or higher credence in it.
To the claim that doxastic attitudes, like beliefs and credences, have
purely epistemic value, epistemic utility theory adds the claim that which
attitudes are rationally permissible is determined by facts about this epis-
should you believe that the next object he pulls out will be another tube of
toothpaste? (Elga, 2010, 1)
4In (Pettigrew, 2016b), I offer an argument for impermissivism in this case: I argue that
my godson should divide his credences equally over the most fine-grained partition that
his conceptual scheme affords him. As we’ll see below, I reject that argument now.
5Some representative pieces that deploy the version that I will explore: (Oddie, 1997;
Joyce, 1998; Greaves & Wallace, 2006; Joyce, 2009; D’Agostino & Sinigaglia, 2010; Williams,
2012; Easwaran, 2013; Schoenfield, 2015, 2016; Pettigrew, 2016a; De Bona & Staffel, 2017;
Schoenfield, 2017).
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temic value, given different ways the world might be, together with bridge
principles from decision theory that allow us to infer facts about rational-
ity from facts about value. Decision theory tells us what we are rationally
permitted to do when we face a given decision problems. A decision prob-
lem consists of a range of available options. In the practical case, these are
different actions we might perform, such as voting for a particular presi-
dential candidate rather than another, consenting to one medical treatment
from a range of alternatives, putting on a scarf or a hat or a winter coat
when we leave the house, and so on. And a decision rule takes such a deci-
sion problem, together with some other ingredients, and determines which
of the available options are rational for you to choose when faced with that
problem. The other ingredients nearly always include the utilities that you
assign to the options, given different ways the world might be. These are
numerical measures of the values that you assign to those options at those
different possible worlds. But they might also include: objective probabil-
ities over the different possible worlds; subjective probabilities over those
worlds, or credences, as we’re calling them here; attitudes to risk; and per-
haps other items. It is these decision rules that supply the bridge principles
that allow us to derive facts about epistemic rationality from facts about
epistemic value. According to epistemic utility theory, the rationally per-
missible doxastic attitudes for an individual are determined by: (i) con-
sidering the decision problem in which the available options are not the
actions the individual might perform, but rather the different possible dox-
astic attitudes they might adopt, and the utilities are not pragmatic utilities,
but epistemic utilities; and (ii) applying the appropriate decision rule to
this decision problem. So the epistemic utilities encode the goal of having
credences, while the decision rule specifies the rationally permissible ways
to pursue that goal. The rational credences are the rationally permissible
ways to pursue the goal of epistemic value.
So that is epistemic utility theory, and it provides the framework in
which our argument takes place. To this, I add the claim, inspired by
William James’ 1897 essay ‘The Will to Believe’, that many different at-
titudes to epistemic risk are permissible (James, 1897). James, thinking
mainly of the case of belief, thought that there were two competing epis-
temic goals: Believe truth! Shun error! The epistemically risk-inclined place
greater weight on the former; the epistemically risk-averse weight the lat-
ter more heavily. Both, James thinks, are permissible—which you have is a
matter of subjective preference.
Following my own earlier treatment of James’ epistemology in epis-
temic utility theory, I note that there are two ways to make James’ claim
precise (Pettigrew, 2016c). In applications of decision theory to practical
choices, there are two ways to encode attitudes to risk: you can encode
them in your utility function or in your decision rule. In Section 3.1, I de-
scribe Thomas Kelly’s Jamesian argument for permissivism about rational
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belief, which proceeds by encoding attitudes to epistemic risk in the epis-
temic utility function and showing that different permissible attitudes to
epistemic risk, so encoded, give rise to different permissible beliefs given
the same evidence (Kelly, 2014). In Section 3.2, I note Sophie Horowitz’s
observation that we cannot hope for a similar argument in the credal case
(Horowitz, 2017).
In Chapter 4, I argue that we should, instead, encode our attitudes to
epistemic risk in the decision rule we apply to certain epistemic decision
problems. In particular, I argue that the decision rule we use to pick our
prior credences—those we have before we acquire any evidence—is differ-
ent from the rule we use to pick our posterior credences—those we have
after evidence has arrived. To pick our priors, we must use a decision rule
that does not include any probabilities among the ingredients needed to
apply it—after all, at the point when we’re picking our priors, there are no
probabilities to hand. I characterise such a family of such rules in Chap-
ter 4: it is the generalised Hurwicz Criterion (GHC), and it includes rules
that encode a wide variety of attitudes to risk. As we see in Chapter 5,
if, like James, we are permissive about rational attitudes to epistemic risk,
this family of decision rules delivers radical interpersonal and moderate
intrapersonal permissivism for the prior credences chosen using it. Then,
in Chapter 6, I argue that you should pick your posteriors using your prior
credences and a risk-neutral decision rule. And, building on work that
Hannes Leitgeb and I undertook over a decade ago, as well as a more re-
cent development by Dmitri Gallow, I argue that you should obtain your
posteriors from your priors via Bayes’ Rule, or Bayesian Conditionalization
(Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010b; Gallow, 2019). Combined with the radical in-
terpersonal and moderate intrapersonal permissivism for priors for which
we argued before, this gives radical interpersonal and moderate intraper-
sonal permissivism for posteriors as well.
I conclude, in Chapter 7, by considering how the argument just de-
scribed helps us answer five objections to permissivism.
A number of themes recur throughout the essay. First, we will see at
a number of points that Jamesian permissivism about epistemic risk, and
the permissivism about rational credences that it entails, is a rather frag-
ile creature. Quite often, I will adopt principles, norms, and theses that, if
strengthened only slightly, either entail impermissivism or plunge us into
inconsistency. Of course, I will explain why we should go so far as to adopt
the principles in question, but not further. But it is nonetheless of inter-
est that our position might collapse in a number of places either into the
impermissivism we seek to avoid, or into outright inconsistency.
Second, as will become most obvious in the responses I offer to some of
the objections in Chapter 7, when we debate permissivism about epistemic
rationality, it is crucial that we say what we might mean by rationality in
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general and in the epistemic case in particular. Epistemic utility theory
offers a very specific account of epistemic rationality: the epistemic util-
ity functions provide the legitimate ways of measuring what you value,
epistemically, about your doxastic attitudes; and the decision rules provide
constraints on the rational ways to pursue the goal of epistemic value, so
measured. As we will see when we respond to some of the general objec-
tions to permissivism below, when we have this specific account in hand,
we can see why some of the general principles on which these objections
rely simply do not hold.
Finally, we will use formal tools throughout. I find myself torn about
this. On the one hand, I think they provide an important methodology
in contemporary philosophy. We pride ourselves on making our claims
precise and identifying imprecision in the claims of others. Formal tools
cannot do this on their own, and indeed they can often obscure mean-
ing and intention; but, used judiciously, they can also assist greatly as we
strive for greater clarity and transparency. In the present essay, they al-
low me to specify my position precisely enough that we can determine its
consequences, reassure ourselves that it is internally consistent, and tease
out nuances that would otherwise remain hidden. As I mentioned above,
what follows will reveal that it is not straightforward to provide a con-
sistent version of a Jamesian epistemology that does not collapse into im-
permissivism. That fact itself only becomes apparent when we formalise
our approach. Nonetheless, I am aware that these methods can deter some
readers. I’ve tried to make much of the technical material self-contained,
though I will at various points refer elsewhere for major results. But I know
that’s not sufficient. We’re all busy people with finite time, and it would
be arrogant of me to think that my ideas are so valuable that it is worth
the time to learn all of the technical machinery from scratch in order to
get hold of the philosophical ideas. So, at the end of each chapter, I will
provide an overview of the argument of that chapter that does not use for-
mal techniques (the blue boxes headed ‘In brief...’). As well as providing
a route through the argument for those less comfortable with the formal
machinery, these summaries provide a way to discern the overall shape of
the argument reasonably quickly without delving into its details.
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2 Varieties of Permissivism
Epistemic rationality is permissive. That’s our claim. But, as often with
philosophical claims, when you start making it precise, it fractures into a
number of more fully specified theses. The rough taxonomy that follows is
inspired by Elizabeth Jackson’s (2019) and extends it a little.
2.1 What sort of doxastic state?
First, there are different versions of the claim for different sorts of doxastic
attitudes we might have in response to evidence. Let’s run through some
of those different sorts of attitude.
We might have beliefs. These are sometimes called full beliefs, all-or-
nothing beliefs, or on-off beliefs. They are categorical states. They are what
you report when you say, ‘I hold that anthropogenic climate change is real’,
or ‘I think the butter is in the fridge’, or ‘I believe that God exists’. We rep-
resent your total belief state by the three sets: the set of propositions you
believe, the set you disbelieve, and the set on which you withhold judg-
ment.
We might have precise credences. These are sometimes called partial be-
liefs, degrees of belief, or subjective probabilities. They are graded states. They
are what you report when you say, ‘I’m 80% sure it’s the next turning on
the right’ or ‘I think it’s 50% likely that Serena will win’ or ‘I’m only 5%
confident that I will see my parents this year’. We represent your credal
state by a function that takes each proposition about which you have an
opinion and assigns to it your precise credence in that proposition. That
credence is represented by a real number that is at least 0 and at most 1.
The stronger the belief, the higher the number that represents it. It mea-
sures how strongly you believe the proposition. 0 represents minimal cre-
dence, while 1 represents maximal credence. That function is known as
your credence function.
We might have comparative confidences.6 These also represent the strength
of our belief in different propositions, but they don’t do it numerically.
Rather, they order the propositions about which we have an opinion by
how strongly we believe them, allowing that some propositions might not
be comparable. We report them when we say, ‘It’s more likely that Sarah
and Telv will stay married than John and Melissa’.
We might have imprecise credences. These are sometimes called mushy
credences or imprecise probabilities.7 These represent our credal state not by
a single precise numerical credence function, but by a set of them, which
we call our representor (van Fraassen, 1990). A natural interpretation is this:
6Since these are less familiar doxastic states, let me recommend an overview for the
interested reader: (Konek, 2019).
7Again, let me recommend this overview: (Bradley, 2016).
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what is determinately true of our doxastic state is what is true according to
every credence function in the representor. So, if I think that rain in Bris-
tol tomorrow is more likely than sun in Bristol tomorrow, every credence
function in my representor assigns higher credence to the former than the
latter. But if I don’t think rain more likely than sun, nor sun more likely than
rain, nor both equally likely, then my representor contains some credence
functions assign higher credence to rain, some assign higher credence to
sun, and some assign the same credence to them both. Imprecise credences
capture well what I report when I say, ‘I’m between 50% and 80% more
confident that it will rain by this afternoon’.
And so on. There are other ways to represent doxastic states, such as
ranking functions (Huber, 2006). But the examples we have given will be
sufficient.
For each way of representing a doxastic state, there is a different ver-
sion of permissivism about epistemic rationality. For instance, according
to the precise credal version of permissivism, there is evidence we might
obtain that doesn’t determine a unique rational credence function on the
set of propositions about which you have an opinion. According to the im-
precise credal version, there is evidence that doesn’t determine a unique
representor. And so on.
For many different sorts of doxastic attitude, you can be permissive
with respect to one but not the other. For instance, take my complex ev-
idence concerning the outcome of the 2020 US Presidential election. You
might think that there is no precise credence in a Biden win that rationality
requires me to adopt. After all, what could determine that 0.787 is per-
missible, for instance, but not 0.786? But that doesn’t prevent there being a
unique imprecise credence that is rationally required. It might, for instance,
be the set of all the rationally permissible precise credences.
However, you might find it harder to see how rationality could be per-
missive about imprecise credences but not about precise ones. Indeed,
since precise credences are usually seen as a particular case of imprecise
credences—a precise credence function represents the same doxastic state
as the representor that contains only that credence function—if rational-
ity requires a unique precise credence function, surely it also requires the
corresponding representor?
But perhaps not. Rationality might sometimes demand a unique pre-
cise credence function because of the more limited representational possi-
bilities they afford, while permitting a number of different imprecise credal
states. For instance, suppose I know that the urn in front of me contains ten
balls, and they are all either green or purple. But I don’t know how many
of each; indeed, I have no evidence that bears on that question. Then there
are eleven possibilities: zero green balls and ten purple; one green and nine
purple; and so on. Now consider the proposition that the next ball drawn
from the urn will be green, as well as its negation, which says that the next
12
ball drawn will be purple. We might imagine that rationality requires that I
treat the green and purple possibilities symmetrically, but nothing beyond
this. Then, among precise credence functions, rationality would permit the
one that assigns 12 to green and
1
2 to purple. And it would permit only that
one. Among imprecise credal states, rationality would permit the represen-
tor that includes only that precise credence function that assigns 12 to green
and 12 to purple. But it would also permit the representor that includes
the eleven precise credence functions that assign credence 0, 110 , . . . ,
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10 , 1 to
green and 1, 910 , . . . ,
1
10 , 0 to purple, respectively. And it would permit the
representor that includes the credence functions that assign 0, 12 , 1 to green
and 1, 12 , 0 to purple, respectively. And so on. And if that is the case, then
rationality is impermissive with respect to precise credences but permissive
with respect to imprecise ones.
There is lively debate about how our credences should relate to our be-
liefs (Kyburg, 1961; Foley, 1992; Arló-Costa & Pedersen, 2012; Buchak, 2014;
Leitgeb, 2014; Staffel, 2016). One straightforward view is the so-called Lock-
ean thesis. This says that there is some threshold 12 ≤ t < 1 such that you
should believe a proposition if your credence in it lies above t, you should
disbelieve it if your credence lies below 1 − t, and you should withhold
judgment on it otherwise. Now, you might think that rationality requires
each individual to set their own Lockean threshold, but it doesn’t require
them to pick any particular one. If this is the case, rationality might de-
mand a unique precise credence function, without demanding unique sets
of beliefs and disbeliefs and suspensions, since it does not specify a unique
Lockean threshold. Similarly, even if it specifies a unique Lockean thresh-
old, it might specify unique sets of beliefs and disbeliefs and suspensions,
but not a unique credence function, since typically there will be many pre-
cise credence functions that all give rise to those beliefs and disbeliefs and
suspensions via the Lockean thesis.
In this essay, I’m interested primarily in permissivism about the epis-
temic rationality of credences. I’ll argue that there is evidence we might
have for which rationality does not specify a unique rational credal re-
sponse.
2.2 Interpersonal or intrapersonal?
So we’re interested in credal permissivism. But this comes in two varieties:
an interpersonal version and an intrapersonal version. According to in-
terpersonal permissivism, it is possible for different rational individuals to
have the same evidence, but different attitudes in response. According to
the intrapersonal version, there is evidence that a single individual might
have, and different doxastic attitudes such that, whichever of these atti-
tudes they have in response to the evidence, they’ll be rational.
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If you think rationality is interpersonally impermissive, it’s hard to see
how you could think it is intrapersonally permissive. After all, if there
are two attitudes and it’s rationally permissible for you to adopt either in
response to your evidence, it’s hard to see how it could not also be rational
for someone else with your evidence to adopt either, regardless of which
you adopt. But there might be pathological cases. I’ll leave that possibility
aside.
It is, however, reasonably easy to see how rationality might be intrap-
ersonally impermissive, but interpersonally permissive. For instance, it
might be that, while a body of evidence on its own does not fix the ra-
tional response, that body of evidence combined with some feature of an
individual does. Let’s meet two such features that have been proposed: (i)
the individual’s conceptual scheme, and (ii) their inductive methods.
Recall my godson. He knows that the Presidential race is between Joe,
Donald, and Jo. Suppose he divides his credence equally between Joe
winning and Joe losing, and then he divides his credence in Joe winning
equally between Donald winning and Jo winning. We might say that he
is irrational because rationality requires him to divide his credence equally
over the finest-grained set of possibilities that his conceptual scheme af-
fords him, and that requires him to divide his credences equally over Joe
winning, Jo winning, and Donald winning (Pettigrew, 2016b). On this ac-
count of rationality’s requirements, we say, then, that they depend both on
your evidence—in my godson’s case, nothing beyond the fact that one of
the three must win—and your conceptual scheme—in my godson’s case, a
conceptual scheme rich enough to represent all three possibilities. But you
might think that rationality does not constrain which conceptual scheme
you have. For my godson, then, rationality requires a credence of 13 that
Joe will win, while for someone with the same evidence, but a concep-
tual scheme that only affords them two possibilities—Joe winning and Joe
losing—rationality requires a credence of 12 that Joe will win. In this case,
credal rationality is intrapersonally impermissive, because your evidence
and your conceptual scheme determine the credence you should have; but
it is interpersonally permissive, because it doesn’t determine what concep-
tual scheme you should have.
Or, as I mentioned above, we might think that what your evidence
doesn’t determine a unique rational response on its own, but it does when
coupled with the inductive methods that you endorse (Schoenfield, 2019;
Titelbaum & Kopec, ms). According to this view, there are many differ-
ent inductive methods that rationality permits you to endorse, and indeed
many that will issue in different conclusions based on the same evidence—
hence, interpersonal permissivism. But, fed any body of evidence, a partic-
ular inductive method will issue in a single mandated doxastic response—
hence, intrapersonal impermissivism.
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2.3 Radical or not?
To fix a version of permissivism, we must fix the attitudes to which it ap-
plies and whether it applies interpersonally or intrapersonally. But we
must also say how radical it is. That is, we must say how varied are the dif-
ferent attitudes that rationality permits us to adopt in response to a given
body of evidence. For instance, on a radical version of permissivism about
belief, there are bodies of evidence to which rationality permits you to re-
spond by believing a particular proposition, suspending judgment on it, or
disbelieving it. On a less radical version, there are bodies of evidence to
which rationality permits you to respond by believing a particular propo-
sition or suspending on it, and there are bodies of evidence to which ratio-
nality permits you to respond by disbelieving a particular proposition or
suspending on it, but there are none that permit all three attitudes. Per-
haps, for instance, rationality permits me and each of my friends to believe
that Biden will win, and also permits us to suspend judgment on it, but
doesn’t permit us to believe he will lose. That would not be radical. In con-
trast, perhaps my godson is rationally permitted to believe Joe will win, but
also rationally permitted to believe he’ll lose, and also rationally permitted
to suspend judgment. That would be radical.
In the credal case, rationality might permit me to have any credence
between 0.75 and 0.77 that Biden will win. That would not be radical. But
it might permit me to have any credence between 0.1 and 0.9. That would
be radical.
2.4 Common or rare?
Finally, whatever attitudes your permissivism applies to, whether it is in-
terpersonal or intrapersonal, and whether it is radical or moderate, it might
also be permissive often or rarely. According to common permissivism,
most evidence permits a number of different attitudes; according to rare
permissivism, most evidence does not.
A rare permissivist, for instance, might think that when evidence is very
complex or very sparse, rationality is permissive, but also think that these
situations are rather rare. For instance, our evidence is complex when we
are trying to predict the behaviour of a complex system, like a society vot-
ing for a leader or the effect of an intervention in our climate system. And
our evidence is sparse when we face an entirely new phenomenon about
which we have little relevant prior evidence, such as the emergence of a
novel viral threat or a new political player about whom we have almost no
evidence. But usually, when we predict the effect of eating a type of food
we’ve enjoyed many times before, or we set our credence that we’ll see a
goldfinch in the park we’ve walked in for ten years, our evidence is rea-
sonably substantial, not terribly complex, and it largely points in the same
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direction.
A common permissivist, in contrast, thinks that rationality is permis-
sive in the presence of nearly all evidence. Suppose, for instance, you think
that the credences it is rationally permissible to have in response to a body
of evidence are precisely the credences you could obtain by starting with
a permissible prior credence function and updating on the evidence in the
required way. You will then be permissivist about most posterior credences
if you think that the priors that are permissible are varied enough and the
evidence we typically have is sufficiently inconclusive to ensure that there
are at least two different permissible priors that update on that evidence to
give different posteriors.
2.5 My brand of permissivism
In this book, I’ll defend two versions of permissivism. First, a radical com-
mon version of interpersonal permissivism about credences. Second, a
slightly less radical and slightly less common version of intrapersonal per-
missivism about credences.
As I mentioned above, I will motivate these versions by arguing within
epistemic utility theory; and I will appeal crucially to the notion of epis-
temic risk. Rationality permits a variety of attitudes to risk in the practical
sphere. Faced with the same risky choice, you might be willing to gam-
ble because you are risk-inclined, and I might be unwilling because I am
risk-averse, but we are both rational and neither more rational than the
other. On my Jamesian account, rationality also permits different attitudes
to risk in the epistemic sphere. And different attitudes to epistemic risk
warrant different credal attitudes prior to receiving any evidence. This de-
livers interpersonal permissivism at least for the empty bodies of evidence
to which we respond with our prior credences. What’s more, because ra-
tionality permits a wide range of different attitudes to risk, it gives a radical
version of interpersonal permissivism about priors—that is, there is a great
variety of rationally permissible priors. And indeed it gives such a radical
version that, for almost any evidence we subsequently receive, if we update
each of this multitude of rationally permissible priors with that evidence,
we get a multitude of rationally permissible posteriors. So it gives a radical
and common version of interpersonal permissivism—rationality is radically
permissive in the presence of most bodies of evidence. And finally, it turns
out that even once an individual’s risk attitudes have been fixed, it is often
the case that many different priors and therefore many different posteriors
are permitted. And that gives a radical common version of intrapersonal
permissivism, but one that is slightly less radical and rather less common,
because fixing the risk attitude does cut down the range of permissible pri-
ors and thus the range of permissible posteriors quite significantly.
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In brief...
In this chapter, I built on and slightly extended Elizabeth Jackson’s
(2019) taxonomy of different species of permissivism about epis-
temic rationality, and I located within that framework the positions
for which I’ll argue in this essay. They are:
• Radical common interpersonal permissivism about credences.
That is, for most bodies of evidence, the range of credal states
for which there is some individual who might rationally re-
spond to that evidence with that credal state is wide.
• Moderate common intrapersonal permissivism about cre-
dences.
That is, for most bodies of evidence and many individuals, the
range of credal states the individual might rationally adopt in
response to that evidence is narrower, but it nonetheless con-
tains more than one option.
17
3 Epistemic risk and epistemic utility
Let me begin by looking at a different attempt to argue for epistemic per-
missivism on the basis of epistemic risk. This is due to Thomas Kelly (2014),
and also inspired by William James’ (1897) ‘The Will to Believe’. Kelly is
concerned not with credences but with full beliefs, and, for them, I think
his argument succeeds. However, as Sophie Horowitz (2017) points out,
his argument cannot be transferred to the case of credences. That will lead
us to seek a different approach, which we’ll present in the remainder of the
book.
3.1 William James’ two duties and permissivism for full beliefs
Kelly begins by reminding us of William James’ distinction between the
two goals we have when we form beliefs—we want to believe truths, and
we want not to believe falsehoods.
There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of
opinion,—ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose
difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown
very little concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid
error,—these are our first and great commandments as would-
be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical
commandment, they are two separable laws. [...]
Believe truth! Shun error!—these, we see, are two materially
different laws; and by choosing between them we may end by
coloring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard
the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as
secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of
error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance. [...]
We must remember that these feelings of our duty about either
truth or error are in any case only expressions of our passional
life. (James, 1897, 18)
When we have a belief, it gives us a chance of being right, but it also runs
the risk of being wrong. In contrast, when we withhold judgment on a
proposition, we run no risk of being wrong, but we give ourselves no
chance of being right. Pursuing the two Jamesian goals, then, pulls you
in two directions. You could guarantee that you achieve the first by be-
lieving every proposition, since you’d thereby believe all truths. And you
could guarantee you achieve the second by believing no propositions, since
you’d thereby believe no falsehoods. Where you should fall between these
two extremes, Kelly says, depends on your attitudes to epistemic risk. The
epistemically risk-inclined will put more weight on the first of James’ two
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aspects of our duty in the matter of opinion—Believe truth! The epistemi-
cally risk-averse will put more weight on the second—Shun error!
To make this precise, we might adopt the epistemic utility theory frame-
work described in the Introduction, and encode your attitudes to epistemic
risk in your epistemic utilities. The idea is that, just as you assign different
pragmatic value to your actions depending on how the world is, and mea-
sure that by your pragmatic utility for that action given the world is that
way, so you might assign different purely epistemic value to your doxastic
attitudes and states depending on how the world is, and measure that by
your epistemic utility for those attitudes and states given the world is that
way. According to Kelly’s reading of James, the weights you place on the
two different duties the matter of opinion are best encoded in your epis-
temic utilities. The greater the weight you put on Believe truth!, the more
highly you value true beliefs and false disbeliefs; the greater the weight
you put on Shun error!, the more highly you disvalue false beliefs and true
disbeliefs.
We can make this precise by appealing to a thesis introduced indepen-
dently by Kenny Easwaran and Kevin Dorst, which finds its inspiration in
a suggestion of Carl Hempel’s (Hempel, 1962; Easwaran, 2016; Dorst, 2019).
Suppose:8
(i) I assign a positive epistemic utility of R > 0 to believing a truth or
disbelieving a falsehood—this is my utility for getting things right;
(ii) I assign a negative epistemic utility (or positive epistemic disutility)
of −W < 0 to believing a falsehood or disbelieving a truth—this is
my utility for getting things wrong; and
(iii) I assign a neutral epistemic utility of 0 to withholding judgment.
Then, the more averse you are to epistemic risk, the greater weight you
will put on Shun error! and the less you will put on Believe truth!, and so
the greater will beW in comparison with R. That is, you will dislike being
wrong much more than you like being right. The more favourable you are
to epistemic risk, the greater weight you put on Believe truth! and the less
on Shun error!, and so the greater will be R in comparison withW . That is,
you will like being right more than you dislike being wrong.
The James-Kelly-Easwaran-Dorst account of epistemic utility just sketched
assumes veritism, the axiological view that we met briefly in the Introduc-
tion and which says that the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for
a doxastic attitude is its accuracy—the closer the attitude comes to repre-
senting the world accurately, the greater the utility. So the epistemic utility
8What I present here is the simplest version of Easwaran’s and Dorst’s thesis, but it
suffices to run Kelly’s argument.
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of a true belief is greater than the epistemic utility of a false belief; and with-
holding judgment lies between the two. But, according to James and Kelly,
veritism leaves open a wide range of rational permissible ways of valu-
ing accuracy. Following James, Kelly takes your attitudes to epistemic risk,
encoded in your epistemic utilities R and W , to be “expressions of your
passional life”. That is, he takes them to be like your tastes and values—
attitudes that are not governed by some external standard, but which are
instead, to a great extent, up to you. That is, there is a large permissible
range of values for R andW from which you might choose.
This gives us a way of encoding your attitudes to epistemic risk within
your epistemic utilities in the case of full beliefs. And we can now use
that to derive permissivism about rational belief from the Jamesian permis-
sivism about attitudes to epistemic risk. Suppose that there is some way to
measure, for each proposition, how likely my evidence makes that propo-
sition. That is, suppose there is a unique evidential probability function of
the sort that J. M. Keynes and Timothy Williamson envisage (Keynes, 1921;
Williamson, 2000). Then, if r is how likely my evidence makes the propo-
sition X, then we can calculate the expected epistemic utility of having a
belief in X, the expected epistemic utility of having a disbelief in X, and the
expected epistemic utility of withholding judgment on X:
(i) the expected epistemic utility of believing X is rR + (1− r)(−W),
(ii) the expected epistemic utility of disbelieving X is r(−W) + (1− r)R,
and
(iii) the expected epistemic utility of withholding judgment is 0.
Having done so, we are rationally required to pick an attitude that has
maximal expected epistemic utility. Here are the crucial facts:
Believe X ≥ Disbelieve X ⇔ r ≥ 1
2
Believe X ≥Withhold on X ⇔ r ≥ W
R + W
Disbelieve X ≥Withhold on X ⇔ r ≤ R
R + W
And here are the consequences. There are three cases: risk-averse, risk-
neutral, and risk-inclined.
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Figure 1: The risk-averse case (i.e.,W > R): the attitudes required or per-
mitted by different evidential probabilities.





































This is illustrated in Figure 1.
















This is illustrated in Figure 2.
So, perhaps unsurprisingly, the more you disvalue having an attitude
that is wrong—a false belief or a true disbelief—and the less you value hav-
ing an attitude that is right—a true belief or a false disbelief—the stronger
the evidence in favour of a proposition will have to be in order to make it
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Figure 2: The risk-neutral and risk-inclined case (i.e. R ≥ W): the attitudes
required or permitted by different evidential probabilities.
rational to believe and the stronger the evidence against will have to be in
order to make it rational to disbelieve. For the risk-averse agent, W > R,
and the more risk-averse, the greater the ratio ofW to R. So the more risk-
averse you are, the stronger the evidence in favour of a proposition has to
be to compel you to believe it rather than withhold judgment on it, and
the stronger the evidence against it must be to compel you to disbelieve
rather than withhold judgment. For the risk-inclined agent, W < R, and
then it doesn’t matter how risk-inclined you are: the threshold for belief is
1
2 regardless. And for the risk-neutral agent, it is the same.
Now, as we noted above, Kelly follows William James in assuming that
there are many different values of R and W that are rationally permissi-
ble. It is permissible to disvalue believing falsehoods a lot more than you
value believing truths; it is permissible to disvalue that just a lot less; and
many attitudes in between are also permissible. If that is the case, differ-
ent individuals might have the same evidence while rationality requires
of them different doxastic attitudes. Rationality might require of one of
them that they believe the proposition, because they disvalue being wrong
only a little more than they value being right, and their evidence makes
the proposition likely enough that it is worth taking the risk. But it might
require of the other individual that they suspend judgment, because the ra-
tio between their disvalue for false belief and value for true belief is much
greater. In our reconstruction of Kelly’s thinking, using Easwaran’s and
Dorst’s framework, we identify the values you pick for R andW with your
attitudes to epistemic risk. So different doxastic attitudes are permissible
in the face of the same evidence because different attitudes to epistemic
risk are permissible and those attitudes to epistemic risk play a key role in
determining what it is rational for you to believe.
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Now, there are a number of features of Kelly’s approach that are worth
noting.
First, it belongs to epistemic utility theory. As we noted in the Intro-
duction, this says that we determine the epistemic rationality of an agent’s
doxastic state as follows: we treat the agent as facing a decision problem in
which the available options are doxastic states; we take the utility of those
doxastic states to be their purely epistemic utility; we apply the appropri-
ate decision rule to that decision problem with those utilities; and whatever
states it deems rationally permissible are the ones that epistemic rationality
permits. For Kelly, when we consider whether a doxastic attitude towards
X is rational or not, the available options are: Believe X, Disbelieve X, With-
hold judgment on X. The utility of each option given each way the world
might be is determined by the agent’s epistemic utilities, R and W . And
the correct decision rule says: an option is rational for an agent just in case
it maximises expected utility from the point of view of the evidential prob-
abilities relative to that agent’s total evidence. We will meet other versions
of epistemic utility theory below. Indeed, epistemic utility theory is the ap-
proach taken in this book. But the options I consider after this chapter will
be individual credences or whole credal states, represented by credence
functions; the utilities will be determined by so-called scoring rules in the
way we set out in the next section; and the decision rules will be quite
different—for instance, they won’t involve evidential probabilities.
Second, note that Kelly manages to show that epistemic rationality might
be permissive even if there is a unique evidential probability measure—
that’s quite a feat! So even if you think you can solve the problem of
which precise probability is demanded by the very sparse evidence and the
very complex evidence we described in the Introduction, still you should
countenance a form of epistemic permissivism if you agree with James and
Kelly that there are different permissible values for R andW . Thus, Kelly’s
approach is markedly different from those where we claim that permis-
sivism results from a sort of indeterminacy in the measure of evidential
support. One consequence of this is that Kelly’s permissivism is much
more widespread—it does not only arise when evidence is very sparse or
very complex. It arises even when our evidence is unequivocal though still
uncertain, such as when you know for certain that there are seven purple
balls and three green balls in the urn before you and you’re about to pick
one in a way that you know is completely random. For Kelly, even though
the evidential probability that you’ll draw a purple ball is 710 , some indi-
viduals will be required to believe that they’ll draw a purple ball—those
for whom WR+W <
7
10 —while other, more risk-averse individuals will be
required to withhold judgment—those for whom WR+W >
7
10 .
Just how common permissivism is on Kelly’s account depends on which
combinations of R and W you consider rational. We might think that
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W = 3 and R = 2 is permitted, butW = 1, 000 and R = 1 is not. William
James himself perhaps suggests this in his response to Clifford, whom he
thinks is unreasonably risk-averse in the matter of belief:
[H]e who says, “Better go without belief forever than believe
a lie!” merely shows his own preponderant private horror of
becoming a dupe. (James, 1897)
Though it’s not clear that he intends this as a charge of irrationality. I won’t
try to adjudicate this matter here. It will arise again in the context of credal
epistemology in Section 5.2 below.
Third, it might seem at first that Kelly’s argument gives interpersonal
permissivism at most. After all, for a fixed attitude to epistemic risk, en-
coded in R and W , and a unique evidential probability for X given your
evidence, let’s say r, it might seem that there is always a single attitude—
belief in X, disbelief in X, or judgment withheld about X—that maximises
expected epistemic value. But this isn’t always true, as we can see from
the lists and figures above. After all, if r = RR+W , then it turns out that dis-
believing and withholding have the same expected epistemic value, and if
r = WR+W , then believing and withholding have the same expected epis-
temic value. And in those cases, it would be rationally permissible for an
individual to pick either.
Fourth, and relatedly, it might seem that Kelly’s argument gives only
narrow permissivism, since it allows for cases in which believing and with-
holding are both rational, and it allows for cases in which disbelieving and
withholding are both rational, but it doesn’t allow for cases in which all
three are rational. But that again is a mistake. If you value believing truths
exactly as much as you value believing falsehoods, so that R = W, and
if the objective evidential probability of X given your evidence is r = 12 ,
then believing, disbelieving, and withholding judgment are all permissi-
ble. Having said that, there is some reason to say that it is not rationally
permissible to set R = W. After all, if you do, and if r = 12 , then it is per-
missible to both believe X and believe the negation of X at the same time,
and that seems wrong.
So Kelly’s argument from epistemic risk to permissivism about full be-
liefs, supplemented with Easwaran’s and Dorst’s precise account of veritist
epistemic value for such doxastic states, delivers a surprisingly strong form
of permissivism. Indeed, as strong as we hope to establish for credences.
Unfortunately, however, his approach won’t work for credences, as we’ll
see in the next section.
3.2 Encoding epistemic risk in epistemic utilities for credences
Kelly’s account of the epistemic value of beliefs and disbeliefs—inspired by
William James and made precise by Kenny Easwaran and Kevin Dorst—
24
delivers permissivism about beliefs because there are propositions X, bod-
ies of evidence we might have that give evidential probability r to X, and
different legitimate ways of valuing getting things right and wrong—namely,
R1 and−W1, respectively, on the one hand, and R2 and−W2 on the other—
such that r assigns highest expected epistemic value to believing X when
epistemic value is determined by R1 and−W1, but assigns highest expected
epistemic value to withholding judgment on X when that value is deter-
mined by R2 and −W2. If we now try to extend this approach to the credal
case, we face the problem that, for any X, any evidential probability r that
our evidence might bestow on X, and any legitimate way of measuring the
epistemic value of credences, r assigns highest expected epistemic value
to having credence r in X. That is, given any evidential probability, rela-
tive to all legitimate ways of measuring the epistemic value of credences,
that probability assigns highest expected epistemic value to the same sin-
gle credence, namely, the one that matches the evidential probability. So
we do not obtain permissivism about credences from permissivism about
measures of epistemic value in the same way that Kelly did in the case of
full belief. This was first pointed out by Sophie Horowitz (2017).
The reason is that all legitimate measures of the epistemic value of cre-
dences are strictly proper. Let’s spell out what this means. The James-Kelly-
Easwaran-Dorst measures of epistemic utility for beliefs apply to individ-
ual doxastic attitudes; in particular, individual beliefs. They say, for a par-
ticular belief, how valuable it is if the proposition believed is true and if the
proposition believed is false. The analogue to this in the credal case is a
scoring rule. This is a pair of functions, s(0,−) and s(1,−): s(0, x) measures
the epistemic value of having credence x in a false proposition; s(1, x) mea-
sures the epistemic value of having credence x in a true proposition.9 Some
examples:
(i) The absolute value scoring rule
• a(0, x) = −x
• a(1, x) = −(1− x)
(ii) The quadratic scoring rule
9Scoring rules were originally used not to measure the epistemic value of a credence, but
to specify some pragmatic reward you might receive for having a particular credence in a
certain situation. For instance, if you run a weather forecasting firm, you might wish to re-
ward your employees differently for the accuracy of their forecasts. If it does indeed rain by
noon on Monday, you might wish to give a higher bonus to one employee, who posted 80%
confidence that it would, than another, who posted 20% confidence. In fact, as they were
originally discussed, the term ‘scoring rule’ covered ways of penalising credences, rather
than rewarding them. But a penalty function is just the negative of a reward function, so we
keep the terminology here. Brier (1950) describes one of the first scoring rules, which was
indeed used in the meteorological setting; Savage (1971) proves some of the fundamental
properties of the species of scoring rule that we’ll consider here.
25
Figure 3: Three scoring rules, a, q, l.
• q(0, x) = −x2
• q(1, x) = −(1− x)2
(iii) The enhanced log scoring rule
• l(0, x) = −x
• l(1, x) = −(x− log x)
Given an evidential probability r and a credence x, the expected epistemic
utility that r assigns to x is
rs(1, x) + (1− r)s(0, x)
Now, we say that the scoring rule s is strictly proper if
(i) s(1, p) and s(0, p) are continuous functions of p, and
(ii) for any 0 ≤ p 6= q ≤ 1,
ps(1, p) + (1− p)s(0, p) > ps(1, q) + (1− p)s(0, q)
That is, s is strictly proper if, for each probability 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the credence
p expects itself to be best, epistemically speaking. That is, it expects ev-
ery other credence to be worse than it expects itself to be. Recalling the
examples above: q and l are strictly proper, while a is not.10
So, if we follow Kelly’s Jamesian lead and encode our attitudes to epis-
temic risk in our epistemic utilities, and if only strictly proper scoring rules
10We briefly sketch the proofs:
• The quadratic score:
d
dx
(rq(1, x) + (1− r)q(0, x)) = − d
dx
(
r(1− x)2 + (1− r)x2
)
= 2(r− x) = 0
iff x = r. So the expected value of q relative to r is maximised uniquely at x = r.
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can be legitimate measures of the epistemic value of a credence, and if we
retain the requirement that we choose only options that maximise expected
utility from the point of view of the evidential probabilities, we will not
obtain permissivism about credences. After all, if r is the evidential prob-
ability of X, then assigning credence r to X uniquely maximises expected
epistemic utility. It is thus the unique rational response to that evidence.
Scoring rules are measures of the epistemic value of having an indi-
vidual credence. But we’ll also be interested in measures of the epistemic
value of an entire credal state: that is, a collection of credences, each as-
signed to a different proposition. Thus, we are interested not only in the
epistemic value of my credence 0.9 that it will rain in the next hour, but in
the epistemic value of my whole credal state, which includes that credence
in imminent rain, as well as my credence of 0.7 that it will be sunny to-
morrow, my credence that Joe Biden will be inaugurated on 20th January,
my credence that I have had an asymptomatic case of COVID-19, my cre-
dence that the water in my tap is safe to drink, and so on. We represent
this credal state by a credence function. The domain of this function is the set
of all propositions to which I assign a credence—call this my opinion set or
agenda and denote it F . Then my credence function C takes each proposi-
tion X in F and returns my credence C(X) in X. For any X in F , C(X) is at
least 0 and at most 1—that is, 0 ≤ C(X) ≤ 1.
A measure of epistemic value, or an epistemic utility function, is then a
function EU that takes
(i) a credence function C defined on a set of propositions F , and
(ii) a possible world, specified as a classically consistent assignment of
truth values to the propositions in F ,
and returns
(iii) a real number or−∞ that measures the epistemic value of having that
credence function at that world.
• The enhanced log score:
d
dx
(rl(1, x) + (1− r)l(0, x)) = − d
dx
(r(x− log x) + (1− r)x) = r
x
− 1 = 0
iff x = r. So the expected value of l relative to r is maximised uniquely at x = r.
• The absolute value score:
ra(1, x) + (1− r)a(0, x) = −(r(1− x) + (1− r)x) = (2r− 1)x− r
is a straight line. It is increasing if r > 12 , and thus maximised at x = 1; it is decreas-
ing if r < 12 , and thus maximised at x = 0; it is constant if r =
1
2 , and thus maximised
for any 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
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We’ll assume throughout that F is a finite algebra. How the proposal of
this essay might be extended to the infinite case is an interesting question.
But there will be plenty to deal with in the finite case, so I restrict attention
to that here.
Whenever we talk of a finite algebra F , we’ll talk of W as the set of
possible worlds relative to that algebra. That is, W is the set of classically
consistent assignments of truth values to the propositions in F . Since F is
a finite algebra, to each world w inW there corresponds a proposition in F
that is true at that world only and not at any others. We will abuse notation
and denote both the world and this propositionW .
A natural way to generate measures of the epistemic value of a credal
state from measures of the epistemic value of the individual credences that
compose it is to take the former to be the sum of the latter. If s is a scoring
rule, let
EUs(C, w) = ∑
X∈F
s(w(X), C(X))
where we abuse notation still further and, for any possible world w inW ,
we write w for the following function: w(X) = 1 if X is true at w, and
w(X) = 0 if X is false at w.11 This gives the following measures using our
examples from above:
(i) The absolute value measure
A(C, W) := EUa(C, w) = ∑
X∈F
a(w(X), C(X)) = − ∑
X∈F
|w(X)−C(X)|
(ii) The Brier score
B(C, w) := EUq(C, w) = ∑
X∈F
q(w(X), C(X)) = − ∑
X∈F
|w(X)−C(X)|2
(iii) The enhanced log score











11While it might be natural, this is by no means the only way to generate a measure of
the epistemic utility of a whole credence function from measures of the epistemic utility of
the credences it assigns. For instance, we might include in the summation only some subset
of the credences it assigns. Or we might weight each credence’s score before summing,
perhaps giving different weights to credences in stronger propositions. Or we might score
each credence using a different scoring rule. And indeed we might not use summation at
all, nor even take the epistemic utility of the whole credal state to be determined by the
epistemic utility of the individual credences. But of course any greater permissivism about
measures of epistemic utility can only give greater permissivism about rational credence.
And so here we will continue to measure epistemic utility in the more restricted way just
described. Thanks to Teddy Seidenfeld for discussion of this.
28
Some credence functions on a finite algebra F are probability functions,
and some are not. A credence function C on F is a probability function or a
probabilistic credence function if
(P1) ∑w∈W C(w) = 1;
(P2) for any proposition X in F , C(X) = ∑w∈X C(w).
That is, the sum of the credences that C assigns to each of the worlds inW
is 1, and the credence that C assigns to a proposition X is the sum of the
credences that C assigns to the worlds at which X is true.
We say that an epistemic value measure EU is strictly proper if, for any
probability function P defined on F , and any other credence function C
defined on F ,
∑
w∈W
P(w)EU(P, w) > ∑
w∈W
P(w)EU(C, w)
Note that s is strictly proper iff EUs is strictly proper. So B and L are strictly
proper, while A is not. Now, again, we have that, if R is the evidential
probability function, and EU is strictly proper, R will expect the credence
function R itself to be best. Again, Kelly’s route to permissivism leads to a
dead end in the credal case.
Why do we say that only strictly proper epistemic utility measures can
be legitimate? There are a number of arguments for this. I’ll describe three.
I won’t spend a great deal of time on these. I am persuaded by the second,
and possibly the third; here, I will simply assume that they establish that
no scoring rule that isn’t strictly proper can be used to measure epistemic
utility, and possibly something stronger than that. If this is wrong, then it
opens up the possibility that we might find an argument for permissivism
that proceeds like Kelly’s: we encode different permissible attitudes to epis-
temic risk in different legitimate epistemic utility functions, which now in-
clude more than just the strictly proper ones; and we show that some of the
different epistemic utility functions corresponding to different attitudes to
epistemic risk render different credences functions rationally permissible
in the presence of a fixed body of evidence. So you might read this book as
investigating how epistemic risk might yield epistemic permissivism, even
if Kelly’s approach won’t work.
Our first argument for strict propriety comes originally from Graham
Oddie, though it also forms the cornerstone of Jim Joyce’s second attempt at
characterising epistemic utility functions (Oddie, 1997; Joyce, 2009).12 The
argument begins with the observation that, though the permissivist claims
that there are evidential situations in which rationality permits more than
one credal response, they also admit that there are evidential situations in
12See Hájek (2008), Konek (ta), and Blackwell & Drucker (2019) for objections.
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which rationality demands a single credal response. For instance, most
permissivists will say that, if you learn the objective chances of the propo-
sitions about which you have an opinion, then the only rational response
is to adopt those chances as your credences. Now, Oddie and Joyce say, for
any probability function P on F , you might learn that P gives the objec-
tive chances. And if you were to learn that, rationality would require that
you adopt P as your credence function. Now, suppose that P expects some




P(w)EU(P, w) ≤ ∑
w∈W
P(w)EU(C, w)
Then it seems that rationality must permit you to move from P to C with-
out any further evidence—after all, by your own lights, doing so is not
expected to lose you any epistemic value. But that’s precisely what we all
agree is not true—we agree that rationality forbids you from moving away
from P while your evidence is still only that P gives the objective chances.
Thus, we must have
∑
w∈W
P(w)EU(P, w) > ∑
w∈W
P(w)EU(C, w)
That is, EU must be strictly proper.
My own argument, as well as D’Agostino and Sinigaglia’s, is based on
an axiomatic characterization of measures of epistemic value. Both appeal
to properties other than strict propriety, but each ends up characterising
precisely the strictly proper epistemic utility functions (Pettigrew, 2016a;
D’Agostino & Sinigaglia, 2010). Both begin with the idea that a credal state
is more valuable, epistemically speaking, the better it corresponds to re-
ality. This is the thesis I called veritism in the Introduction. To make this
veritist assumption precise, we introduce two pieces of machinery. First,
the ideal credence function at a possible world. This is the one that repre-
sented the world with maximal accuracy. Both arguments claim that the
ideal credence function at a world is the one that gives maximal credence
to all truths and minimal credence to all falsehoods. That is, if for any
world w in W , we abuse notation as before and define the function w as
above—so that w(X) = 1 if X is true at w and w(X) = 0 if X is false at
w—then w is the ideal credence function at world w. The second piece of
machinery is a measure of distance D from one credence function to an-
other. The idea is that the epistemic value of a credence function C at a
world w is given by how close C lies to the ideal credence function at that
world, namely, w. That is, EU(C, w) = −D(w, C). Both arguments then
proceed by placing conditions on D. If D satisfies all of my conditions, and
if EU(C, w) = −D(w, C), then EU is a strictly proper epistemic value mea-
sure generated by a strictly proper scoring rule. And if D satisfies all of
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D’Agostino and Sinigaglia’s condition, and if EU(C, w) = −D(w, C), then
EU is the Brier score B, which is strictly proper, as we saw above.
3.3 Foundational results in epistemic utility theory
Before moving on, it’s worth noting a handful of facts about strictly proper
scoring rules and the strictly proper epistemic utility functions that they
generate. We will have cause to refer back to these a number of times in
what follows. Together, these provide the foundational results in the credal
version of epistemic utility theory, and they ground the epistemic utility ar-
guments for the following norms that we typically take to govern our cre-
dences: Probabilism, the Principal Principle, and two synchronic versions
of Conditionalization, the Bayesian’s favoured updating rule.13
3.3.1 Probabilism
The first norm is Probabilism, which says that your credences should sat-
isfy the axioms of the probability calculus. We usually state those axioms
as follows:
(P1’) C(>) = 1 and C(⊥) = 0
That is, you should have maximal credence in a tautology, and mini-
mal credence in a contradiction.
(P2’) C(X ∨Y) = C(X) + C(Y) if X and Y are mutually exclusive.
That is, your credence in a disjunction of two mutually exclusive
propositions should be the sum of your credences in the disjuncts.
Above, we stated the axioms differently:
(P1) ∑w∈W C(w) = 1;
(P2) ∑w∈X C(w) = C(X).
It is easy to see that these are equivalent: (P1) + (P2)⇔ (P1’) + (P2’).
The norm can then be stated more carefully:
Probabilism At any time in your epistemic life, it is rationally
required that, if C is your credence function at that time, then C
is a probability function.
To establish this, epistemic utility theory appeals to the following result
(Joyce, 2009; Predd et al., 2009):
13We’ll leave an argument for a diachronic version of Conditionalization until later (Sec-
tion 6.3).
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Theorem 1 Suppose EU is a strictly proper epistemic utility function, and sup-
pose C is a credence function defined on F . Then:
(I) If C is not a probability function, then there is an alternative credence func-
tion C? defined on F that is a probability function such that, for all possible
worlds w inW ,
EU(C, w) < EU(C?, w)
(II) If C is a probability function, then there is no alternative credence function
C? 6= C defined on F such that, for all possible worlds w inW ,
EU(C, w) ≤ EU(C?, w)
In the language of decision theory: if you violate Probabilism, then your
credence function is strictly dominated; if you satisfy it, it is not even weakly
dominated. As I noted above, one of the key claims of epistemic utility
theory is that an account of epistemic utility together with an appropriate
decision rule will deliver a verdict about what is rational. In this case, the
decision rule is one that I have called Undominated Dominance: it says that
it is irrational to choose an option that is strictly dominated by some alter-
native option that isn’t itself even weakly dominated (Pettigrew, 2016a).
From this, together with the claim that epistemic utility functions must be
strictly proper, we conclude Probabilism.
3.3.2 The Principal Principle
The second norm is the Principal Principle. At the beginning of the paper
in which he first discusses this norm, and in which he gives it this name,
David Lewis gestures informally towards a number of versions (Lewis,
1980). Here’s one: rationality requires that, if your total evidence entails
that ch is the probability function that gives the objective chances, and if
your credence function is C, then C(X) = ch(X), for all X in F . Here’s
another: rationality requires that, if C is your prior credence function at the
beginning of your epistemic life, and Cch is the proposition that says that
ch is the probability function that gives the current objective chances, and
C(Cch) > 0, then C(X|Cch) = ch(X). And here’s a third: rationality requires
that if C is the set of epistemically possible objective chance functions, then
C should be a weighted average of the members of C.
The version I will state is closest to the latter. As we see, it appeals to
the notion of an epistemically possible objective chance function. A prob-
ability function ch is an epistemically possible objective chance function at
a particular time if your total evidence at that time is compatible with ch
giving the objective chances; that is, if your evidence does not rule out ch
giving the objective chances. Then:
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Principal Principle At any time in your epistemic life, if C is the
set of epistemically possible objective chance functions for you
at that time, then rationality requires that, if C is your credence
function at that time, then C is a member of the closed convex
hull of C.
This uses a technical notion, namely, the notion of a closed convex hull. Given
a set X of probability functions, the closed convex hull of X is the smallest
set with the following properties: (i) it contains all the probability func-
tions in X ; (ii) whenever it contains two probability functions, it contains
all mixtures of them; (iii) whenever it contains an infinite sequence of prob-
ability functions that approach another probability function in the limit, it
also contains that other probability function.14
This sounds like an overly technical requirement, but in straightfor-
ward cases it makes straightforward and intuitively plausible demands.
Suppose, for instance, that I have been told that the urn before me either
contains one blue ball and three orange ones or one orange ball and three
blue ones. Then there are just two epistemically possible objective chance
functions. The first: ch1(Blue) = 14 , where Blue is the proposition that a ball
drawn at random from the urn will be blue. The second: ch2(Blue) = 34 .
Then the Principal Principle demands that my current credence function is
some mixture of these two. That is, there is 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 such that, for all X in
F , C(X) = αch1(X) + (1− α)ch2(X).
To establish this version of the Principal Principle, epistemic utility the-
ory appeals to the following result (Pettigrew, 2013):
Theorem 2 Suppose EU is a strictly proper epistemic utility measure, C is a set
of probability functions, and suppose C is a credence function defined on F . Then:
(I) If C is not in the closed convex hull of C, then there is an alternative credence
function C? defined on F that is in the closed convex hull of C such that, for
all ch in C,
∑
w∈W
ch(w)EU(C, w) < ∑
w∈W
ch(w)EU(C?, w)
(II) If C is in the closed convex hull of C, then there is no alternative credence
function C? 6= C defined on F such that, for all ch in C,
∑
w∈W
ch(w)EU(C, w) ≤ ∑
w∈W
ch(w)EU(C?, w)
Say that your credence function is strictly chance dominated by an alternative
if every epistemically possible chance function expects the alternative to be
14If C and C′ are probability functions, C? is a mixture of C and C′ if there is 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
such that C? = λC + (1− λ)C′.
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strictly better than yours; and say that it is weakly chance dominated by the al-
ternative if they all expect it to be at least as good as yours, and some expect
it to be better. So, if your credence function violates the Principal Principle,
it is strictly chance dominated; and if it satisfies the Principal Principle, it is
not. To establish the Principal Principle from this, epistemic utility theory
appeals to the following decision rule, which we might call Undominated
Chance Dominance: it says that it is irrational to choose an option that is
strictly chance dominated by some alternative option that isn’t itself even
weakly chance dominated (Pettigrew, 2016a). From this, together with the
claim that epistemic utility functions must be strictly proper, we establish
the Principal Principle.
3.3.3 Plan Conditionalization
Finally, our third and fourth norms are slightly different formulations of the
synchronic version of Conditionalization. It might seem that this is an oxy-
moron. Isn’t the norm of Conditionalization quintessentially diachronic?
Doesn’t it concern how we update our credences from one time to another
when we learn new evidence between those two times? Yes, it’s true that
this is how we usually understand Conditionalization, and indeed we’ll ar-
gue for exactly such a diachronic principle in Section 6.3 below, building on
an argument that Hannes Leitgeb and I once gave, and which Dmitri Gal-
low has recently improved significantly (Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010b; Gal-
low, 2019). But here we mention two arguments for closely related versions
of a synchronic norm. This norm governs not the relationship between
your credence functions at an earlier and at a later time, but between your
credences at an earlier time and your plans at that very same time for how
you will update those credences at the later time in the light of evidence
that you’ll receive in between. This is the sense in which it is synchronic: it
governs the relationship between credence functions and updating plans,
both of which are held at the same time.
An updating plan is a function that maps each body of total evidence
you might have at the later time onto the new credence function that the
plan says you should adopt if you do receive that evidence. Suppose E =
{E1, . . . , Em} is the set of propositions that give the different bodies of total
evidence you might have at the later time. That is, by the later time, you
might come to have total evidence E1, or you might come to have total
evidence E2, and so on. Then a plan R takes each possible body of evidence
Ei and returns a credence function Ri, which is the posterior you plan to
have after acquiring Ei as your total evidence.
Plan Conditionalization (narrow scope) If C is your credence
function at the earlier time, and if you know that your total ev-
idence at the later time will come from E = {E1, . . . , Em}, then
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rationality requires that, if R is your updating plan, then R is a
Bayesian plan for C—that is, for each Ei in E , if C(Ei) > 0, then
Ri(−) = C(−|Ei).
To establish this, at least in the case in which E is a partition, the epis-
temic utility theorist appeals to a result by Hilary Greaves and David Wal-
lace, building on work by Graham Oddie (Oddie, 1997; Greaves & Wallace,
2006). Here, for any possible world w, we write Eiw for the member of the
partition E to which w belongs. So, given an updating rule R, Riw is the
credence function it requires you to adopt at world w, since you’ll learn ev-
idence Eiw at that world. So we might naturally take EU(Riw , w) to measure
the epistemic utility of updating plan R at world w—it is the epistemic util-
ity of the credence function this plan requires you to adopt if you learn the
evidence that you’ll learn at world w.
Theorem 3 Suppose EU is a strictly proper epistemic utility measure, C is a prob-
abilistic credence function, and E is a partition.
(I) If R, R′ are both Bayesian plans for C, then
∑
w∈W
C(w)EU(Riw , w) = ∑
w∈W
C(w)EU(R′iw , w)
(II) If R is a Bayesian plan for C and R′ is not, then
∑
w∈W
C(w)EU(R′iw , w) < ∑
w∈W
C(w)EU(Riw , w)
So, your credence function at the earlier time expects Bayesian updating
rules to maximise expected epistemic utility: it assigns each Bayesian rule
the same expected epistemic utility, and it assigns any other rule a lower ex-
pected epistemic utility. From this, we conclude the narrow scope version
of Plan Conditionalization. It is narrow scope because it has the following
form: If your credence function is . . . , then rationality requires that your
updating plan is . . . . We now meet a wide scope version of the norm, which
has the following form: Rationality requires that, if you credence function
is . . . , then your updating plan is . . . .
Plan Conditionalization (wide scope) If you know that your
total evidence at the later time will come from E = {E1, . . . , Em},
then rationality requires that, if C is your credence function at
the earlier time, and if R is your updating plan, then R is a
Bayesian plan for C—that is, for each Ei in E , if C(Ei) > 0, then
Ri(−) = C(−|Ei).
To establish this, we appeal to the following result (Briggs & Pettigrew,
2020):
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Theorem 4 Suppose EU is a strictly proper epistemic utility measure and E is a
partition.
(I) If R is not a Bayesian plan for C, then there is an alternative credence func-
tion C? and updating plan R? such that R? is a Bayesian plan for C, and for
all w inW ,
EU(C, w) + EU(Riw , w) < EU(C
?, w) + EU(R?iw , w)
(II) If R is a Bayesian plan for C, there is no alternative credence function C?
and alternative plan R? such that, for all w inW ,
EU(C, w) + EU(Riw , w) ≤ EU(C?, w) + EU(R?iw , w)
So, if you plan to update in some way other than using a Bayesian up-
dating rule, there is an alternative credence function and an alternative
updating plan that, taken together, is guaranteed to be better than your
credence function and updating plan, taken together. From this, together
with Undominated Dominance, we conclude a wide scope version of Plan
Conditionalization.
In brief...
In Section 3.1, we met Thomas Kelly’s argument for permissivism
about rational belief (Kelly, 2014). It is inspired by William James’
permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk (James, 1897). James
held that we have two goals in our epistemic life: to believe truths,
and not to believe falsehoods. How we weigh these against each
other is determined by our attitudes to epistemic risk. If you are risk-
averse, you place greater weight on avoiding getting things wrong,
while if you are risk-inclined you place greater weight on getting
things right. James held that many different ways of weighing these
two goals are permissible.
We interpreted Kelly’s argument using an account of epistemic value
that has been explored by Kenny Easwaran (2016) and Kevin Dorst
(2019). According to this, we encode these Jamesian attitudes to epis-
temic risk in our epistemic utilities—that is, in our measures of epis-
temic value. For the risk-averse, the disvalue of believing falsely is
greater than the value of believing truly; for the risk-inclined, it is re-
versed; for the risk-neutral, they are the same. Kelly posits epistemic
probabilities: that is, for each body of evidence and each propo-
sition, he posits a unique objective, agent-independent probability
that measures how likely that body of evidence makes that propo-
sition. Combining this with Easwaran and Dorst’s account of epis-
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temic utility, we can then proceed as follows. For any individual,
any total body of evidence, and any proposition about which they
might have an option, we calculate the expected epistemic utilities
of (i) believing the proposition, (ii) disbelieving the proposition, and
(iii) withholding judgment about it, all from the point of view of the
evidential probability of the proposition relative to the individual’s
total evidence. Kelly holds that rationality requires us to do what-
ever maximises expected epistemic utility from that point of view.
And he notes that, since rationality permits a number of different at-
titudes to epistemic risk, which we then encode in our epistemic util-
ities, the same evidential probability might demand one person to
believe a proposition and another to withhold judgment—the more
risk-averse you are, the stronger your evidence will have to be to
demand belief. From this, he concludes in favour of permissivism
about rational belief.
In Section 3.2, we noted Sophie Horowitz’s observation that a similar
argument will not deliver permissivism in the credal case (Horowitz,
2017). This is because, in that case, it is generally agreed that
all legitimate measures of epistemic utility must have a particular
property—in the jargon, they must be strictly proper. But, for any
strictly proper epistemic utility function and any evidential proba-
bility, the evidential probability expects itself to be epistemically bet-
ter than any other credence. So it renders itself the unique rational
response to the evidence, which gives impermissivism. So we con-
cluded that, if we are to secure permissivism for rational credences
using epistemic utility theory, we can’t adopt Kelly’s approach.
In the remainder of Section 3.2 and in Section 3.3, we considered
these strictly proper epistemic utility functions in greater detail, and
we met some of the central results of epistemic utility theory, which
furnish arguments for various Bayesian norms for credences: the
norm that says that your credences should obey the probability cal-
culus (Probabilism); the norm that says that they should defer to the
objective chances (Principal Principle); and the norm that says that
you should plan to update your credences using Bayes’ Rule (Plan
Conditionalization).
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4 Epistemic risk and picking priors I: the decision rule
In the previous chapter, we met Thomas Kelly’s argument for epistemic
permissivism for full beliefs. In that, he argued that permissivism about
our attitudes to epistemic risk, encoded in our epistemic utilities, entails
permissivism about the epistemic rationality of full beliefs. Unfortunately,
as Horowitz points out, a similar approach will not work for credences,
which are our topic here.
But all is not lost. After all, as has long been recognised in approaches to
practical decision-making, and as I’ll explain in detail in Section 4.1, there
are two ways in which we can encode our attitudes to risk: we can encode
them in our utilities, as Kelly would have us do; or we can encode them in
the decision rules that we use when we face a decision problem. As we’ll
see below, economists and decision theorists first realised this when Mau-
rice Allais presented a set of apparently rational risk-averse preferences
that cannot be rationalised by encoding the attitudes to risk in the utilities
while retaining the standard risk-neutral expected utility rule for decision-
making.
In this chapter, I’ll consider various candidate decision rules that we
might use to pick our prior credences—that is, the credences we have at the
beginning of our epistemic life, when we have no evidence and no other
credences. I’ll explain how we might distinguish these different decision
rules by appealing to axioms that characterise the preference orderings that
give rise to them. As I discuss those axioms, I’ll argue in favour of some
and against others. The ones that I favour characterise a new family of
decision rules called the generalised Hurwicz criterion. When we determine
which prior credences it is rational for an individual to have, it is one of
these decision rules, along with our epistemic utilities for credences, that
we should apply.
Thus, our approach, like Kelly’s, belongs to epistemic utility theory,
where we take the rational credences to be those deemed rational by the
correct decision rule when the options in question are our doxastic states,
and the utility of each option is its epistemic utility. And, like Kelly, the
priors that are rationally permissible for a particular individual are deter-
mined by their attitudes to risk. However, unlike Kelly, those attitudes to
risk will appear not in our epistemic utilities, but in our decision rule. In
the following chapter, I’ll derive the consequences of applying these rules
to our doxastic decision problem.
4.1 Risk-sensitive decision-making under risk
In this section, I’d like to explain how we might incorporate risk into util-
ities in practical sphere, and then explain why economists and philoso-
phers historically thought it necessary to go beyond this and introduce risk-
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sensitive decision rules. I will be concerned with the case of decision-making
under risk, which covers those decision problems for which we know the
objective probabilities of the different possible states of the world on which
the available options are defined. This is not our situation when we pick
our priors. At that point, we know nothing of the objective probabilities.
Picking priors is a case of decision-making under uncertainty, which covers
those decision problems for which we do not know the objective probabili-
ties. I turn to decision-making under uncertainty in Section 4.2; if you wish,
you can go there now without loss.
We’ll begin with the simplest possible example. I am about to flip a
fair coin. I make you an offer: pay me £30, and I will pay you £100 if the
coin lands heads and nothing if it lands tails—that is, if you accept my
offer and the coin lands heads, you will make a net gain of £70, while if
you accept and it lands tails, you’ll lose £30; if you don’t accept, you’ll
lose nothing and gain nothing either way. You choose to reject my offer.
But why? After all, the expected monetary payout of accepting my offer
is £
(




= £20, and this is greater than the expected
monetary payout of rejecting it, which is £0. Have you been irrationally
risk-averse? Have you placed more weight on the badness of the possible
£30 loss than is warranted, and less weight on the goodness of the possible
£70 gain?
There are two ways to rationalise your decision. On the first, we retain
the standard decision rule that demands that you maximise your expected
utility; we encode your attitude to risk in your utility function; and we
show that you in fact maximise expected utility by rejecting my offer, even
though you don’t maximise expected monetary payout. On the second,
we abandon the expected utility rule; we introduce a new decision rule to
govern these situations; and we show that rejecting my offer is exactly what
that rule demands, or at least permits.
4.1.1 Expected utility theory and the diminishing marginal utility of
money
Let’s present the first approach in a little more detail. The key point is this:
we noted that the expected monetary payout of accepting my offer exceeds
the expected monetary payout of rejecting it; but our decision-principle
says nothing about expected monetary payouts, and instead talks only of
expected utility. And, as Daniel Bernoulli and Gabriel Cramer noted in the
very earliest discussions of expected utility theory, I can rationalise your
decision to reject my offer by ascribing to you a certain sort of utility func-







u(Lose £30) < u(Status quo).
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Figure 4: Utility as a logarithmic function of wealth
And, as Bernoulli and Cramer observed, a utility function that is a suf-
ficiently concave function of your total wealth as measured in monetary
units will do the job. For instance, to borrow Bernoulli’s own suggestion,
perhaps your utility for an outcome in which your total wealth is £n is log n.
And perhaps your current wealth is £40.
If that’s the case, then your total wealth if you were to accept my offer
and the coin were to land heads would be £110, while your total wealth
if you were to accept and the coin were to lands tails would be £10. Then
your expected utility for accepting my offer is 12 log 110 +
1
2 log 10 ≈ 3.502
while your expected utility for rejecting it is log 40 ≈ 3.689. So, you max-
imise your expected utility by rejecting my offer. What’s more, it seems
reasonable for you to value money in the way that Bernoulli’s logarith-
mic utility function suggests. After all, money is what economists call a
dependent good—how valuable a certain amount of it is depends on how
much you have already. And, in particular, it has diminishing marginal
utility. That is, each extra unit of money adds less utility than the previ-
ous one. The more money you have, the less extra utility you gain by re-
ceiving a certain amount more. So giving £10 to a millionaire increases
their utility less than giving £10 to someone living in poverty increases
theirs. And that’s precisely what the logarithmic utility function suggests.
If my total wealth is £100 and I receive £10, then my utility increases from
log 100 ≈ 4.61 to log 110 ≈ 4.7—an increase of around 0.09. Whereas if
my total wealth is £1,000,000 and I receive £10, then my utility increases
from log 1, 000, 000 ≈ 13.81551 to log 1, 000, 010 ≈ 13.81552—an increase of
around 0.00001.
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4.1.2 Risk-weighted expected utility and the Allais preferences
On the approach just sketched, we take a risk-neutral decision rule—the
one that says you should maximise your expected utility—and combine it
with a risk-averse utility function—the logarithmic one, or some other suf-
ficiently concave function—and thereby rationalise your decision to reject
my offer. But we might rationalise that decision in the opposite way. We
might abandon the risk-neutral decision rule in favour of a risk-averse one,
and ascribe to you a utility function that is linear in money. What would
a risk-averse decision rule look like? As we’ll see below, they come in two
varieties: those that apply when probabilities, either subjective or objective
or evidential, are available for the outcomes of the decision; and those that
apply when no such probabilities are available. In the epistemic case, we’ll
be more interested in the latter variety. But for the moment, let’s meet one
of the former variety, due to John Quiggin and Lara Buchak (Quiggin, 1982,
1993; Buchak, 2013).
We say the expected utility rule is risk-neutral because the weight it
assigns to each outcome is just the probability of that outcome. Buchak’s
risk-weighted expected utility rule allows us to use other weights for the
outcomes—in particular, it allows us to give greater weight to worse-case
scenarios and less weight to best-case scenarios than expected utility theory
allows. To see how it works, consider the following alternative way of
describing the expected utility of the offer that I make to you. As we usually
present expected utility, we take each of the two outcomes—the first where
the coin lands heads and you make a net gain of £70, the second where
the coin lands tails and you make a net loss of £30—we weight them by
the probabilities of these outcomes, and we add these weighted utilities
together to give the expected utility. That is:







But we might equally describe it as follows: we start with the worst-case
outcome—you make a net loss of £30—and weight its utility by the prob-
ability you’ll obtain at least that much utility, which is obviously 1; then
we take the amount of extra utility over and above that worst-case util-
ity you’d get from the second-worst case outcome—where you make a net
gain of £70—and weight that extra utility by the probability you’ll get that
as well, which is 12 in this case; then you add them up. In other words:




(u(Gain £70)− u(Lose £30))
Now, according to the risk-weighted expected utility rule, we do something
similar to the second calculation, but instead of weighting the extra utility
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you’ll gain from the second-worst outcome by the probability you’ll get
that extra utility, you weight it by some transformation of that probability.
This transformation is effected by your risk function r, which takes the prob-
abilities you’d use in the expected utility rule and returns the weightings
you’ll use in the risk-weighted expected utility rule. In particular:
Risk-weighted expected utility of accepting the offer =
u(Lose £30) + r(
1
2
)(u(Gain £70)− u(Lose £30))
We insist that:
(i) r(0) = 0 and r(1) = 1,
(ii) if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, then 0 ≤ r(p) ≤ 1, and
(iii) r is a strictly increasingly function, so that if 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1, then
0 ≤ r(p) < r(q) ≤ 1.
But otherwise we have a lot of freedom to define r. If r(p) < p for all
0 < p < 1, then we say that r is risk-averse throughout its range. That’s
because it gives less weight to the better case scenario than expected utility
theory does—in our case, it gives r( 12 ) <
1
2 . If r(p) > p for all 0 < p < 1,
then we say that r is risk-inclined throughout its range. That’s because it
gives more weight to the better case scenario than expected utility theory
does—in our case, it gives r( 12 ) >
1
2 . And of course, if r(p) = p for all
0 < p < 1, then risk-weighted expected utility is just expected utility.
Now, suppose your utility is linear in money. So your utility for an
outcome in which your total wealth is £n is n. And suppose your current
wealth is £40. Then the risk-weighted expected utility of accepting the offer
is:
Risk-weighted expected utility of accepting the offer =
u(Lose £30) + r(
1
2





And the risk-weighted expected utility of declining the offer is just 40, since
choosing that will guarantee your current wealth level of £40, and so the
worst-case scenario and the second-worst-case scenario are the same and
you receive £40 in each. So risk-weighted expected utility will demand that










you should decline my offer.
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Figure 5: Three risk functions: r1 is risk-inclined, r2 is risk-neutral, and r3 is
risk-averse.
Upon first meeting the risk-weighted expected utility rule, you might
wonder why we go to the bother of creating a whole new decision rule,
when we have seen that we can instead encode our attitudes to risk in our
utility function. The reason is that there are certain combinations of choices
we might make that seem perfectly reasonable, but which cannot be ratio-
nalised using Bernoulli’s trick of picking an appropriate utility function.
The classic example was first described by Maurice Allais (1953). He de-
scribed four lotteries, a, b, c, and d. Each has a million tickets. But the
payouts from the tickets are different in the four lotteries. He then asked
which you would choose if you were offered a random ticket from a or a
random ticket from b; and which you would choose if you were offered a
random ticket from c or a random ticket from d. He noted that it seems
reasonable to choose a over b, and d over c. But he also showed that there is
no utility function you can ascribe to an individual such that a has higher
expected utility than b and d has higher expected utility than c relative to
it. That is, for any utility function, if a has higher expected utility than b,
then c has higher expected utility than d. Here are the four lotteries:
Tickets a b c d
1-89 £1m £1m £0m £0m
90 £1m £0m £1m £0m
91-100 £1m £5m £1m £5m
Now, notice that a and b give the same outcome for the first eighty-nine
tickets; and so do c and d. So, according to expected utility theory, which
option you prefer out of a and b depends only on your attitudes to their
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different outcomes for the other eleven tickets; and similarly for c and d.
But, c has exactly the same outcomes for those remaining eleven tickets as
a, and d has exactly the same outcomes as b. So your expected utility for
a is greater than your expected utility for b iff your expected utility for c
is greater than your expected utility for d.15 The upshot: expected utility
theory cannot rationalise a preference for a over b and d over c.
For this reason, we must introduce risk-weighted expected utility, or
something similar. After all, if you choose a over b but d over c, this sug-
gests that you are risk-averse. The worst-case scenario of b—namely, £0m—
is worse than the worst-case scenario of a—namely, £1m. But this is not
true of d and c, which have the same worst-case scenario—namely, £0m.
And we can see that, even with a utility function that is linear in mone-
tary wealth, and even for someone with no initial wealth, risk-weighted
expected utility can rationalise this behaviour. For instance, let r(p) = p3.
Then here are the risk-weighted utilities of the four lotteries:
• a: 1× 1, 000, 000 = 1, 000, 000
• b:
(1× 0) + (r(0.99)× (1, 000, 000− 0))+
(r(0.1)× (5, 000, 000− 1, 000, 000)) = 974, 299
• c: (1× 0) + (r(0.11)× (1, 000, 000− 0)) = 1, 331
• d: (1× 0) + (r(0.1)× (5, 000, 000− 0)) = 5, 000
The risk-weighted expected utility of a exceeds that of b, and the risk-
weighted utility of d exceeds that of c, just as we wanted.
15In symbols, let u0, u1, u5 be your utilities for the outcomes £0m, £1m, £5m, respectively.
Then
Expected utility of a > Expected utility of b
iff
0.89u1 + 0.01u1 + 0.1u1 > 0.89u1 + 0.01u0 + 0.1u5
iff
0.01u1 + 0.1u1 > 0.01u0 + 0.1u5
iff
0.89u0 + 0.01u1 + 0.1u1 > 0.89u0 + 0.01u0 + 0.1u5
iff
Expected utility of c > Expected utility of d
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4.2 Risk-sensitive decision-making under uncertainty
So much for risk-sensitive decision rules that cover those cases when ob-
jective probabilities are available. While Allais’ preferences showed the ne-
cessity of developing such rules for those cases, risk-sensitive decision rules
had been developed a few years earlier for those cases in which the objec-
tive probabilities are not available. They came during a flurry of activity at
the Cowles Commission in Chicago at the end of the 1940s, and the work
was undertaken by a group of young researchers who would go on to make
great contributions in their respective fields: the mathematicians Abraham
Wald and John Milnor, and the economists Leonid Hurwicz and Kenneth
Arrow. From what I can tell, this group didn’t set out to investigate risk-
sensitive decision-making specifically. Rather, they were interested in how
we might choose in the absence of any evidence, and specifically in the
absence of any knowledge of the objective chances.
There are two species of decision rule that govern decision-making un-
der uncertainty: those that begin by setting endogenous probabilities—in
particular, credences—and then use those to choose between options; and
those that do not use probabilities at all. We’ll consider four of the first
species and three of the second. In the first group:
(i) subjective Bayesianism, which says that you may pick any probability
distribution and then maximise expected utility with respect to that;
(ii) risk-weighted subjective Bayesianism, which says that you may pick any
probability distribution and then maximise risk-weighted expected
utility with respect to that;
(iii) objective Bayesianism, which says that you should maximise expected
utility with respect to the uniform distribution;
(iv) risk-weighted objective Bayesianism, which says that you should max-
imise risk-weighted expected utility with respect to the uniform dis-
tribution.
And in the second group, which does not set endogenous probabilities,
we’ll consider:
(v) the Maximin rule, which says that you should pick the option whose
worst-case utility is highest;
(vi) the Hurwicz criterion, which says you should set a weighting for the
worst outcome and a weighting for the best outcome, and then you
should pick the option where the weighted average of the worst util-
ity and best utility is highest;
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(vii) the generalised Hurwicz Criterion, which says you should set weight-
ings for the worst, second-worst, . . . , second-best, and best outcomes,
and then you should pick the option where the weighted average of
the worst, second-worst, . . . , second-best, and best utilities is highest.
We are interested in these decision rules because they are designed to
cover exactly the sort of decision problem that epistemic utility theory takes
us to face when we set our prior credences. In that case, as in the cases
these are designed to cover, we have no evidence; and, a fortiori, we have
no access to the objective probabilities that govern the possible worlds over
which our options are defined.
Here’s the framework. The subject of our study is an individual facing
a decision problem. A decision problem consists of a series of available op-
tions between which the individual must choose. The options are specified
at a particular level of grain, which is determined by the set of possible
worlds that the individual uses. Each option is determined by the utility
that it assigns to each possible world in the individual’s set. A decision
rule takes the available options in a decision problem and divides them
into those that rationality permits and those that it does not permit. Each
of the decision rules we’ll describe works in the same way: it begins by as-
signing a numerical score to each option; these numerical scores determine
the individual’s preference ordering over the options, with one option pre-
ferred to another just in case the first one’s score is higher than the second
one’s; and then the decision rule says that an option in a decision problem
is irrational if there is another available option that is strictly preferred.
• Possible worlds LetW be the set of individual’s set of possible worlds.
At a minimum, these must be specified in enough detail that they fix
all the aspects of the outcomes of a choice that determine its utility
for our agent. For instance, if the agent is a pure hedonist egoist and
values only their own pleasure, each w in W would have to specify
exactly the amount of pleasure that they enjoy at that world. Or, in the
case of the doxastic decision problem that interests us, each w in W
would have to specify everything that determines the epistemic util-
ity of each credence function. Throughout, we’ll assume that the set
of possible worlds is finite. In particular, we’ll letW = {w1, . . . , wn}.
• Options Given a set of possible worlds W , an option is represented
by a function fromW into the real numbers. If a is an option andW
is a possible world inW , then a(w) is the utility of a atW .16
16We fix a single numerical scale on which the utility of all options are measured. As
Hurwicz himself notes, we can use the von Neumann-Morgenstern representation theorem
to determine the numerical utilities that our individual assigns to the outcome of an option
at a world (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). That is, we can appeal to our preferences
when we know the objective probabilities of the various outcomes to discover our utilities
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• Preferences Our individual has a preference ordering over options.
This is an ordering  on the set of options.
The preference ordering  is what is sometimes called the weak or
non-strict preference ordering. This distinguishes it from the strong
or strict preference ordering ≺. Given , we write a ≺ b if a  b but
b 6 a, and we write a ∼ b if a  b and b  a. We say that a and b are
comparable if a  b or b  a or both.
We are now ready to meet our decision rules. In fact, in many cases, we
meet a family of decision rules. Each member of the family corresponds
to a different choice of some further ingredient—sometimes a probability
function over the possible worlds; sometimes some other way of weighting
the utilities of the options at different worlds.
4.2.1 Subjective Bayesianism
Given an option a and a probability assignment 0 ≤ p1, . . . , pn ≤ 1 with
∑ni=1 pi = 1, which we denote P, define the expected utility of a relative to
P as follows:
ExpP(a) := p1a(w1) + . . . + pna(wn)
Subjective Bayesianism says that you should order options by their ex-
pected utility relative to a probability assignment of your choice. Thus,
given P,
a Psb a′ ⇔ ExpP(a) ≤ ExpP(a′)
And the corresponding decision rule says that you should pick a proba-
bility assignment P and then, having done that, it is irrational for you to
choose a if there is a′ such that a ≺Psb a′.
4.2.2 Objective Bayesianism
Let P† be the uniform distribution. That is,
P†(w1) = . . . = P†(wn) =
1
n
Objective Bayesianism says that you should order options by their expected
utility relative to the uniform distribution. Thus,
a ob a′ ⇔ ExpP
†
(a) ≤ ExpP†(a′)
in the outcomes, and then use those when we are choosing in the absence of information
about the objective probabilities.
In our representation theorems below, we’ll assume a rich set of options—every function
from the worlds to the reals will count as an option. However, we need not claim that they
are all available to the agent. Rather, the agent’s preferences are defined over all possibil-
ities, so that when a subset of these becomes available to them in a decision problem that
they face, they can appeal to their preference ordering to make their choice.
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And the corresponding decision rule says that it is irrational to choose a if
there is a′ such that a ≺ob a′. So we have our decision rule: a is irrational if





4.2.3 Risk-weighted subjective Bayesianism
Given an option a, a probability assignment 0 ≤ p1, . . . , pn ≤ 1 with ∑ni=1 pi =
1, and a risk function r : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], which is strictly increasing and con-
tinuous with r(0) = 0 and r(1) = 1, define the risk-weighted expected
utility of a relative to P and r as follows: if
a(wi1) ≤ a(wi2) ≤ . . . ≤ a(win)
then
RExpP,r(a) :=
a(wi1) + r(pi2 + . . . + pin)(a(wi2)− a(wi1))+
r(pi3 + . . . + pin)(a(wi3)− a(wi2)) + . . .+
r(pin−1 + pin)(a(win−1 − win−2))+
r(pin)(a(win)− a(win−1))
Risk-Weighted Subjective Bayesianism says that you order options by their
risk-weighted expected utility relative to a probability assignment and risk
function of your choice (Buchak, 2013). Thus, given P and r:
a P,rrs a′ ⇔ RExpP,r(a) ≤ RExpP,r(a′)
And the corresponding decision rule says that you should pick a proba-
bility assignment P and a risk function r and then, having done that, it is
irrational to choose a if there is a′ such that a ≺P,rrs a′.
4.2.4 Risk-Weighted Objective Bayesianism
Risk-Weighted Objective Bayesianism says that you should order options
by their risk-weighted expected utility relative to the uniform probability
assignment. Your preference ordering should be such that there is a risk
function r for which:
a rro a′ ⇔ a P
†,r
rs a
′ ⇔ RExpP†,r(a) ≤ RExpP†,r(a′)
That is, you should order options by their risk-weighted expected utility
score relative to the uniform distribution and a risk function of your choice.
And the corresponding decision rule says that you should pick a risk
function and that, having done that, it is irrational to choose a if there is a′
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such that a ≺ a′. So we have our decision rule: for someone with a risk
function r, a is irrational if there is a′ such that RExpP
†,r(a) ≤ RExpP†,r(a′).
This completes our presentation of the four accounts of preference or-
derings that take probabilities as one of their inputs. Next, we turn to those
accounts that do not.
4.2.5 Wald’s Maximin rule




That is, W(a) is the minimum utility that a receives; the utility it receives
at the world at which it receives lowest utility (Wald, 1945).
Maximin says that you should order options by their Wald score. Thus,
a mm a′ ⇔W(a) ≤W(a′)
And the corresponding decision rule says that it is irrational to choose a if
there is a′ such that a ≺mm a′.
The problem with Wald’s rule is that it demands an excess of caution.
It puts all of its weight on the worst case and thereby ignores the second-
worst case, the third-worst, etc., all the way up to the best case. For in-
stance, I might offer you two options, a and b. Their outcome depends on
which of two worlds we’re in: w1 and w2. You know nothing of the ob-
jective chance of these two worlds; you know nothing at all that bears on
which is actual. Here are the outcomes in utiles, the unit of utility, where ε
is a very very small finite quantity:
a1 b1
w1 1 1− ε
w2 1 + ε 1, 000
Wald’s Maximin requires you to choose a1, even though b1 looks at the very
least permissible.
Another problem is that, on its own, Maximin permits you to choose a
weakly dominated option. Consider, for instance a2 and b2:
a2 b2
w1 1 1
w2 1 + ε 1, 000
The options a and a′ have the same Wald score—namely, 1. So Wald’s rule
demands that our agent is indifferent between them—that is, a2 ∼ b2. And
so, in a decision between just those options, it permits both. But b2 is at
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least as good as a2 at all worlds, and better at some—that is, in the jargon
of decision theory, b2 weakly dominates a2. And surely it is irrational to
choose a weakly dominated option.
Now, we can save Wald’s decision rule from this objection by saying
that it merely gives a sufficient condition for irrationality: it says only that
an option is irrational if there is an alternative with a lower Wald score. It
does not say that this is the only route to irrationality. So we might combine
Wald’s decision rule with a rule that says that being weakly dominated
also suffices for irrationality. Thus, a is irrational if either (i) there is a′ with
a mm a′ or (ii) there is a′ that weakly dominates a or both (i) and (ii). But
this does not fix the first problem. Whether or not it is permissible to be as
risk-averse as Wald’s rule requires you to be, it is certainly not mandatory.
4.2.6 Hurwicz’s Criterion of Realism
Noting that Wald’s decision rule was too cautious and unreasonably ig-
nored outcomes other than the very worst, Hurwicz introduced an alter-
native that pays attention not only to the worst-case outcome but also to
the best-case outcome (Hurwicz, 1951, 1952). It asks you to score an op-
tion not by its worst-case utility alone, but by a weighted average of its
worst-case and the best-case utilities. That weighting, Hurwicz thought,
measured how optimistic or pessimistic you are—hence the name, ‘the cri-
terion of realism’. The optimist gives more weight to the best-case utility;
the pessimistic gives more to the worst-case. I think it’s more reasonable to
see this not as a reflection of pessimism or optimism, which seems to make
it an attitude about how the world is, but as a reflection of risk-sensitivity.
The more risk-averse you are, the more weight you’ll give to the worst-
case scenario; the more risk-inclined, the more weight you bestow upon
the best-case scenario.
Given an option a and a weight 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, define the Hurwicz score of a
relative to λ as follows:
Hλ(a) := λ max
w∈W
a(w) + (1− λ) min
w∈W
a(w)
That is, Hλ(a) is the weighted average of the minimum utility a receives
and the maximum utility it receives.
The Hurwicz Criterion says that you should order options by their Hur-
wicz score relative to a weighting λ of your choice. Thus, given λ,
a λhc a′ ⇔ Hλ(a) ≤ Hλ(a′)
And the corresponding decision rule says that you should pick your Hur-
wicz weight λ and then, having done that, it is irrational to choose a if there
is a′ such that a ≺λhc a′.
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The idea is that you specify your attitude to risk by specifying your
Hurwicz weight λ, and then the decision rule specifies what options are
irrational for you. The higher λ is, the more risk-inclined; the lower it is,
the more risk-averse.
First, let’s note that, for a huge range of weights, the Hurwicz Criterion
delivers the verdict we want in the cases above that Maximin got wrong.
Providing λ > ε999 , then
Hλ(a1) = (1 + ε)λ + (1− λ) < 1, 000λ + (1− ε)(1− λ) = Hλ(b1)
So, unless you’re extremely risk-averse, b1 is the rational choice, which
matches our intuitive verdict. Similarly, providing λ > 0, then
Hλ(a2) = (1 + ε)λ + (1− λ) < 1, 000λ + (1− λ) = Hλ(b2)
So, unless you are maximally risk-averse, b2 is the rational choice. Note, of
course, that this is because, when λ = 0, the Hurwicz score and the Wald
score coincide: H0(a) = W(a), for any option a.
However, analogous problems haunt Hurwicz’s Criterion. Consider
the following choice:
a3 b3
w1 1 1− ε
w2 1 + ε 1, 000− ε
w3 1, 000 + ε 1, 000
Then, for any weighting, the Hurwicz score of a3 is higher than the Hur-
wicz score of b3. And yet, as before, it seems that b3 is at least rationally
permissible. Also, consider the following choice:
a4 b4
w1 1 1
w2 1 + ε 1, 000− ε
w3 1, 000 1, 000
Then b4 weakly dominates a4, but their Hurwicz scores are the same, and so
in a decision between only the two of them, both are rationally permitted.
Though note that, again, we can simply add to the decision rule that weakly
dominated options are irrational.
4.2.7 The generalised Hurwicz Criterion
Now, we noted above that the Hurwicz Criterion is essentially a weaken-
ing of the Maximin rule: that is, Maximin is a special case of the Hurwicz
Criterion, and so the latter permits anything that the former permits. The
natural reaction to the problems that we’ve identified with both rules is to
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move further in the same direction. This leads us to my generalisation of
the Hurwicz Criterion.
Suppose W = {w1, . . . , wn} is the set of possible worlds over which
our options are defined. Given an option a and a sequence of weights 0 ≤
λ1, . . . , λn ≤ 1 with ∑ni=1 λi = 1, which we denote Λ, define the generalised
Hurwicz score of a relative to Λ as follows: if
a(wi1) ≥ a(wi2) ≥ . . . ≥ a(win)
then
HΛ(a) := λ1a(wi1) + . . . + λna(win)
That is, HΛ(a) is the weighted average of all the possible utilities that a re-
ceives, where λ1 weights the highest utility, λ2 weights the second-highest,
and so on.17 The generalised Hurwicz Criterion says that you should or-
der options by their generalised Hurwicz score relative to a sequence Λ of
weightings of your choice. Thus, given Λ,
a Λghc a′ ⇔ HΛ(a) ≤ HΛ(a′)
And the corresponding decision rule says that you should pick your Hur-
wicz weights Λ and then, having done that, it is irrational to choose a if
there is a′ such that a ≺Λghc a′.
A more risk-averse agent will pick a sequence of weights λ1, λ2, . . . , λn
in which the early weights in the sequence, which weight the better cases,
are less than the later weights, which weight the worse cases; and a risk-
inclined agent will do the opposite. A risk-neutral agent will assign equal
weight to all cases.
Notice that GHC permits reasonable verdicts for the examples given
above: if λ2 > ε999−ε , then
HΛ(a3) = λ3 + λ2(1 + ε) + λ1(1000 + ε) <
λ3(1− ε) + λ2(1000− ε) + λ1(1000) = HΛ(b3)
And, if λ3 < 1, then
HΛ(a4) = λ3 + λ2(1 + ε) + λ1(1000) <
λ3 + λ2(1000− ε) + λ1(1000) = HΛ(b4)
17It is important to convince yourself that HΛ(a) is well-defined. After all, it’s possible
that
a(wi1 ) ≥ a(wi2 ) ≥ . . . ≥ a(win )
and
a(wi2 ) ≥ a(wi1 ) ≥ . . . ≥ a(win )
if a(wi1 ) = a(wi2 ). But then of course
λ1a(wi1 ) + λ2a(wi2 ) + . . . + λna(win ) = λ1a(wi2 ) + λ2a(wi1 ) + . . . + λna(win )
as required.
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And indeed, providing all weights are positive—that is, 0 < λ1, . . . , λn <
1—then if a′ weakly dominates a, then HΛ(a) < HΛ(a′).
4.3 Characterizing our rules
In this section, we build on John Milnor’s classic paper, ‘Games Against Na-
ture’, to characterise the seven families of decision rule we have described
(Milnor, 1954). That is, we will describe certain properties that a preference
orderings might or might not have; and then, for each of the families of
rules described, we’ll find a set of those properties and show that a pref-
erence ordering belongs to the family in question if, and only if, it has all
of the properties in this set. This will allow us to tell between the different
families of rules by considering the properties that distinguish them.
While we will present combinations of axioms that characterise each
of the families of decision rules presented above, our goal is to determine
the decision rule that we should apply to discover which prior credences
are rationally required. So, when we motivate certain axioms below, we
motivate them as requirements on whichever decision rule governs that
particular decision problem.
With this in mind, it is worth noting a theme that will run throughout:
it is a certain sort of motivation for restricting certain axioms in a particular
way. There are many accounts of when a family of decision rules permits
risk-sensitivity. Here is mine: to permit risk-sensitivity, a family of deci-
sion rules must permit you to take the utility of an option a at a worldW
to contribute differently to the evaluation of that option depending on the
position in the ordering of the worlds by utility obtained by a thatW occu-
pies. For instance, if a(w1) = 0, a(w2) = 8, and b(w1) = 24, b(w2) = 8, then
both obtain the same utility at world w2, but that is the best case for a and
the worst case for b, and so a risk-sensitive decision theory should permit
you to take the shared utility at w2 to contribute differently to the overall
evaluation of a and the overall evaluation of b. This will come up again
and again in what follows. If we follow William James in permitting many
different attitudes to epistemic risk, and we wish to encode those attitudes
in our decision rule, rather than our epistemic utilities, we must ensure that
our axioms don’t rule out permissible attitudes to risk.
To give our characterizations, we need some notation:
• We will sometimes denote an option by the n-tuple of its utility values
at the n different worlds. Thus, a = (a(w1), . . . , a(wn)).
• Given a real number u, we write u for the constant option that has
utility u at all worlds. That is, u = (u, . . . , u).18
18As mentioned above, we assume the set of options over which your preference ordering
is defined is very rich.
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• If a, a′ are options, then define a + a′ to be the option with (a +
a′)(w) = a(w) + a′(w), for all w inW . Thus,
a + a′ := (a(w1) + a′(w1), . . . , a(wn) + a′(wn))
• If a is an option and m, k are real numbers, then define ma + k to be
the option with (ma + k)(w) = m× a(w) + k, for all w inW . Thus,
ma + k := (ma(w1) + k, . . . , ma(wn) + k)
• We say that a and b order the worlds in the same way if a(wi) ≤ a(wj) iff
b(wi) ≤ b(wj) for all wi, wj inW .
• We say that a and b are comparable if a  b or b  a.
4.3.1 The axioms
We now present some axioms that govern preference orderings .
(A1) Reflexivity  is reflexive. That is, a  a, for all a.
(A2) Transitivity  is transitive. That is, if a  b and b  c, then a  c, for
all a, b, c.
These aren’t controversial in this context. I won’t say anything more about
them.
(A3) Weak Mixture Continuity If a ≺ b ≺ c, and a, b, c order the worlds
in the same way, then there is 0 < α < 1 such that αa + (1− α)c ∼ b.
(A3*) Strong Mixture Continuity If a ≺ b ≺ c, then there is 0 < α < 1 such
that αa + (1− α)c ∼ b.
These requirements are more controversial. A natural way to justify them
is assume to that I should set my preferences over the options by assigned
to each option a numerical score and to order them by their scores. (As we
noted above, this is an approach shared by all of the families of decision
rules listed above—expected utilities, risk-weighted and otherwise, subjec-
tive or objective; Wald scores; and Hurwicz scores, generalised or not.) We
then assume that this score is a continuous function of the options: that
is, for any option a, and for any maximum difference ε between scores,
there is some distance from a such that, providing an option b is within
that distance from a, the score of b is within ε of the score of a. And so, in
particular, the score of the mixtures αa + (1− α)c is a continuous function
of α. But, since the score of a lies below b and the score of c lies above, the
Intermediate Value Theorem tells us that there must be some 0 < α < 1 for
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which the score of αa + (1− α)c is the same as the score of b. And therefore
αa + (1− α)c ∼ b. To justify the weaker version of the condition, we need
only assume that the score is continuous on trajectories through options all
of which order the worlds in the same way.
I think this justification is on the right track. But it assumes too much.
We needn’t assume yet that we order options by assigning a numerical
score to each. Instead, we begin with α = 0 (that is, c) and move steadily
to α = 1 (that is, a), and we ask at each point whether you prefer the mix-
ture to b, prefer b to the mixture, are indifferent between them, or whether
they are incomparable. We can, I think, assume that they are comparable.
After all, a, b, and c are comparable, and it’s plausible that when three op-
tions are comparable, so is any one of them with any mixture of the other
two. But now suppose that there is no mixture αa + (1 − α)c for which
b ∼ αa + (1 − α)c. Then, at some point between α = 0 and α = 1, my
preferences just flip from preferring the mixture to preferring b; and they
do this without going through the intermediate stage in which they are in-
different between the two. What could precipitate this?
One suggestion is that, at that point, the way in which the mixture or-
ders the worlds changes. Consider, for instance, the two options a = (1, 2)
and c = (2, 1). Then, for α < 12 , the mixture αa + (1− α)c orders the worlds
strictly, with w1 above w2; then, at α = 12 , it takes them to be equal; and,
for α > 12 , it orders them strictly again, with w2 above w1. Perhaps, then,
for the risk-sensitive agent, who cares about best cases, second-best cases,
. . . , second-worst cases, and worst cases, we might expect a discontinuity
at α = 12 . We might expect preferences to flip at that point without pass-
ing through the intermediate stage. For this reason, I suspect that (A3)
is a more appropriate assumption for permissivists about risk, while the
stronger (A3*) is safe for others.
Note that this is the first time we appeal to our background Jamesian
assumption that risk-sensitivity is permissible in the epistemic realm. If we
think that is correct, we might wish to allow for the sort of discontinuity
described in the previous paragraph in cases in which the two options be-
tween which we’re taking mixtures order the worlds in a different way. So
we opt for (A3), not (A3*).
(A4) Weak Dominance
(i) If a(w) ≤ a′(w) for all w inW , then a  a′.
(ii) If a(w) < a′(w) for all w inW , then a ≺ a′.
Thus, for instance, by (ii),
(0, 0, . . . , 0, 0) ≺ (1, 1, . . . , 1, 1)
(A4*) Strong Dominance If
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(i) a(w) ≤ a′(w) for all w inW , and
(ii) a(w) < a′(w) for some w inW ,
then a ≺ a′.
Thus, for instance,
(0, 1, . . . , 1, 1) ≺ (1, 1, . . . , 1, 1)
The weak version of the dominance principle is uncontroversial; the strong
version is slightly more controversial. After all, even standard expected
decision theory sometimes allows you to violate the latter. If I assign zero
probability to world w, and if there are two options, a and a′, which have
the same utilities everywhere except at w, and a′ has greater utility than
a at w, then a′ weakly dominates a, but their subjective expected utility
is equal—the only place they differ is at w and that receives probability
weight 0.
However, even subjective Bayesians are keen to avoid this outcome in
cases in which you have no evidence. They typically impose the Regular-
ity Principle, which, in its most plausible form says that you should assign
positive probability to all worlds at which your evidence is true. Your prior
is your response to an absence of evidence, so your evidence at the point
when you are picking priors is true at every world. And so the Regularity
Principle secures a positive probability for each world, and maximising ex-
pected utility relative to such a prior will always satisfy Strong Dominance.
(A5) Weak Linearity If m, k are real numbers, m > 0, and a ∼ a′, then
ma + k ∼ ma′ + k.
(A5*) Strong Linearity If m, k are real numbers and a ∼ a′, then ma + k ∼
ma′ + k.
(A6) Weak Summation If a, a′, b, and b′ order the worlds in the same way,
and a ∼ a′ and b ∼ b′, then a + a′ ∼ b + b′.
(A6*) Strong Summation If a ∼ a′ and b ∼ b′, then a + a′ ∼ b + b′.
As with the Mixture Continuity axioms, the risk-sensitive decision-maker
will want to opt for the weaker versions of these requirements. After all,
they might easily be indifferent between a = (1, 8) and a′ = (2, 2), be-
cause they are a little risk-averse and focus on the low worst case of a
rather than the high best case, but then would not be indifferent between
−a = (−1,−8) and −a′ = (−2,−2), since the worst case of −a is much
lower than the guaranteed payout of −a′. So they should opt for Weak
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Linearity. And we can find similar examples to motivate not going be-
yond Weak Summation for the risk-sensitive. For instance, here is an ex-
ample that shows that the Hurwicz Criterion violates Strong Summation:
Let λ = 14 . And let


















































(−6) = H 14 (b + b′)
so a ≺ a′ and b ≺ b′, but a + a′  b + b′. We will see another case when we
come to apply these principles to the choice of credences below.
(A7) Permutation Indifference If π : W ∼= W is a permutation of the
worlds inW and if a′(w) = a(π(w)) for all w inW , then a ∼ a′.
Thus, for instance,
(u1, u2, u3) ∼ (u1, u3, u2) ∼ (u2, u1, u3) ∼
(u2, u3, u1) ∼ (u3, u1, u2) ∼ (u3, u2, u1)
This says that it doesn’t matter to which particular worlds an option assigns
its utilities. What matters is which utilities it assigns. So, if you take one
option and obtain another by assigning the same utilities but to different
worlds, you should be indifferent between the two. For me, this is the least
controversial of the axioms when our decision rule is intended to govern
us in the absence of evidence and the absence of probabilities.
Of course, it is precisely such considerations that objective Bayesians
often adduce to argue for the Principle of Indifference, which says that
your prior credence function should be the uniform distribution—it’s the
only probabilistic credence function for which maximising expected util-
ity will satisfy Permutation Indifference. And of course this gives us im-
permissivism about credences. But interestingly, as we will see, if we do
not assume expected utility theory from the start, we will end up with a
much less restrictive decision theory, and one that is equipped to deliver
permissivism. This seems to me an important point: symmetry principles
like Permutation Indifference have been a battleground between subjective
and objective Bayesians for many years, and indeed between other sorts of
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permissivist and impermissivist. As we will see, the permissivist can and
indeed should accept Permutation Indifference—though only for this first
crucial decision where she picks her priors.
We now come to the condition that is rather different from what has
gone before. Our other conditions talk only of the individual’s preference
ordering over the options defined on the their setW of possible worlds. But
to state this condition, we need to talk not only of that preference ordering,
but also their preference ordering over certain options defined on coarse-
grainings ofW .
So, first question: what is a coarse-graining ofW? Here’s an example:
Suppose my set of possible worlds isW = {w1, w2, w3}, where Biden wins
the election in w1, Trump in w2, and Jorgensen in w3. Then one coarse-
graining of that set would be W ′ = {w′1, w′2}, where Biden wins in w′1,
and Biden loses in w′2. We represent a coarse-graining of W as a set W ′
and a surjective (or onto) function h : W → W ′.19 The idea is that each
possible world w in W is a version of the coarser-grained possible world
h(w) inW ′, but specified at a finer grain of detail. Thus, in the case of the
presidential candidates above, we represent this coarse-graining by the set
W ′ = {w′1, w′2} and the function h, where h(w1) = w1 and h(w2) = h(w3) =
w′2. w2 is a version of h(w2) = w
′
2, but specified at a finer grain of detail: w2
specifies not only that Biden loses, but also that Trump wins.
Now, some options defined on W are also well defined on a coarse-
grainingW ′ ofW . Suppose that, for all w1, w2 inW , if h(w1) = h(w2), then
a(w1) = a(w2). Then we can define an option a′ onW ′ as follows: for w in
W , a′(h(w)) = a(w). We call a′ a coarse-graining of a. The following condi-
tion demands that your preference ordering ∼ over the options defined on
W is related to your preference ordering∼′ over the coarse-grained options
defined onW ′ in a particular way.
(A8) Coarse Grain Indifference SupposeW ′ together with h :W →W ′ is
a coarse-graining ofW . Suppose option a′ defined onW ′ is a coarse-
graining of option a defined on W ; and suppose option b′ defined
onW ′ is a coarse-graining of option b defined onW . Then a ∼ b iff
a′ ∼′ b′.
For instance, supposeW = {w1, w2, w3},W ′ = {w′1, w′2}, and h(w1) =
w′1 and h(w2) = h(w3) = w
′
2. Then (u, v, v) ∼ (v, u, u) iff (u, v) ∼′
(v, u).
This axiom requires that you are not only indifferent to the worlds to which
the utilities are assigned, but also to the grain at which the possibilities
are represented in the worlds. Suppose, for instance, we consider three
19h is surjective (or onto) if, for all w′ inW ′, there is w inW such that h(w) = w′. That is,
W ′ is the range of h.
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possible worlds: one in which Joe wins the election (w1), one in which Jo
does (w2), and one in which Donald does (w3). I consider two options:
a = (10, 2, 2) and b = (2, 10, 10). Now, I notice that I might have faced
these options even if I’d grained the possibilities more coarsely. Suppose
that my set of possible worlds is notW = {w1, w2, w3}, butW ′ = {w′1, w′2}
with h(w1) = w′1 and h(w2) = h(w3) = w
′
2, so that w
′
1 is the possibility in
which Joe wins, and w′2 is the possibility in which Joe loses. Then, relative
to that coarse-graining, I face the choice a′ = (10, 2) and b′ = (2, 10). These
are just the coarse-grained versions of a and b. So, I should be indifferent
between a and b iff I am indifferent between a′ and b′.
I do not assume these axiom, and indeed I think it’s not a requirement
of rationality. I’ll explain why below.
(A9) Convexity If a ∼ b, then a, b  12 a +
1
2 b
Thus, for instance, if (u, v) ∼ (u′, v′), then










This is very much a requirement that only a risk-averse individual would
accept. Mixtures of options are more cautious than the options they mix; so
many risk-inclined individuals will prefer two options between which they
are indifferent to any mixture of those options, and in particular the equal
mixture of them. To see this in action, consider the Hurwicz Criterion.
Suppose there are just two worlds: that is, W = {w1, w2}. And suppose
the Hurwicz weight λ is greater than 12 , so that it represents a risk-inclined
agent who assigns greater weight to the best case than to the worst case.
Now suppose u > v. Then






























Again, I do not accept this as a requirement of rationality, so I will say
nothing more to motivate it.
4.3.2 The representation theorems
This completes our tour through some of the many requirements we might
place on our preference ordering. We can now move to our characterization
results, which borrow heavily from John Milnor’s classic paper, ‘Games
against Nature’ (Milnor, 1954).20 We state these in the following pair of
20Note that these characterization results are a little different from the representation the-
orems we often find in decision theory. Those representation theorems seek to extract from
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tables. Down the left of each, we have various decision theories: SB is sub-
jective Bayesianism, OB is objective Bayesianism, and so on. Along the top
we have various requirements. In the first table, these requirements are im-
posed only on the preferences that order the options defined onW . In the
second, they are imposed on , but also on any preferences ′ that order
the coarse-grained options defined on a coarse-grainingW ′ together with
h : W → W ′. The core principles are: Reflexivity, Transitivity, Weak Mix-
ture Continuity, Weak Dominance, Weak Linearity, and Weak Summation.
All of our decision theories require those. We then distinguish between our
various decision theories by adding further requirements: Strong Linearity,
Permutation Invariance, Grain Invariance, and Convexity. Given a decision
theory, we specify the axioms required to characterise it with X. We put ◦
if an axiom is compatible with a decision theory, though not required to
characterise it, and sometimes we say what further conditions that axiom
places on the decision theory. We put × if an axiom is incompatible with
the decision theory. And we put ? if we just don’t know!
Theorem 5
(I) Imposing conditions on  only:
A1-6 A4* A5* A7 A8 A9
(i) SB X pi > 0 X pi = 1n ◦ ◦
(ii) OB X ◦ X X ◦ ◦
(iii) RSB X pi > 0 r(x) = x pi = 1n ? ?
(iv) ROB X ◦ r(x) = x X × ?
(vii) GHC X λi > 0 λi = 1n X × ?
(II) Imposing conditions on , as well as ′, for any coarse-graining W ′ to-
gether with h :W →W ′:
A1-6 A4* A5* A7 A8 A9
(v) MM X × × X X X
(vi) HC X × λ = 12 X X ◦
I hope I have gone some way towards motivating the core principles
A1-6 above. And I hope I’ve convinced you that someone who is permis-
sivist about attitudes to risk should be wary of Strong Summation (A5*),
and the permissivist about risk who wishes to permit risk-inclined attitudes
preference orderings not only credences or risk weights, but also the utilities themselves. In
our characterization, we follow Hurwicz and Milnor in assuming that the cardinal utilities
are given already. This is appropriate in our case, since we are interested in the doxastic
case, where the epistemic utilities are already specified by the various scoring rules.
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as well as risk-averse attitudes should be wary of Convexity (A9). I wish to
combine (A1-6) with Permutation Indifference (A7) to give the generalised
Hurwicz Criterion. But this raises the question: why not go further and
adopt Coarse Grain Indifference (A8) as well? That would give the original
Hurwicz criterion. After all, both seem compelling principles for an indi-
vidual at the beginning of their epistemic life, who has no probabilities to
guide them. The first says that, for such an individual, it shouldn’t matter
which utilities are assigned to which worlds, but only which utilities are
assigned and to how many worlds; the second says that, for such an indi-
vidual, it should matter the level of grain at which a decision is presented.
The problem is that Coarse Grain Indifference (A8) is inconsistent with
Permutation Indifference (A7) and Strong Dominance (A4*). The problem
is easily seen. Consider two options (u, u, v) and (u, v, v), where u > v.
Then, by Permutation Indifference for ∼, (u, u, v) ∼ (v, u, u). By Coarse
Grain Indifference (v, u, u) ∼ (u, v, v) iff (v, u) ∼′ (u, v). By Permutation
Indifference for ∼′, (v, u) ∼′ (u, v). So (u, v, v) ∼ (v, u, u) ∼ (u, u, v). But
(u, u, v) weakly dominates (u, v, v). So, by Strong Dominance, (u, v, v) ≺
(u, u, v). And we have a contradiction. I think this is an interesting re-
sult.21 All three conditions—Strong Dominance, Permutation Indifference,
and Coarse Grain Indifference—seem extremely plausible, and indeed fun-
damental, in the absence of evidence. And this is one of the times where, as
I mentioned in the Introduction, we sail close to inconsistency. Here, I side
with Strong Dominance and Permutation Indifference, and I reject Coarse
Grain Indifference. Given the inconsistency, and the resulting forced choice
between them, I think this is the right pair to back. Strong Dominance
should be endorsed by anyone, at least for individuals who lack any evi-
dence at all. And the permissivist about risk attitudes should endorse Per-
mutation Indifference instead of Coarse Grain Indifference. A risk-sensitive
agent might easily treat (u, v, v) and (u, v) differently. In the former, there
is a best case, a second-best case, and a worst case; in the latter only a best
and a worst. It seems reasonable that this might make a difference. On the
other hand, there can be no justification for treating (u1, u2, u3) differently
from (u1, u3, u2) in the absence of evidence.
Together with the core principles, Permutation Indifference delivers GHC.
Adding Strong Dominance adds the requirement that each Hurwicz weight
is positive. It is that decision rule whose consequences I will explore in the
epistemic realm in the remainder of this book.
21After I posted a blogpost discussing it in 2020, Johan Gustafsson sent me an unpub-
lished paper of his in which he notes the same fact (Gustafsson, ms).
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4.4 Appendix: proofs
4.4.1 A useful lemma
We begin with a lemma that can be proved using only the axioms in the
core, namely, Reflexivity, Transitivity, Weak Mixture Continuity, and Weak
Dominance (i.e. A1-4).
Lemma 6 If  satisfies (A1-4), then, for any option a, there is a real number β
such that
β = (β, . . . , β) ∼ a
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose  satisfies Continuity and Weak Dominance.
And suppose that, for all worlds wi, u ≤ a(wi) ≤ v. By Weak Dominance,
u  a  v
So, by Weak Mixture Continuity, there is α such that
αu + (1− α)v ∼ a
But
αu + (1− α)v = αu + (1− α)v
So let β = αu + (1− α)v. Then β ∼ a, as required. 2
In the coming sections, we prove Theorem 5. We will provide our proofs
specifically for the case in which there are three worlds. It is easy to gen-
eralise from these proofs, but we avoid tendrils of sub- and superscripts
by doing so. Throughout, we appeal to Lemma 6 to define the following
numbers:
(1, 0, 0) ∼ β1 (1, 1, 0) ∼ β4
(0, 1, 0) ∼ β2 (0, 1, 1) ∼ β5
(0, 0, 1) ∼ β3 (1, 0, 1) ∼ β6
Note that, by Weak Dominance,
0 ≤ β1 ≤ β4, β6 ≤ 1
0 ≤ β2 ≤ β4, β5 ≤ 1
0 ≤ β3 ≤ β5, β6 ≤ 1
4.4.2 Proof of Theorem 5(i): characterizing subjective Bayesianism
Define the probability assignment P onW as follows:
p1 = β1
p2 = β4 − β1
p3 = 1− β4
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Then 0 ≤ p1, p2, p3 ≤ 1 and
p1 + p2 + p3 = β1 + (β4 − β1) + (1− β4) = 1
Then suppose a = (u1, u2, u3). By Strong Linearity (A5*),
(β1(u1 − u2), β1(u1 − u2), β1(u1 − u2)) ∼ (u1 − u2, 0, 0)
(β4(u2 − u3), β4(u2 − u3), β4(u2 − u3)) ∼ (u2 − u3, u2 − u3, 0)
(u3, u3, u3) ∼ (u3, u3, u3)
Now,
β1(u1 − u2) + β4(u2 − u3) + u3 = p1u1 + p2u2 + p3u3 = ExpP(a)
and
(u1 − u2) + (u2 − u3) + u3 = u1
and
(u2 − u3) + u3 = u2













∼ (u1, u2, u3)
So, if ExpP(a) = ∑i piui = ∑i pivi = Exp
P(b), then by Transitivity (A2)




pivi ∼ (v1, v2, v3) = b
What’s more, if ExpP(a) = ∑i piui < ∑i pivi = Exp
P(b), then by Weak
Dominance (A4) and Transitivity (A2),




pivi ∼ (v1, v2, v3)
Thus, a  b iff ExpP(a)  ExpP(b), as required. 2
4.4.3 Proof of Theorem 5(ii): characterizing objective Bayesianism
By Theorem 5(i), there is a probability assignment P such that a  b iff
∑i pia(wi)  ∑i pib(wi). By Permutation Indifference (A7), p1 = p2 = p3,
as required. 2
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4.4.4 Proof of Theorem 5(iii): characterizing subjective risk-weighted
Bayesianism
Let
r(p1) = β1 r(p1 + p2) = β4
r(p2) = β2 r(p2 + p3) = β5
r(p3) = β3 r(p1 + p3) = β6
Then suppose a = (u1, u2, u3). And suppose that u1 ≥ u2 ≥ u3. Then, by
Weak Linearity (A5),
(β1(u1 − u2), β1(u1 − u2), β1(u1 − u2)) ∼ (u1 − u2, 0, 0)
(β4(u2 − u3), β4(u2 − u3), β4(u2 − u3)) ∼ (u2 − u3, u2 − u3, 0)
(u3, u3, u3) ∼ (u3, u3, u3)
Now,
β1(u1 − u2) + β4(u2 − u3) + u3 =
r(p1)(u1 − u2) + r(p1 + p2)(u2 − u3) + u3 = RExpP,r(a)
and
(u1 − u2) + (u2 − u3) + u3 = u1
and
(u2 − u3) + u3 = u2
So, by Weak Summation (A6),
RExpP,r(a) ∼ (u1, u2, u3)
So, if RExpP,r(a) = RExpP,r(b), then, by Transitivity (A2), a ∼ b. What’s
more, if RExpP,r(a) < RExpP,r(b), then by Weak Dominance (A4) and Tran-
sitivity (A2), a ≺ b. Thus, a  b iff RExpP,r(a) ≤ RExpP,r(b), as required.
2
4.4.5 Proof of Theorem 5(iv): characterizing objective risk-weighted Bayesian-
ism
By Theorem 5(iii), there is a probability assignment P and a risk function r
such that a  b iff RExpP,r(a) ≤ RExpP,r(b). By Permutation Indifference
(A7), p1 = p2 = p3, as required. 2
4.4.6 Proof of Theorem 5(vi): characterizing the Hurwicz Criterion
Let λ = β1. So
(λ, λ, λ) ∼ (1, 0, 0)
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Now, for any u < v, by Weak Linearity (A5), with m = v− u > 0 and k = u,
(u + λ(v− u), u + λ(v− u), u + λ(v− u)) ∼ ((v− u) + u, u, u)
So
(λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u) ∼ (v, u, u)
By Permutation Indifference (A7) and Coarse Grain Indifference (A8),
(v, u, u) ∼ (u, v, v) ∼ (v, v, u)
Thus, by Transitivity (A2),
(λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u) ∼ (u, v, v)
Now, suppose v = u1 ≥ u2 ≥ u3 = u. Then, by Weak Dominance (A4),
(u1, u2, u3)  (v, v, u) ∼ (λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u)
And, again by Weak Dominance (A4),
(λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u) ∼ (u, u, v)  (u1, u2, u3)
So, by Transitivity (A2),
(u1, u2, u3) ∼ (λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u, λv + (1− λ)u) = Hλ(a)
Thus, a  b iff Hλ(a) ≤ Hλ(b). 2
4.4.7 Proof of Theorem 5(v): characterizing Minimax
By Theorem 5(vi), there is 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 such that a  b iff Hλ(a) ≤ Hλ(b).
Then, note that, by Permutation Indifference,
(0, 0, 1) ∼ (0, 1, 0)
So, by Convexity (A8),







• Hλ((0, 0, 1)) = λ





So Hλ((0, 0, 1)) ≤ Hλ((0, 12 ,
1
2 )) only if λ = 0. But H
0(a) = W(a), so a  b
iffW(a) ≤W(b), as required. 2
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λ2 = β4 − β1
λ3 = 1− (β4 − β1)− β1 = 1− β4
Then 0 ≤ λ1, λ2, λ3 ≤ 1 and λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = 1. Also,
(λ1, λ1, λ1) ∼ (1, 0, 0)
(λ1 + λ2, λ1 + λ2, λ1 + λ2) ∼ (1, 1, 0)
(λ1 + λ2 + λ3, λ1 + λ2 + λ3, λ1 + λ2 + λ3) ∼ (1, 1, 1)
Now, suppose u1 ≥ u2 ≥ u3, and consider the option a = (u1, u2, u3). Then,
by Weak Linearity (A5):
• (λ1(u1 − u2), λ1(u1 − u2), λ1(u1 − u2)) ∼ (u1 − u2, 0, 0)
• ((λ1 + λ2)(u2 − u3), (λ1 + λ2)(u2 − u3), (λ1 + λ2)(u2 − u3)) ∼ (u2 −
u3, u2 − u3, 0)
• ((λ1 + λ2 + λ3)u3, (λ1 + λ2 + λ3)u3, (λ1 + λ2 + λ3)u3) ∼ (u3, u3, u3)












∼ (u1, u2, u3)
So, a  b iff HΛ(a) ≤ HΛ(b), as required.
Now, suppose Strong Dominance (A4*). And suppose λk = 0. Then
define options a and b as follows:
w1 . . . wk−1 wk wk+1 . . . wn
a 1 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 0
b 1 . . . 1 1 0 . . . 0
Then, by Strong Dominance, a ≺ b. But
HΛ(a) = λ11 + . . . + λk−11 + λk0 + λk+10 + . . . + λn0 =
λ1 + . . . + λk−1
and
HΛ(b) = λ11 + . . . + λk−11 + λk1 + λk+10 + . . . + λn0 =
λ1 + . . . + λk−1 + λk = λ1 + . . . + λk−1
So HΛ(a) = HΛ(b). And thus a ∼ b. This gives a contradiction. So, if we
assume Strong Dominance, we must have 0 < λ1, . . . , λn < 1. 2
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In brief...
In this chapter, we argued in favour of the family of decision rules
that we will apply to the choice of prior credences in what follows.
The family is called the generalised Hurwicz Criterion (GHC). Each de-
cision rule within the family is specified by a set of generalised Hur-
wicz weights. Each weight is a number. The first weight is the one
we will apply to the best-case utility of an option to determine its
contribution to the overall value of that option; the second weight
is the one we will apply to the second-best case utility to determine
its contribution; and so on down to the second-last weight, which is
the one we will apply to the second-worst case utility, and the last
weight, which we apply to the worst-case utility. We measure the
value of each option by its generalised Hurwicz score, which we calcu-
late as follows: we line up the possible utilities that the option might
obtain for us, from best to worst. And then we apply the appropri-
ate weights to each of these utilities—our first generalised Hurwicz
weight to the best utility, second weight to the second-best utility,
and so on. And then we add up the weighted utilities. We then pre-
fer one option to another just in case the generalised Hurwicz score
of the first exceeds the generalised Hurwicz score of the second. And
we say that an option is irrational if there is some alternative that we
strictly prefer. The result is that the rationally permissible options
relative to this decision rule are precisely those that maximise this
generalised Hurwicz score.
We might understand GHC by contrasting it with a more familiar
family of decision rules, namely, the family of standard expected
utility rules. According to the rules in both families, the utility of
an option at a world receives a particular weighting, and you score
an option by applying the appropriate weightings and adding up the
weighted utilities. But they differ in the way in which the weights
are assigned. In expected utility, each world receives a weight and
that weight is applied to the utility of the option at that world. In
GHC, in contrast, a weight does not attach to a specific world, but to
a position in the ranking of worlds from best to worst. That weight
is then applied to the utility of the option at the world that occupies
that place in the ranking of worlds by the utilities that the option
obtains at those worlds.
These generalised Hurwicz weights are best understood as our atti-
tudes to risk. The more risk-inclined you are, the more weight you
will concentrate in the earlier generalised Hurwicz weights, since
these weight the better cases; the more risk-averse, the more weight
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you will concentrate in the latter generalised Hurwicz weights, since
these weight the worse cases. And if you’re risk-neutral, you’ll as-
sign equal generalised Hurwicz weights to each position in the rank-
ing of worlds.
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5 Epistemic risk and picking priors II: the consequences
of the rule
The upshot of Section 3.2 was that we cannot argue for permissivism about
credences in exactly the same way that Kelly argues for permissivism about
full beliefs. That is, while there are many permissible measures of epistemic
value for credences, just as there are for full beliefs, the credal epistemic
utility functions all agree on which credence maximises expected epistemic
value from the point of view of a specific evidential probability—it is that
very evidential probability itself. So, if we are to establish permissivism
by appealing to the notion of epistemic risk, we can’t do as Kelly does and
encode attitudes to epistemic risk in our measures of epistemic value. We
must instead encode them in our decision rules. That is, we must use one
of the decision rules discussed in Section 4.2. For the reasons given there,
when it is our prior credences that we are picking, we’ll use the generalised
Hurwicz Criterion.
So, when we pick our priors, we encode the way we value credences in
our epistemic value measure EU; and we encode our attitudes to risk in our
generalised Hurwicz weights, 0 ≤ λ1, . . . , λn ≤ 1; and then we pick a prior
that maximises the generalised Hurwicz score with these weights. That is,
the norm that governs our priors is this:
Rational Priors If EU is your epistemic utility function for cre-
dences functions, then rationality requires you to pick your gen-
eralised Hurwicz weights, 0 ≤ λ1, . . . , λn ≤ 1, which we’ll
take to encode your attitudes to epistemic risk, and then to pick
a prior C with maximal generalised Hurwicz score relative to
those weights and that epistemic utility function.22
That is, you are rationally permitted to pick C if, and only if, for
any credence function C′,
HΛ(EU(C)) ≥ HΛ(EU(C′))
where EU(C) is the option whose utility at world w is EU(C, w),
and similarly for EU(C′).
That is, you are rationally permitted to pick C if, and only if, for
22I should perhaps emphasise that this description of how you should go about set-
ting your prior is not intended to be taken too literally. GHC doesn’t demand that you
go through the process described here. It simply says that your preference ordering over
credence functions should be representable by a generalised Hurwicz score. That is, there
should be generalised Hurwicz weights such that you prefer one credence function to an-
other just in case the generalised Hurwicz score of the first relative to those weights and
relative to your epistemic utility function is greater than the generalised Hurwicz score of
the second.
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any credence function C′, if
EU(C, wi1) ≥ . . . ≥ EU(C, win)
and
EU(C′, wj1) ≥ . . . ≥ EU(C
′, wjn)
Then
HΛ(EU(C)) = λ1EU(C, wi1) + . . . + λnEU(C, win) ≥
λ1EU(C′, wj1) + . . . + λnEU(C
′, wjn) = H
Λ(EU(C′))
5.1 Decomposing options into their component parts
In the next section, we’ll explore the consequences of this norm. But first,
we should note something about our decision to apply GHC to our choice
of prior credence function, rather than to our choice of individual prior
credences. As we’re about to see, this is a substantial choice.
Consider the simplest of individuals. They have credences in just two
possible worlds, w1 and w2. And they assign credences to w1 or w2 or
both. And suppose that their generalised Hurwicz weights are λ1 = 34
and λ2 = 14 .
23
Now, first of all, apply GHC with these weights to the choice of cre-
dence function. As always, we measure the epistemic value of a whole cre-
dence function using a strictly proper measure, EU, generated by a strictly









Next, apply GHC with these weights to the choice of individual cre-
dences when we measure the epistemic value of an individual credence
with the strictly proper scoring rule, s. There are two credences you might




4 )(s(−)). They are: 14 and
3
4 . And there are





they are: 14 and
3
4 . So, if we apply GHC when we pick our prior credence in
w1, it’s rationally permissible to assign it 14 ; and if we apply it when we pick
our prior in w2, it is again rationally permissible to assign 14 to that as well.
23Note that, since there are only two worlds in play, applying GHC with λ1 = 34 and
λ2 =
1




But of course this results in a credence function C′, which is both different
from C1 and C2 and also non-probabilistic:
w1 w2
C′ 1/4 1/4
This is a particular instance of the phenomenon we met above: GHC does
not obey the Strong Summation (A6*) axiom from above. Suppose I mea-
sure epistemic utility using what we sometimes call a 0/1 symmetric scoring
rule: that is, s(1, p) = s(0, 1− p), for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1—the quadratic score q
is an example of such a scoring rule. Then, if I assign 14 to w1 (and no cre-
dence to w2), that receives exactly the same generalised Hurwicz score as if
I assign 34 to w1 (and no credence to w2). And, obviously, if I assign
1
4 to w2
(and no credence to w1), that receives the same generalised Hurwicz score
as if I assign 14 to w2 (and no credence to w1). Yet, if I assign
1
4 to w1 and
1
4 to
w2, I do not receive the same generalised Hurwicz score as if I assign 34 to
w1 and 14 to w2—indeed, I receive a lower score.
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The upshot is that GHC is sensitive to whether an option is presented
to you all at once or in parts spread across different decision problems. If
there is a way to break options down into component parts, you might
hope that your decision rule does not make different demands depending
on whether you are faced with a choice between two whole options and a
choice between each of their component parts separately. It is well known
that risk-sensitive decision rules typically violate this requirement (Buchak,
2013, Chapters 6-7). It is also well known that this often leads them to be
exploitable in various ways. That is, they will permit you to choose a dom-
inated option when it and the alternatives are presented piecemeal.25 And
24The epistemic utility of assigning 14 to w1 and
1
4 to w2 is the same at the two worlds: it
is s(0, 14 ) + s(1,
1
4 ) = s(1,
3
4 ) + s(0,
3
4 ). So that is its generalised Hurwicz score.
The epistemic utility of assigning 34 to w1 and
1




4 ) at w1 and s(0,
3
4 )+
s(1, 14 ) at w2. Since, s(1,
3
4 ) + s(0,
1
4 ) > s(0,
3
4 ) + s(1,
1
4 ), its generalised Hurwicz score is:
3
4
(s(1, 3/4) + s(0, 1/4)) +
1
4
(s(0, 3/4) + s(1, 1/4))
Since s is strictly proper,
3
4
(s(1, 3/4) + s(0, 1/4)) +
1
4



































s(0, 1/4) + s(1, 1/4) = s(1, 3/4) + s(0, 3/4)
25Indeed, unless your generalised Hurwicz weights are all the same—in which case GHC
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indeed that’s exactly what happens in the case I have just presented. As-
signing credence 14 to w1 and credence
1
4 to world w2 is permissible if your
choice of credence for each world is presented separately. But, since this
option is non-probabilistic, we know that it is dominated. And indeed, for
Maximin, the Hurwicz Criterion, and the generalised Hurwicz Criterion,
there are dominated options that are not only permissible when presented






And suppose you’re first presented with the choice between a and c, and
then with the choice between b and c. Maximin will lead you to choose c
both times. But c + c is dominated by a + b. What’s more, the Hurwicz
criterion with λ < 38 will lead to the same choices; and similarly for the
generalised Hurwicz Criterion with λ1 < 38 .
One way to avoid this issue is to strengthen our axioms above by impos-
ing Strong Summation (axiom A6*) instead of merely Weak Summation (ax-
iom A6). Along with the other axioms for which we argued in that section,
this would give us objective Bayesianism and, with it, impermissivism. But
to do so would be to say that different attitudes to risk are not permissible.
After all, objective Bayesianism does not permit them. Perhaps that’s the
coincides with objective Bayesianism—there will always be a sequence of decision prob-
lems such that applying GHC with your weights when faced with each requires you to
choose a sequence of options that is dominated by an alternative sequence. After all, sup-
pose λ1, . . . , λn is a sequence of Hurwicz weights, with ∑ni=1 λi = 1. And suppose that, for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, λi 6= 1n . Then either
(a) there is a sequence of utilities u1 ≥ u2 ≥ . . . ≥ un and a utility v such that
(i) λ1u1 + . . . + λnun > v and
(ii) u1+...+unn < v
or
(b) there is a sequence of utilities u1 ≥ u2 ≥ . . . ≥ un and a utility v such that
(iii) λ1u1 + . . . + λnun < v and
(iv) u1+...+unn > v
Suppose (a). Then, for any permutation π of the worlds w1, . . . , wn, consider the following
options: uπ = (uπ(1), . . . , uπ(n)) and v = (v, . . . , v). By (i), GHC requires you to choose uπ
over v. Now suppose that you face n! decision problems, one for each permutation π. In
the decision problem corresponding to permutation π, the options are uπ and v. In each,
GHC requires you to choose uπ . Then the total utility of your sequence of choices at each
world is (n− 1)!(u1 + . . . + un). But the total utility of instead choosing v in each case is
n!v at each world. But, by (ii), n!v > (n− 1)!(u1 + . . . + un). Thus, the sequence of choices
that GHC requires you to make is dominated. And similarly, mutatis mutandis, for (b).
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correct conclusion to draw. After all, being permissive about attitudes to
risk has led us to a decision theory that permits sequences of choices that,
taken together, are dominated by alternative sequences of choices.
There is, I think, an alternative way out. The problem that we have iden-
tified arises if you use the GHC for more than one decision. Since GHC it-
self satisfies Weak Dominance—and also satisfies Strong Dominance, if the
weights are all positive—then if you only ever apply the rule to a single
decision, it will never permit you to choose a dominated option. And this,
I suggest, is exactly what we should do. We use GHC to pick our whole
credence function at the beginning of our epistemic life. That’s it. That’s
the single decision we make using that rule. Thereafter, we are armed with
probabilities, namely, our credences, and so another rule is appropriate.
And, for that initial decision, we choose our whole credence function at
once, for only by doing that do we guarantee that we won’t pick a domi-
nated option.
I think it’s helpful to see the situation in the same way we saw the
conflict between Permutation Indifference, Coarse Grain Indifference, and
Strong Dominance above. Each of those three principles is compelling and
desirable. But they are incompatible; they form an inconsistent triad. And
so we opted for Permutation Indifference and Strong Dominance, since
they are most central to the permissivism about attitudes to risk that is
most central here. Similarly, we’d like our decision theories not to permit
us to choose a dominated sequence of options in response to a sequence of
decision problems; and we’d like to use our decision theory whenever we
face a decision problem. But, we discovered here, these two properties are
not compatible with being permissive about our attitudes to risk: there are
sequences of decision problems such that, if we were to approach each with
GHC, we would be permitted to choose a dominated sequence of options.
Again, we face an inconsistent triad—and again we see what I anticipated
in the Introduction, namely, that it is difficult to formulate a fully satisfac-
tory theory that is permissive about epistemic risk in the way that James
would like; inconsistency or impermissivism always threatens. Again, we
pick the two that allow us to retain permissivism about attitudes to risk.
That is, we retain GHC and the principle that we should not be permitted
to choose a sequence of dominated options. This forces us to specify just
one decision to which we apply GHC. It is our choice of prior.
5.2 The credal consequences of the rules
We are now finally at the point where we can say which priors rationality
requires you to pick. We have spelled out the norm that governs this choice:
it is Rational Priors. All that remains is to investigate its consequences. I’d
like to begin by looking at the case in which our priors will be defined on
just three possible worlds w1, w2, w3. Things get complicated pretty fast as
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we increase the number of worlds, and there will be plenty of interest in
this simple case. What’s more, this is the easiest case to visualise. But we
will return to the general case at the end of the next section.
We assume that our measure EU of epistemic value is generated by a
scoring rule in the way outlined above. That is, there is s such that
EU(C, w) = ∑
X∈F
s(w(X), C(X))
And we assume that EU and s are strictly proper. Given a probabilistic
credence function C defined on w1, w2, w3, we will write c1 for C(w1), c2
for C(w2), and c3 for C(w3), and we will sometimes denote C by the triple
(c1, c2, c3).
5.2.1 The credal consequences of the other rules
Before we turn to GHC and Rational Priors, let’s see first what subjective
and objective Bayesianism, Maximin, and the original Hurwicz criterion
demand.
For subjective Bayesianism, it is straightforward. It permits you to pick
any probability function, and then maximise expected epistemic value from
that point of view. But, since s and EU are strictly proper, if you pick P,
then P will maximise your expected epistemic utility. So every probabilis-
tic prior is permissible from an interpersonal point of view. From an in-
trapersonal point of view, only the one that you pick to do the picking is
permissible.
Objective Bayesian seems at first like an impermissive rule. It tells you
to maximise expected epistemic value from the point of view of the uniform
distribution P†; and since EU is strictly proper scoring rule, it demands
that you have the uniform distribution as your prior. In fact, as many have
pointed out, this is more permissive than it seems at first, because the uni-
form distribution is defined relative to a set of possible worlds, and the rel-
evant set of possible worlds is determined by the propositions about which
you have opinions. And that, we might assume, can vary from rational
person to rational person.
Maximin gives the same result as objective Bayesianism, though for dif-
ferent reasons (Pettigrew, 2016b). There is just one credence function whose
worst-case is best, and it is the uniform distribution. To see this, note first
that it has the same epistemic value at every world. That epistemic value is
therefore both its worst and its best case. Now, consider another credence
function. Since the measure is strictly proper, there can be no credence func-
tion that is at least as good as the uniform distribution at all worlds. There-
fore, there is some world at which this other credence function is worse
than the uniform one. But then of course its worst case is not as good as the
worst case of the uniform distribution.
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The original Hurwicz criterion demands that we pick a Hurwicz weight
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, weight the best case by λ and the worst by 1− λ, and maximise
the result. In earlier work, I investigated what this decision rule requires in
the credal case (Pettigrew, 2016c). There are two cases: if n is the number
of possible worlds, then
(a) if λ ≤ 1n , then the uniform distribution maximises the Hurwicz score
Hλ(EU(−)).
(b) if λ > 1n , then there are n different credence functions that maximise
the Hurwicz score Hλ(EU(−)): each assigns λ to some world, and
then distributes the remaining credence 1 − λ equally over the re-
maining worlds, giving 1−λn−1 to each.
So suppose, for instance, that there are just three possible worlds w1, w2, w3.
Then:
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Maximin is the most extremely risk-averse decision rule. And it de-
mands the uniform distribution. Our characterization of the credence func-
tions that maximise the original Hurwicz score show that you don’t have
to be so maximally risk-averse in order to end up with the uniform distri-
bution. You just have to give low enough weight to the best case (λ ≤ 1n )
and high enough weight to the worst case (1− λ ≥ n−1n ). But if you are less
risk-averse than this, you will move beyond the uniform distribution. And
when you do, you will plump for a particular world and assign it greater
credence than the others, and you will treat each of the others equally. As
we’ll see, the space of attitudes to risk that demand the uniform distribu-
tion gets even more varied when we look to the generalised Hurwicz Cri-
terion. And, equally, the sorts of credence function that go beyond the uni-
form distribution that your risk attitudes might justify also become more
varied.
5.2.2 The credal consequences of GHC
Having seen each of these, let’s turn now to the generalised Hurwicz Cri-
terion. Since there are three worlds, we need three generalised Hurwicz
weights, 0 ≤ λ1, λ2, λ3 ≤ 1 such that λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = 1. The first thing to
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note is that, if (c1, c2, c3) maximises HΛ(EU(−)), then so does any permu-
tation of it—that is, the six credence functions
(c1, c2, c3), (c1, c3, c2), (c2, c1, c3), (c2, c3, c1), (c3, c1, c2), (c3, c2, c1)
all maximise HΛ(EU(−)) if any of one of them does. The reason is that the
generalised Hurwicz score for the three-world case depends on the best,
middle, and worst epistemic utilities that a credence function obtains, and
those are exactly the same for those six credence functions, even though
they occur at different worlds for each. In other words, GHC satisfies the
Permutation Indifference principle that we laid out above. This means that,
in order to find the maximisers, we only need to identify the maximiser
for which c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3. All others will be permutations of those. Let
X = {(c1, c2, c3) | c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3}. Since the measure EU of epistemic value is
strictly proper and generated by a scoring rule, for each c in X,26
EU(c, w1) ≥ EU(c, w2) ≥ EU(c, w3)
And so
HΛ(EU(c)) = λ1EU(c, w1) + λ2EU(c, w2) + λ3EU(c, w3)
That means that HΛ(EU(c)) is the expected inaccuracy of c by the lights of
the credence function (λ1, λ2, λ3) that corresponds to the Hurwicz weights.
This allows us to calculate each case. As Catrin Campbell-Moore helped
me to see, it turns out that the maximiser does not depend on which strictly
proper scoring rule you use to generate your measures of epistemic value—
each gives the same.
In the second column of the table below, I list the different possible or-
derings of the three Hurwicz weights. In two cases, specifying that order
is not sufficient to determine the maximiser. To do that, you also need to
know the absolute values of some of the weights. Where necessary, I in-
clude those in the third column. In the fourth column, I specify the mem-
ber of X that maximises HΛ(EU(−)) relative to those weights. As we noted
above, any permutation of the credence function specified in the third col-
umn will also maximise HΛ(EU(−)). In the first column, I give the region
of the simplex depicted in Figure 6 that corresponds to that row of the ta-
26This follows from the fact that strictly proper scoring rules are truth-directed. That is,
if s is strictly proper, then for any 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1, s(0, p) ≥ s(0, q) and s(1, q) ≥ s(1, p). I
learned this first from Catrin Campbell-Moore and Ben Levinstein. To prove it, you can use
Savage’s original representation theorem for strictly proper scoring rules. This says that, if
s is a continuous strictly proper scoring rule, then there is a strictly convex function ϕ such
that s(i, x) = ϕ(i)− ϕ(x)− ϕ′(x)(i− x).
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Region of Ordering of Further properties c1 c2 c3
simplex the weights of the weights





























(4) λ2 ≤ λ3 ≤ λ1 − λ1 λ2+λ32
λ2+λ3
2
(5) λ3 ≤ λ1 ≤ λ2 − λ1+λ22
λ1+λ2
2 λ3
(6) λ3 ≤ λ2 ≤ λ1 − λ1 λ2 λ3
In Figure 6, we plot the different possible generalised Hurwicz weights
in a barycentric plot, so that the bottom left corner of the triangle is (1, 0, 0),
the bottom-right is (0, 1, 0) and the top is (0, 0, 1). We then divide this into
four regions. If your weights Λ = (λ1, λ2, λ3) lie in a given region, then the
triple I’ve placed in that region gives the credence function that maximises
the generalised Hurwicz score HΛ(EU(−)) for those weights. Note, the
bottom left triangle is X. Essentially, to find which member of X a given
weighting demands, you plot that weighting in this diagram and then find
the closest member of X, where the measure of distance is Euclidean. As
mentioned above, it turns out that this will work for any measure EU of
epistemic value that is generated by a strictly proper scoring rule.
Let’s work through the segments, from (1) through to (6). Let’s start
with (1). Perhaps unsurprisingly, if you assign greatest weight to the worst-
case, next greatest to the middle, and least weight to the best case, GHC
demands that you pick the uniform distribution, just as Maximin also de-
mands. But, those aren’t the only weights that demand the uniform dis-
tribution, as witnessed by (2b) and (3a). Notice that in all three—that is,
(1), (2b), and (3a)—the weight given to the best case is at most one-third—
that is, λ1 ≤ 13 ; this mirrors the situation for the original Hurwicz criterion.
However, in the original version, assigning at most than one-third to the
27In an n-dimensional space, the standard simplex is the set of points P = (p1, . . . , pn)




























Figure 6: The barycentric plot of the generalised Hurwicz weights and the
corresponding maximiser.
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best case is necessary and sufficient for demanding the uniform distribu-
tion, whereas it is necessary but not sufficient in this case. We must also
demand that λ1 + λ2 ≤ 23 . So, for instance, if λ1 =
1
6 , λ2 =
2
3 , λ3 =
1
6 , then
GHC does not demand the uniform distribution. Rather, that assignment
of weights belongs to (2a), and it demands (λ1+λ22 ,
λ1+λ2







In general, segments (2a) and (5) show that, if we continue to assign the
majority of the weight to the worst and middle cases together, but shift it
more towards the middle case, GHC no longer demands the uniform distri-
bution, and rather demands that we pick a world and treat it as less likely
than the others, which we treat equally. And segments (3b) and (4) show
that, if we assign the majority of the weight to the best and worst cases to-
gether, but shift it more towards the best case, then GHC will demand that
we pick a world and treat it as more likely than the other, which we treat
equally (thus mirroring the demand of the original Hurwicz criterion). And
(6) shows that, if we assign greatest weight to the best case, next greatest to
the middle case, and least weight to the worst case, then GHC will simply
demand that we adopt the weights as our credences.
So far, we have described what happens for the second-simplest case,
namely, where there are just three worlds.28 But what happens in general?
This takes a little bit of terminology to describe. Given a sequence of num-
bers A = (a1, . . . , an), let Av(A) = a1+...+ann . That is, Av(A) is the arithmetic
mean of the numbers in A. And given 1 ≤ k ≤ n, let A|k = (a1, . . . , ak).
That is, A|k is the truncation of the sequence after ak. Then we say that A
does not exceed its average if, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
Av(A) ≥ Av(A|k)
That is, at no point in the sequence does the average of the numbers up to
that point exceed the average of all the numbers in the sequence. We can
now state our theorem:
Theorem 7 Suppose Λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) is a sequence of generalised Hurwicz
weights. Then there is a sequence of subsequences Λ1, . . . , Λm of Λ such that
(i) Λ = Λ1 _ . . . _ Λm
(ii) Av(Λ1) ≥ . . . ≥ Av(Λm)
(iii) each Λi does not exceed its average.
Then,
(Av(Λ1), . . . , Av(Λ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
length of Λ1
, Av(Λ2), . . . , Av(Λ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
length of Λ2
, . . . , Av(Λm), . . . , Av(Λm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
length of Λm
)
28In the simplest case, in which there are two worlds, GHC and Hurwicz’s original crite-
rion coincide.
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maximises HΛ(EU(−)) among probabilistic credence functions C = (c1, . . . , cn)
for which c1 ≥ . . . ≥ cn.
Here are a couple of examples:




























(i) Λ = Λ1 _ Λ2
(ii) Av(Λ1) = 14 ≥
1
6 = Av(Λ2)
(iii) Both Λ1, Λ2 do not exceed their averages.












. And thus the maximisers
are precisely this and its permutations.






























(i) Λ = Λ1 _ Λ2 _ Λ3
(ii) Av(Λ1) = 625 ≥ Av(Λ2) =
5
25 ≥ Av(Λ3) =
4
25
(iii) Λ1, Λ2, Λ3 do not exceed their averages.












. And thus the maximis-
ers are precisely this and its permutations.
So we’ve seen which credence functions the GHC demands given different
generalised Hurwicz weights. Let’s now return to our taxonomy of permis-
sivisms from Chapter 2 to see which one we can establish by appealing to
GHC applied to measures of epistemic value that are generated by strictly
proper scoring rules.
Of course, our version of permissivism concerns credences. Let’s con-
sider the interpersonal case. Whether we obtain permissivism, and if we
do how radical it is, depends on which generalised Hurwicz weights it is
permissible to have. For instance, in the case in which there are just three
possible worlds, if it is only permissible to have weights λ1, λ2, λ3 with
λ1 ≤ 13 and λ3 ≥
2
3 , then we do not obtain permissivism at all. After all,




3 ). But providing
we allow something beyond that, we obtain permissivism. And the further
beyond that we permit, the more radical the permissivism becomes. At
its extreme, if we permit all possible generalised Hurwicz weights, we ob-
tain the most radical possible permissivism—that is, for any probabilistic
credence function, there are weights relative to which GHC permits it.
It’s hard to know quite how to argue about which generalised Hur-
wicz weights are permissible. One way is to consider non-epistemic deci-
sions, describe the preferences that the weights determine, and appeal to
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our judgment that they are rational preferences. Thus, for instance, con-
sider the following two options, a and b:
w1 w2 w3
a1 4 1 0
b1 2 2 2
Then, if λ1 = 12 , λ2 =
1
3 , λ2 =
1
6 , then you’ll prefer an option a to b. This
doesn’t seem beyond the pale. It is risk-inclined, for sure, but our Jamesian
contention is that rationality does not prohibit that. We would not count
someone irrational who risked getting 1 or even 0 utiles in order to open
up the possibility of getting 4 utiles when the alternative can give them 2
utiles at most.
I take it that it is the very essence of William James’ objection to Clifford
that risk aversion is not the only rational attitude towards beliefs, just as
it is not the only rational attitude towards other decisions in life. Absent
reasons to the contrary, we should treat our choice of prior like any other
decision formed in the absence of probabilities to guide us. This, we have
said, requires that we use the Generalised Hurwicz Criterion. And that,
in turn, says that we should pick generalised Hurwicz weights and then
maximise the generalised Hurwicz score relative to them. As in the case of
practical decisions, we permit at least some risk-inclined weights. And that
is enough to give permissivism.
Nonetheless, perhaps there are limits. Here is one that we have already
met: if any of our generalised Hurwicz weights is 0, then our preferences
violate Strong Dominance. So I’m inclined to say that our weights must
all be positive. And that entails that our prior credences similarly should
all be positive—that is, at least at the beginning of our epistemic life, we
should obey the Regularity Principle.
Here’s a second: we might consider it irrational to prefer a2 to b2:
w1 w2 w3
a2 1, 000, 000 0 0
b2 999, 998 999, 998 999, 998
But this is demanded if our Hurwicz weights are (λ1, λ2, λ3) and λ1 >
999,998
1,000,000 . So perhaps there are limits to how risk-inclined it is rational to
be. If there are, then there will be limits to the probability functions one










as a rational prior. It’s hard to know
how to adjudicate this question. On the one hand, I think we are confident
that there are rational restrictions on the extremity of your risk attitudes—
some seem simply beyond the pale. But on the other, there is no argu-
ment of which I am aware that pinpoints exactly what is so bad about such
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attitudes, nor where the pale is located. I’ll leave this question open. If
there are no such rational restrictions, we obtain the widest possible in-
terpersonal permissivism compatible with Probabilism—namely, extreme
subjective Bayesianism. If there are such rational restrictions, we obtain
something slightly narrower. But either way, we still obtain permissivism.
Just as there might be limits to how risk-inclined it is rational to be, so
there are likely limits to the level of rational risk-aversion. For instance, we
might consider it irrational to prefer a3 to b3
w1 w2 w3
a3 1 1 1
b3 1, 000, 000 1, 000, 000 0
And yet we will prefer that if λ3 > 999,9991,000,000 . This latter point has less impact
in the credal case, however, since even quite mild risk-aversion demands
the uniform distribution. And so ruling out extreme risk aversion, which
would also demand the uniform distribution, does not restrict the set of
credence functions that may be justified using GHC.
Let’s turn now to intrapersonal permissivism. That is, given your at-
titude to risk, encoded in your generalised Hurwicz weights, what is per-
missible for you? Well, this very much depends on what your weights are.
Consider the regions in the simplex in Figure 6. If my weights are in (1),
(3a), or (2b), there’s no intrapersonal permissivism for me at all. Given my
attitudes to risk, there’s a unique credence function I must adopt and it’s
the uniform distribution. However, as I become less risk-averse by moving
from the top right of the simplex into (2a) or (5), or into (3b) or (4), some
intrapersonal permissivism opens up for me: for instance, in (2a) or (5),


























And finally, if I become risk-inclined enough to occupy segment (6), there
are six credence functions that are permissible:
(λ1, λ2, λ3) (λ2, λ1, λ3) (λ3, λ1, λ2)
(λ1, λ3, λ2) (λ2, λ3, λ1) (λ3, λ2, λ1)
In short, and very roughly speaking, the more risk-inclined and less risk-
averse you are, the more is permissible for you.
The final part of our taxonomy asks how common permissivism is.
How common are the bodies of evidence for which permissivism holds?
For what proportion of bodies of evidence is the rational response to it not
uniquely determined? But we can’t answer that quite yet, because so far
we have only spoken about how to pick priors. That is, we have considered
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how to respond to only one body of evidence, namely, the empty body that
you have when you pick your priors. We will explore how to respond to
other bodies of evidence in the next section.
5.3 Appendix: proofs
5.3.1 Proof of Theorem 7
Suppose EU is a measure of epistemic value that is generated by the strictly
proper scoring rule s. And suppose that Λ is the following sequence of gen-
eralised Hurwicz weights 0 ≤ λ1, . . . , λn ≤ 1 with ∑ni=1 λi = 1. In this sec-
tion, we ask which are the credence functions C that maximise HΛ(EU(−)).
We’ll consider credence functions defined on the whole algebra F over
the finite set of worldsW . As we saw in Theorem 1 above, since GHC sat-
isfies Weak Dominance, whatever maximises HΛ(EU(−)) will be a proba-
bility function. Thus, ∑w∈W C(w) = 1 and ∑w∈X C(w) = C(X).
Next, recall that, if C maximises HΛ(EU(−)), then so does any credence
function obtained from C by a permutation π of the possible worlds inW .
If π : W ∼= W , then define Cπ such that Cπ(w) = C(π(w)). Then, if C
maximises HΛ(EU(−)), so does Cπ. From that, we know that there must
be a maximiser C such that c1 ≥ c2 ≥ . . . ≥ cn, where ci = C(wi). It is this
maximiser that we will show how to find.
Now, since EU is generated by a strictly proper scoring rule, it is also
truth-directed. That is, if ci > cj, then EU(C, wi) > EU(C, wj). Thus, if
c1 ≥ c2 ≥ . . . ≥ cn, then
HΛ(EU(C)) = λ1EU(C, w1) + . . . + λnEU(C, wn)
This is what we seek to maximise. But notice that this is just the expecta-
tion of EU(C) from the point of view of the probability function generated
by Λ = (λ1, . . . , λn). Throughout we will write (p1, . . . , pn) for the prob-
ability function that assigns pi to world wi. Thus, the probability function
generated by Λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) is the one that assigns λi to world wi.
Now, Savage (1971) showed that, if s is strictly proper and continuous,
then there is a differentiable and strictly convex function ϕ such that, if P, Q


















We call ϕ the entropy function of s.29 So C maximises HΛ(EU(−)) among
credence functions C with c1 ≥ . . . ≥ cn iff C minimises Ds(Λ,−) among
29For clear proof of this representation theorem, see (Predd et al., 2009).
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credence functions C with c1 ≥ . . . ≥ cn. We now use the KKT conditions
to calculate which credence functions minimise Ds(Λ,−) among credence
functions C with c1 ≥ . . . ≥ cn.
First, we define the following functions:














































which we abbreviate θk(x).
Second, define the following functions:
h(x1, . . . , xn) = x1 + . . . + xn − 1
g1(x1, . . . , xn) = x2 − x1




gn−2(x1, . . . , xn) = xn−1 − xn−2
gn−1(x1, . . . , xn) = xn − xn−1
Then
∇h = 〈1, 1, 1, 1 . . . , 1, 1, 1, 1〉
∇g1 = 〈−1, 1, 0, 0 . . . , 0, 0, 0, 0〉
∇g2 = 〈0,−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 0, 0, 0〉




∇gn−3 = 〈0, 0, 0, 0, . . . ,−1, 1, 0, 0〉
∇gn−2 = 〈0, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0,−1, 1, 0〉
∇gn−1 = 〈0, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0, 0,−1, 1〉
So the KKT theorem says that x1, . . . , xn is a maximiser iff there are λ, µ1, . . . , µn−1
with 0 ≤ µ1, . . . , µn−1 such that




µi∇gi(x1, . . . , xn) + λ∇h(x1, . . . , xn) = 0
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That is, iff there are λ and 0 ≤ µ1, . . . , µn−1 such that
θ1(x)− µ1 + λ = 0




θn−1(x)− µn−1 + µn−2 + λ = 0
θn(x) + µn−1 + λ = 0
By summing the identities above, we get


















Now, suppose that there is a sequence of subsequences Λ1, . . . , Λm of Λ
such that
(i) Λ = Λ1 _ . . . _ Λm
(ii) Av(Λ1) ≥ . . . ≥ Av(Λm)
(iii) each Λj does not exceed its average.
And let
P = (Av(Λ1), . . . , Av(Λ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
length of Λ1
, Av(Λ2), . . . , Av(Λ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
length of Λ2
, . . . , Av(Λm), . . . , Av(Λm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
length of Λm
)
That is, given 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if λi is in Λj, then pi = Avj, where we write Avj to
abbreviate Av(Λj).
We will now show that, if we let xi = pi, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and we
take λ, µ1, . . . , µn−1 to be defined as above, then
(i) λ = 0; and
(ii) µi ≥ 0.
Thanks to the KKT theorem, this is sufficient to complete the theorem.
Our proof depends on an identity, which we will derive now. In the
derivation, we make use of a particular way of categorising propositions.
We say that the type of a proposition X ⊆W is the sequence β = (β1, . . . , βm)
such that |X ∩ Λj| = β j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Given a proposition X ⊆ W and
85
β = (β1, . . . , βm), with β j ≤ Λj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we write X ∈ β iff the






































































































where we abuse notation and write Λj for |Λj|, that is, the length of se-
quence Λj. Note, this number doesn’t depend on k. So the number sum-





























































and ask, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, how many times λi occurs in this summation.
Here’s the answer:

























β j∗(β j∗ − 1)
Λj∗(Λj∗ − 1)
Λj∗ |k∗












β j∗ − 1
Λj∗ − 1
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Λj∗ − 1
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Λj∗ − 1







Now, if j 6= j∗, then





λi = Λj∗ |k∗β jAvj −Λj∗ |k∗β jAvj = 0
While
Λj∗ |k∗β j∗Avj∗ −








β j∗ − 1
Λj∗ − 1





= Λj∗ |k∗β j∗Avj∗ −


















Λj∗ − β j∗
Λj∗ − 1 ∑λi∈Λj∗ |k∗
λi
=
Λj∗ − β j∗
Λj∗ − 1




Putting all of this together, we have: for 1 ≤ j∗ ≤ m and 1 ≤ k∗ ≤ n with




Λj∗ − β j∗
Λj∗ − 1







































which is non-negative iff |Λj|k|Avl −∑λi∈Λj|k λi ≥ 0 iff Av(Λj) ≥ Av(Λj|k).
But, by assumption, this is true, since each Λj does not exceed its average.
So, in conclusion, P maximises HΛ(EU(−)), as required.
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This completes our proof that, if there is a sequence of subsequences of
Λ that satisfy (i), (ii), (iii) from above, then they provide the maximiser. We
now show that such subsequences always exist. We proceed by induction.
BASE CASE n = 1. Then it is clearly true with the subsequence Λ1 = Λ.
INDUCTIVE STEP Suppose it is true for all sequences Λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) of
length n. Now consider a sequence (λ1, . . . , λn, λn+1). Then, by the induc-
tive hypothesis, there is a sequence of sequences Λ1, . . . , Λm such that
(i) Λ _ (λn+1) = Λ1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1)
(ii) Av(Λ1) ≥ . . . ≥ Av(Λm)
(iii) each Λj does not exceed its average.
Now, first, suppose Av(Λm) ≥ λn+1. Then let Λm+1 = (λn+1) and we’re
done.
So, second, suppose Av(Λm) < λn+1. Then we find the greatest k such
that
Av(Λk) ≥ Av(Λk+1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1))
Then we let Λ∗k+1 = Λk+1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1). Then we can show that
(i) (λ1, . . . , λn, λn+1) = Λ1 _ Λ2 _ . . . _ Λk _ Λ∗k+1.
(ii) Each Λ1, . . . , Λk, Λ∗k+1 does not exceed average.
(iii) Av(Λ1) ≥ Av(Λ2) ≥ . . . ≥ Av(Λk) ≥ Av(Λ∗k+1).
(i) and (iii) are obvious. So we prove (ii). In particular, we show that Λ∗k+1
does not exceed average. We assume that each subsequence Λj starts with
Λij+1
• Suppose i ∈ Λk+1. Then, since Λk+1 does not exceed average,
Av(Λk+1) ≥ Av(Λk+1|i)
But, since k is the greatest number such that
Av(Λk) ≥ Av(Λk+1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1))
We know that
Av(Λk+2 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1)) > Av(Λk+1)
So
Av(Λk+1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1)) > Av(Λk+1)
So
Av(Λk+1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1)) > Av(Λk+1|i)
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• Suppose i ∈ Λk+2. Then, since Λk+2 does not exceed average,
Av(Λk+2) ≥ Av(Λk+2|i)
But, since k is the greatest number such that
Av(Λk) ≥ Av(Λk+1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1))
We know that
Av(Λk+3 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1)) > Av(Λk+2)
So
Av(Λk+1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1)) > Av(Λk+2|i)
But also, from above,
Av(Λk+1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1)) > Av(Λk+1)
So
Av(Λk+1 _ . . . _ Λm _ (λn+1)) > Av(Λk+1 _ Λk+2|i)
• And so on.
This completes the proof. 2
In brief...
In previous chapters, we have argued that, when we pick our priors,
we should do so using (i) strictly proper epistemic utility functions to
measure the epistemic value of a credal state, and (ii) a decision rule
from the family of risk-sensitive decision rules called the Generalised
Hurwicz Criterion. Recall: each member of this family is picked out
by a sequence of generalised Hurwicz weights, and these encode
our attitudes to risk. In this chapter, we derive the consequences of
picking our priors in this way. Some of the upshots:
• For many Hurwicz weights that encode attitudes to risk that
range from risk-averse to risk-neutral, if you apply GHC with
these weights to your choice of priors, it demands that you
adopt the uniform prior—that is, the one that divides your cre-
dences equally over all worlds.
• As we move from these risk-averse and risk-neutral weights
to more risk-inclined ones, the resulting versions of GHC de-
mand priors that are not uniform—they permit priors that as-
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sign more credence to some worlds than to others; and as the
priors becoming more and more risk-inclined, they permit pri-
ors that assign a lot of their credence to some worlds, and much
less to others.
• In the end, for any probabilistic prior credence function, there
is a set of generalised Hurwicz weights—and so, a set of at-
titudes to epistemic risk—for which that credence function is
among those rationally permitted by GHC for an individual
with those weights.
This gives a wide version of interpersonal permissivism about
rational prior credences.
• If your weights demand the uniform distribution then for you
rationality is intrapersonally impermissive concerning prior
credences—there is a single rational prior for you, and it is the
uniform distribution.
• However, if your weights do not demand the uniform distri-
bution, then for you rationality is intrapersonally permissive
about priors—after all, if one credence function is permitted
by GHC, so is any permutation of it; that is, if one prior as-
signment of credences to possible worlds is permitted so is
any assignment that assigns the same credences but to different
worlds.
This gives a narrower, but sometimes still quite wide version
of intrapersonal permissivism about rational prior credences.
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6 Epistemic risk and picking posteriors
So, having set our priors using GHC, how should we set our posteriors?
That is, how should we set our credences at times other than the very begin-
ning of our epistemic life, when our body of total evidence might no longer
be empty? In this chapter, we set out a variety of possible approaches to
this question. In the end, I’ll opt for one that builds on insights from work
by Kenny Easwaran, as well as ideas that Hannes Leitgeb and I developed
ten years ago, and which Dmitri Gallow has recently improved (Leitgeb
& Pettigrew, 2010b; Easwaran, 2014; Gallow, 2019). But it is interesting to
work through the other possibilities to see why they are problematic. Those
impatient for the truth and indifferent to interesting falsehoods can skip
straight to Section 6.3.
6.1 GHC forever
One natural proposal is simply to apply GHC at each point in your epis-
temic life, not just at the initial point. There is a wrinkle here, however.
Let’s say thatW = {w1, . . . , wn} is the set of possible worlds about which
you have an opinion. As you obtain new evidence, you rule out those
worlds that are incompatible with your evidence. When you apply GHC
at the initial time in your epistemic life, you assign n Hurwicz weights,
λ1, . . . , λn, one for each place in the ordering of worlds from best to worst,
and you apply GHC with those weights. Now, suppose you learn E =
{w1, . . . , wm}, for some m < n, and you wish to apply GHC again. How do
you do this?
On the one hand, if you simply use the same n Hurwicz weights, GHC
will permit the same credence functions that it permitted at the initial time.
If only the uniform distribution was permissible then, only the uniform
distribution will be permissible now; and so on. But then it makes no dif-
ference that you have learned E. What it is rational for you to believe will
be sensitive neither to whether you have received any new evidence nor to
what evidence you have received if you have. What’s more, among the per-
missible posteriors there will typically be none that are obtained from your
prior by applying Bayes’ rule to your evidence; and indeed none even that
make you certain of the evidence that you have learned. If I am required
to have the uniform distribution as my prior, and then required again to
have it as my posterior after learning E, then my posterior does not evolve
from my prior by Bayes’ Rule, and it does not even assign certainty to E—it
assigns credence mn < 1.
On the other hand, you can’t apply GHC to the new, more restricted
set of epistemically possible worlds, since there’s no principled way to
extract your m Hurwicz weightings λ′1, . . . , λ
′
m relative to the set of pos-
sible worlds E = {w1, . . . , wm} from your old weightings relative to the set
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W = {w1, . . . , wn}. Suppose W = {w1, w2, w3} and E = {w1, w2}. How
should we obtain λ′1, λ
′
2 from λ1, λ2, λ3? Should we sum λ1 and λ2, our
original generalised Hurwicz weights for the best and second-best case, to
give λ′1, our new generalised Hurwicz weights for the best case? Or should
we let λ1 be λ′1? Or something else?
I think the best proposal in this vein is to apply GHC with the original n
weights, while restricting the set of available posteriors to those that respect
your evidence by assigning it maximal credence. That is, we must pick a
posterior that maximises your generalised Hurwicz score HΛ(EU(−)) rel-
ative to your weights among the credence functions C with C(E) = 1. As we’ll
see, however, this is often incompatible with Bayes’ Rule.
For the sake of providing concrete examples, we’ll assume:
• the set of possible worlds isW = {w1, w2, w3};
• your total evidence at the later time is E = {w1, w2};
• your generalised Hurwicz weights are λ1, λ2, λ3.
There are three cases I’d like to consider. They don’t exhaust all the
options, but they nicely illustrate the possibilities and problems with this
approach. They are distinguished by the Hurwicz weights that you assign
(i) λ1 ≤ λ2 and 13 ≤ λ3—that is, your Hurwicz weights lie in region (1)
or (2b) from Figure 6 above;
(ii) λ1 ≤ λ2 and λ3 < 13 —that is, they lie in region (2a) or (5) from Figure
6 above;
(iii) λ2 < λ1 and λ1 < 13 —that is, they lie region (3a) from Figure 6 above.
Let’s treat them in turn.
Suppose (i) λ1 ≤ λ2 and 13 ≤ λ3. Then, however you measure epistemic





3 ). And, again regardless of how you measure epistemic utility, ap-




And the latter is the result of applying Bayes’ Rule to the former. What’s





3 ), then, for any evidence you might acquire, you will get the same
posterior whether you update your prior on this evidence using Bayes’
Rule or whether you apply GHC with the restriction that your posterior
must be certain of this evidence.
Next, suppose (ii) λ1 ≤ λ2 and λ3 < 13 . Then GHC requires you to adopt
(λ1+λ22 ,
λ1+λ2
2 , λ3) or one of its permutations as your prior. And, again, ap-




30I state and prove the general result as Theorem 9 in Section 6.5 below.
31Again, this is proved within Theorem 9 in Section 6.5 below.
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And this is the result of applying Bayes’ Rule to (λ1+λ22 ,
λ1+λ2
2 , λ3). How-
ever, it is not the result of applying Bayes’ Rule to (λ1+λ22 , λ3,
λ1+λ2
2 ), which
GHC also permits as a prior with these generalised Hurwicz weights. So
we cannot say anything as strong as we did for case (i). Bayes’ Rule and
GHC will not always coincide. Nonetheless, we can say this: for someone
with these generalised Hurwicz weights, there is always a route through
their epistemic life that satisfies GHC at each stage and evolves by updating
on evidence using Bayes’ Rule at each stage. That is, for any such weights
and any future body of evidence, there are priors permitted by GHC, and
posteriors permitted by the version of GHC that restricts to posteriors that
are certain of the evidence, such that the posteriors are obtained from the
priors by applying Bayes’ Rule to the evidence.
Finally, suppose (iii) λ2 < λ1 and 23 < λ3. Then GHC requires your




3 ), and applying Bayes’ Rule to that when you learn E
would give ( 12 ,
1
2 , 0). However, there are no strictly proper scoring rules for




32 So, for these generalised Hurwicz weights there can be no route
through your epistemic life that satisfies both GHC and Bayes’ Rule.
Of course, you might ask why we should be so concerned to update
in the way that Bayes’ Rule recommends at each stage. One reason comes
from the famous diachronic sure loss argument due to David Lewis (1999).
Like other sure loss arguments for credal principles, such as Ramsey’s and
de Finetti’s famous sure loss argument for Probabilism, Lewis’ argument
relies on the following claim about the bets that your credences require
you to accept: if you have credence 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 in proposition X, you are
rationally required to pay any amount less than rS utiles for a bet that pays
out S utiles if X is true and 0 utiles if X is false. Lewis then shows that, if
you plan to update in some way other than by Bayes’ Rule, there are bets
that your priors require you to accept and bets that your planned posteriors
will require you to accept that, taken together, will lose you utility for sure.
I have doubts about this argument. It tells you that, were you to face cer-
tain choices, your priors and your posteriors would require you to choose
in a way that is guaranteed to serve you badly. But it says nothing about
how they will require you to choose when you face other choices. Perhaps
your priors and planned posteriors will serve you very well in those situ-
ations. The problem is that the diachronic sure loss argument does not tell
us whether there is a trade-off here that might make it reasonable to keep
the prior credence function and updating plan even though they are, taken
together, vulnerable to the diachronic sure loss. Perhaps there is some way
in which the prior and plan compensate for their poor performance in the
face of the specific pair of decision problems that underpin the sure loss
argument. Perhaps they perform extremely well when presented with an-
32Another consequence of Theorem 9 in Section 6.5 below.
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other pair of decision problems, and perhaps we are more likely to face this
alternative pair. I’ve explored this question in more detail elsewhere, so I’ll
leave it here, particularly since these pragmatic arguments for credal norms
are not our main concern here.33
Instead, let’s turn to one of the epistemic utility arguments for planning
to update by Bayes’ Rule that we met in Section 3.3. According to the result
that Ray Briggs and I presented, if you plan to update your prior in any
way other than by Bayes’ Rule, there will be an alternative prior and an
alternative updating plan that, taken together, have greater total epistemic
utility than your prior and plan, taken together. What’s more, if you always
plan to update by Bayes’ Rule, this won’t happen.
A notable feature of this argument is that, if it works at all, it establishes
a wide scope version of the norm that says you should update by Bayes’
Rule. That is, it does not establish: if your prior is P, then you should
plan to pick your posteriors by conditioning P on your evidence. Rather, it
establishes: you ought not to have prior P and plan to pick your posteriors
by something other than conditioning P on your evidence. But of course
this does tell against the person who plans to use GHC at each point of
time, simply restricting at each point to those credence functions that are
certain of your total evidence at that time. At least if they are in situation
(iii) from above, the argument above shows that the prior and updating
plan that GHC requires them to have are, taken together, dominated.
This argument shows that, in the epistemic context, planning to make
repeated use of GHC with certain Hurwicz weights leads to dominated
choices. So what gives? The repeated use of GHC? Or the troublesome
Hurwicz weights? We might retain GHC as our decision rule at each stage
of our epistemic life and badge as rationally impermissible the attitudes
to risk that are encoded in the Hurwicz weights that lead to dominated
choices—e.g. those in (iii) above. Or we might say that GHC applies at
only one time, namely, the beginning of your epistemic life, when you use
it to pick your priors. I opt to retain for the latter for two reasons.
First, as we saw in our discussion of Strong Summation above, we have
good reason not to apply GHC more than once; and it is a reason that is
quite independent of the result that Briggs and I offer. After all, as we saw
in footnote 25, there is only one set of generalised Hurwicz weights that
avoids the problem of diachronic incoherence: it is the uniform weights,
λ1 = λ2 = . . . = λn = 1n . For any others, there will be sequences of choices
in the face of which GHC will require you to choose a dominated sequence
of options. So, again, if we wish to retain our Jamesian permissivism about
attitudes to risk, we should restrict our use of GHC to a single time.
33I discuss this objection to the diachronic sure loss argument in (Pettigrew, 2020). And I
discuss a related objection to exploitation arguments for rationality more generally in (Pet-
tigrew, 2019, Chapter 13).
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Second, as we have noted before, using GHC only at the beginning of
your epistemic life makes sense. Once we have used GHC to choose our
priors, we are in a situation in which we have probabilistic opinions that
we should use to make future decisions. Indeed, part of our purpose in
picking priors is to do exactly this with them.
6.2 Priors and plans together
So, applying GHC at each point in time leads us in the epistemic case—
as in the practical case—to the possibility of dominated decisions, unless
our Hurwicz weights lie in a particular risk-averse region of the simplex.
But the argument that establishes this might give us an idea. In that ar-
gument, we considered the combination of an individual’s prior credence
function and her updating plan. And we applied the decision-theoretic
principle of Weak Dominance to show that, if you plan to obtain your pos-
terior credence function by updating your prior credence function in some
way other than by Bayes’ Rule, then you are irrational, because there is an
alternative prior and an alternative plan that are jointly more valuable than
yours, epistemically speaking, at every world. Perhaps, then, as well as
applying the Weak Dominance principle when we choose these prior-plan
pairs, we might apply the stronger principle GHC as well. As we will see,
the problem with this approach is that the priors it requires you to have are
determined not only by your generalised Hurwicz weights, but also by the
partition from which your evidence will come. And this is not something
you typically know at the point when you are choosing your priors.
Let’s see how this works in a specific case. As usual, we assume there
are just three worlds: w1, w2, w3. And we suppose that your Hurwicz
weights are λ1 = 16 , λ2 =
1
2 , and λ3 =
1
3 . And now consider two partitions
of possible evidence:
(i) E = {E1 = {w1}, E2 = {w2}, E3 = {w3}};
(ii) E ′ = {E′1 = {w1, w2}, E′2 = {w3}}.
Now, we know by the dominance argument that Briggs and I offered that
GHC requires you to plan to update by Bayes’ Rule—since dominated op-
tions never maximise generalised Hurwicz scores, GHC requires you to
plan to use Bayes’ Rule, just as Undominated Dominance does.
So consider case (i) first, where the evidence you will receive will come
from partition E . Whatever prior you have, updating on whatever evidence
from E you get will lead to a posterior credence function that has maximal
epistemic utility.34 So, if we apply GHC to prior-plan pairs in this case,
34This is because, for any strictly proper measure of epistemic utility EU, and any world w
inW , EU(w, w) ≥ EU(C, w), for all credence functions C, where w is the credence function
w(X) = 1 if X is true at w and w(X) = 0 if X is false at w.
96
the pairs that maximise the generalised Hurwicz score will have as their
prior the same credence function that GHC would have demanded had we
applied it only to the choice of prior. So, given the generalised Hurwicz
weights above, the prior-plan pair that GHC demands is the one with the




3 ), as its prior.
But now consider case (ii), where the evidence you will receive will
come not from partition E , but from partition E ′. Here, we look at each
prior and calculate not only its epistemic utility at each world but the sum
of the epistemic utilities of it and the result of updating it by Bayes’ Rule
on whatever evidence you’ll learn at that world. And we measure epis-
temic utility using the Brier score. Applying GHC to these joint epistemic
utilities, we find that the pair that maximises epistemic utility is the one
determined by this prior and Bayes’ Rule: (0.333 . . . , 0.429 . . . , 0.238 . . .).
So: when we understand ourselves as choosing our prior and ours
plans for updating together, as a package, GHC requires that the prior
that belongs to the package you pick depends not only on your Hurwicz
weights, but also on what evidence you might acquire during your life.35
Of course, if this is where the argument leads, then we must follow it. But
I think it is not. Contrary to the picture that Briggs and I presented, we do
not pick our priors and our updating plans together. Rather, we pick our
priors and then use those to pick our updating plans. Indeed, when we
pick our priors, we pick one of the tools that we will use to pick everything
else. We pick a vantage point from which to approach the world and from
which to make decisions. We do not pick both that vantage point and our
plans for how to pick other things all at once. So, again, I think, it is appro-
priate to apply GHC only to the choice of priors. We will then see in the
following section how to use those priors to pick our posteriors.
6.3 Using priors to pick posteriors
How, then, should we use our prior credences, chosen using GHC, to choose
our posterior credences after we acquire some evidence. Here, I turn to re-
cent work by J. Dmitri Gallow (2019). To introduce it, I return to where
I started with epistemic utility arguments, in the two papers that Hannes
Leitgeb and I wrote in 2010 (Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010a,b). In those, we con-
sidered two sorts of argument in favour of a genuinely diachronic version
of the Bayesian updating norm.
The first ran as follows: Suppose my prior credence function is P, which
is a probability function. And suppose I obtain evidence E. How should
I respond? Leitgeb and I suggested that evidence E imposes constraints
on your posterior credence function, namely, it requires that you assign
maximal credence to E—note that this is the same constraint we explored
35See (Konek, 2016) for a similar suggestion.
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in Section 6.1 above. You should now pick the posterior, among those that
satisfy this constraint, that maximises expected epistemic utility from the
point of view of your prior.36 That is, your posterior P′ should be







where P is the set of probabilistic credence functions over F .
The first problem with this proposal is that the updating rule it de-
mands is not Bayes’ Rule, and indeed it has undesirable features. Leitgeb
and I applied the approach using only the Brier score, and Ben Levinstein
(2012) offered what I take to be a definitive critique of the rule that results.
But it turns out that, for all strictly proper measures of epistemic utility, the
approach gives the same updating rule, at least for many priors.37 And so
Levinstein’s criticisms apply to the approach as a whole.
The second problem with this approach to updating comes from Dmitri
Gallow (2019, 9-10). He notes that we seek a justification for Bayes’ Rule
that is wholly based on considerations of epistemic utility. That is, we hope
not to appeal to any non-telelogical reasoning. But how, Gallow asks, can
we justify restricting our possible posteriors to those for which p(E) = 1?
What justification that appeals only to epistemic utility can we give for
that? There is an evidentialist justification, of course. It simply points
out that evidence E supports proposition E to the maximal degree, and so
someone with evidence E should believe E to the maximum degree, which
is credence 1. But what of the epistemic utility theorist? Can they say why
we restrict to only those credence functions?
I suspect the following answer gives our best hope. In the dominance
argument for Probabilism, we show that, if you do not satisfy the prob-
ability axioms, then there is some alternative credence function that has
greater epistemic utility at all worlds. We might say that, upon learning E,
you have reason not to care about your epistemic utility at worlds where E
is false. If that’s the case, we might appeal to the following slight tweak of
the mathematical theorem on which the dominance argument for Probabil-
ism is based: if credence function C does not satisfy the probability axioms,
or if it does, but C(E) < 1, then there is an alternative credence function C?
with C?(E) = 1 that has greater epistemic utility than C at all worlds at
which E is true. That’s why you should assign maximal credence to your
evidence.
The problem with this argument is that it takes an inconsistent view of
which worlds you should care about. On the one hand, when it applies the
36As good card-carrying veritists, and conceiving of ourselves as extending the accuracy-
first programme in epistemology that had been initiated by Jim Joyce (1998), Leitgeb and
I took accuracy to be the sole source of epistemic utility. But that axiological commitment
doesn’t make any difference here.
37I prove this in Theorem 10 in Section 6.5 below.
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tweaked version of the dominance argument to conclude that you should
assign maximal credence to your evidence, it says that you should not care
about the epistemic utility of a credence function at worlds at which your
evidence is false. But, on the other hand, when it comes to calculating
the expected epistemic utility of the candidate posterior credence function,
you take its epistemic utility at each world, including those at which your
evidence is false, weight it by your credence in that world, and include it
in the summation that gives your expected epistemic utility. So, ultimately,
I think this proposal is not coherent enough to be compelling.
Let’s move on, then, to the second argument that Leitgeb and I gave.
As before, we argued that learning evidence should lead you to not care
about worlds at which it is false; and, as before, we argued that it should
lead you to omit those worlds in the decision rules that you follow. But we
focused not on the dominance principle but on the principle of maximising
expected utility. That is, when we claimed that, when we calculate the
expected epistemic utility of a candidate posterior from the point of view
of our prior, we should simply omit the summands for worlds at which the
evidence is false. Thus, we seek







And it turns out that, for any strictly proper epistemic utility function, this
will be P′(−) = P(−|E), whenever P(E) > 0, just as Bayes’ Rule requires.
Indeed, this is easy to see, since
∑
w∈E
P(w)EU(Q, w) = P(E) ∑
w∈W
P(w|E)EU(Q, w)
Multiplying a function by a constant does not change its maximiser, and
since EU is strictly proper, ∑w∈W P(w|E)EU(Q, w) is maximised, as a func-
tion of Q, at Q(−) = P(−|E).
The problem with this approach, as Gallow points out, is that our usual
arguments for choosing by maximising expected utility do carry over to the
restricted case in which we sum over only the worlds at which the evidence
is true. Fortunately, Gallow also notices an ingenious way to avoid this
problem. He suggests that what happens when you learn E is this: you
don’t exclude the worlds at which E is false from the set over which you
run your dominance arguments nor from the set over which you sum to
obtain your expectation; rather, you change your epistemic utility function
so that:
(i) for a world at which E is true, the value of a credence function is its
usual epistemic utility, as measured by a strictly proper scoring rule;
(ii) for a world at which E is false, the value of a credence function is
some constant k, the same one for each world.
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This has the effect of making us not care about the epistemic utility of a
credence function in worlds that our evidence has ruled out. Thus, given
an epistemic utility function EU, a body of evidence E, and a constant k,
define the new epistemic utility function EUkE as follows:
EUkE(P, w) :=
{
EU(P, w) if w ∈ E
k if w 6∈ E
Then it is easy to see that the following functions of Q are maximised at the
same point:




So, since (i) is maximised at Q(−) = P(−|E), so is (ii). Borrowing it from
Gallow, then, this is our argument for updating using Bayes’ Rule.
6.4 Tying up loose ends
There are two loose ends to tie up before this gives us a satisfactory account
of credal updating. First, you might worry that, while your prior was an
appropriate probability function to use to calculate expectations before the
new evidence arrived, it is no longer appropriate now that the new evi-
dence is here, and so it isn’t rationally required to update to whatever max-
imises expected epistemic value from its point of view. Second, you might
worry that this solution requires us to choose using GHC when we have
no evidence and no prior, and then using expected utility when we have
a prior and some evidence—and you might wonder what could motivate
this difference. In this section, I answer these worries.
6.4.1 Maximising expected epistemic utility from whose point of view?
The first objection usually runs as follows. At an earlier time, you have
a credence function C and a total body of evidence E; and we suppose C
is a rational response to E. But then your evidence changes, because you
learn something new—specifically, you learn E′. And now you want to
know how to respond to this. According to Gallow’s approach, which I am
adopting here, you call on your credence function C and you calculate the
expected epistemic utilities for the various candidate posteriors relative to
that and using an epistemic utility function EUkE′ , where k is some constant
and EU is strictly proper. But surely your credence function C has no au-
thority any longer? After all, while it respects your evidence E at the earlier
time, it does not respect your new evidence E′; it gives positive credence
to worlds at which E′ is false. So why should we pay any attention to the
expected epistemic utilities calculated from its point of view?
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I think the first thing to say is that the epistemic utility theorist has no
notion of respecting the evidence that does not flow ultimately from con-
siderations of epistemic utility. So it isn’t obvious, before you look at the
epistemic utilities, whether or not your current credence function does or
does not respect the evidence, even supposing that notion has any mean-
ing. But Gallow’s approach does allow us to see that there is something
amiss with your prior as a response to this new evidence. And indeed it
gives a recommendation for how to correct that error. It is irrational, we
might suppose, to have a credence function that expects another to be bet-
ter. So, we might suppose that C expects itself to be best relative to the
epistemic utility function EUkE. But now you have evidence E
′ and your
new epistemic utility function is EUkE′ . And now C no longer passes the test
(unless C(E′) = 0 or C(E′) = 1). But it does tell you how to respond—you
should adopt whichever credence function does now maximise epistemic
utility function from the point of view of C and relative to the epistemic
utility function EUkE′ . And, as Gallow shows, that is C(−|E′).
6.4.2 In favour of maximising expected utility
The second objection is due to Sophie Horowitz (2017, Footnote 24). As
I read it, she presents two challenges to the sort of approach I champion
here. The first, to say why we should use different decision rules at each
stage; the second, to say why these principles, in particular—i.e. GHC to
pick your priors, and then the expected utility rule thereafter.
I think the first is reasonably easy to answer. In Section 4, we noted that
we can classify decision rules by the ingredients they take as inputs. For in-
stance, some take as inputs only a representation of the possibilities and a
representation of the agent’s conative attitudes. Wald’s Maximin principle
is like this. We represent the possibilities by possible worlds and the cona-
tive attitudes by utilities. And that’s all that Maximin requires to specify
the rationally permissible choices. Others take a representation of the pos-
sibilities, a representation of the conative attitudes, and a representation of
the risk attitudes. The original Hurwicz criterion is like this, as is our gen-
eralised version. Possibilities are again represented possible worlds, cona-
tive attitudes by utilities, and risk attitudes by Hurwicz weights. Others
still take possibilities, conative attitudes, and doxastic attitudes, the latter
represented by credence functions. Maximising expected utility is an in-
stance of this. And some add attitudes to risk to the conative and doxastic
attitudes. Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory is such a
decision rule.
Now, at the beginning of your epistemic life, before you have assigned
credences, you cannot appeal to a principle that requires as an input your
doxastic state—after all, you don’t have one. And we argued above that, in
such a situation, you should adopt GHC. However, once you have acquired
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a doxastic state, new decision rules become available. In particular, those
that require a doxastic state. For instance, maximising expected utility or
maximising risk-weighted expected utility, among others. Which should
you choose? I’ll build on work by Martin Peterson and Kenny Easwaran
to argue that you should choose by maximising expected utility relative to
your credences.
Recall how we argued for GHC above. We began with just the pos-
sible worlds and the utility function over those worlds, and laid down
axioms governing your preference orderings . And we showed that,
for any ordering that satisfies those axioms, there are Hurwicz weights
Λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) such that, for any acts a and a′,
a  a′ iff HΛ(a) ≤ HΛ(a′)
This time, we are not in the same situation. As well as the possible worlds
and the utility function, we also have a probabilistic credence function P
defined over the possible worlds. Now we wish to show that, in this case,
your preferences should be as follows:





We call this biconditional the expected utility principle. We want to give what
is sometimes called an ex ante justification for this principle.
This is not the usual sort of justification that is given for that norm. In
Savage’s original work, he proceeded as follows (Savage, 1954). He as-
sumed that you have a preference ordering  over a rich set of acts; he im-
posed rational requirements on that preference ordering; and he showed
that, if your preference ordering satisfies these constraints, there is a prob-
ability function that assigns a credence P(w) to each world w inW , and a
utility function that, for each option a, assigns a utility a(w) to each world
w, such that





This is Savage’s representation theorem. It provides what is called an ex
post justification of the expected utility principle. It begins with your pref-
erence ordering and extracts from it credences and utilities for which ex-
pected utility orders the acts just as your preference ordering does. But
a natural question arises: are the credences and utilities extracted from
your preference ordering in this way the credences and utilities that you
assign? Are they your credences and utilities? For some philosophers and
for many economists, the answer is, by definition, yes. They take a repre-
sentation theorem like Savage’s to say what it means to have a particular
credence function and a particular utility function: it is simply to have a
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preference ordering that satisfies Savage’s axioms and that orders acts by
their expected utilities relative to that credence function and utility func-
tion. Others will say that credences, utilities, and preferences have sep-
arate, independent existences; it is possible to have credences and utilities
that do not match your preferences in the way the expected utility principle
demands. But they might also say that, when they don’t, you are irrational.
That is, the expected utility principle is not part of a definition of what it
means to have certain credences and utilities; rather, it is a norm that gov-
erns how your credences, utilities, and preference ordering should relate.
This is the view I take here. But Savage’s representation theorem provides
no route to it. Instead of a list of conditions on a preference ordering alone
and a theorem that shows that, for any preference ordering that satisfies
those conditions, there exist a credence function and utility function that,
together with the preference ordering, satisfy the expected utility principle,
we need a list of conditions on the relationship between a preference order-
ing, a credence function, and a utility function and a theorem that shows
that any three that satisfy those conditions together satisfy the expected
utility principle. Fortunately, such justifications already exist. I am aware
of two: one due to Martin Peterson (2004); the other, more general one, due
to Kenny Easwaran (2014).
Some of the conditions we will impose on the relationship between
preferences, credences, and utilities are familiar; others less so. Recall Coarse
Grain Indifference (A8) from Section 4.3 above. To state that, we had to talk
of coarse-grainings of our individual’s set of possible worlds. To state our
conditions here, we need to talk about fine-grainings of our individual’s set
of possible worlds, and then fine-grainings of their probability and utility
functions as well.
• A coarse-graining ofW is a setW∗ together with a surjective function
h :W →W∗.
• A fine-graining of W is a set W ′ together with a surjective function
h :W ′ →W .
Suppose W = {w1, w2, w3}, where Biden wins at w1, Trump at w2, and
Jorgensen at w3.
• Here is a coarse-graining ofW : W∗ = {w∗1 , w∗2}, where Biden wins at
w∗1 and Biden loses at w
∗
2 . So h(w1) = w
∗
1 and h(w2) = h(w3) = w
∗
2 .
• Here is a fine-graining of W : W ′ = {w′1, w′2, w′3, w′4}, where Biden
wins and is left-handed at w′1, Biden wins and is right-handed at w
′
2,







h(w′3) = w2, and h(w
′
4) = w3.
See Figure 7 for an illustration.
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Figure 7: Our example of fine- and coarse-grainings.
Given a probability function P on W , and a fine-graining W ′, h of W ,






That is, the probability of a world in W is the sum of the probabilities as-
signed to its fine-grainings inW ′.
Given an option a that is defined onW , and a fine-grainingW ′, h ofW ,
we say that an option a′ onW ′ is the fine-graining of a if, for all w′ inW ′,
a′(w′) = a(h(w′)). That is, the utility of a′ at a fine-graining of world w is
just the utility of a at w.
Here are the conditions. They are imposed not only on the individual’s
preference ordering W ,P on options defined on W and where their cre-
dence function is P, but also on their preference orderings W ′,P′ on fine-
grainings of options of those options and where their credence function P′
onW ′ is a fine-graining of P.
(A1) Reflexivity W ′,P′ is reflexive.
(A2) Transitivity W ′,P′ is transitive.
As before, these are uncontroversial in this context, so I’ll say no more about
them.
(A3*) Limit Continuity If a1, a2, . . . tends to a and a′ ≺W ′,P′ ai for all i, then
a′ W ′,P′ a.
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This is a slightly different continuity axiom from the one we imposed above,
but it is no less natural.
(A4) Weak Dominance
(i) If a(w) ≤ a′(w) for all w inW , then a W ′,P′ a′
(ii) If a(w) < a′(w) for all w inW , then a ≺W ′,P′ a′.
Again, this is uncontroversial.
(A8*) Probabilistic Fine Grain Indifference SupposeW ′ and h :W ′ →W
is a fine-graining of W , suppose P′ defined on W ′ is a fine-graining
of P defined onW , and suppose options a′ and b′ defined onW ′ are
fine-grainings of options a and b defined on W , respectively. Then
a ∼W ,P b iff a′ ∼W ′,P′ b′.
Why require this? After all, we rejected the coarse-graining version when
we offered our characterization of GHC above. But, in fact, it’s for that
very reason that we should accept it here. We rejected it in our character-
ization of the decision rule you should use when you have no probabili-
ties and no evidence because it conflicts with Permutation Indifference and
Strong Dominance, and because Permutation Indifference is a more com-
pelling principle in that situation. But now we are considering our agent
in a different situation. They might still have no evidence, but they do
have probabilities—either prior probabilities that they set by appealing to
GHC, or probabilities obtained from those priors using Bayes’ Rule. And
so Permutation Indifference is no longer appropriate. Once you have set
your credences in the possible worlds, it is no longer reasonable for us to
demand that you are indifferent between options that differ only in which
worlds receive which utilities, but do not differ in the utilities assigned.
So, having dropped Permutation Indifference, we clear away the obstacle
that prevented us from adopting the other very compelling sort of principle
that we wished to adopt above, but which were prevented from adopting
by the threat of inconsistency. And indeed, we can now see why Strong
Dominance, Permutation Indifference, and Coarse Grain Indifference are
all so plausible despite being inconsistent. Strong Dominance is a require-
ment at all times; Permutation Indifference is a requirement only when you
have no probabilities and no evidence; and the various versions of Grain
Indifference are required only when you do have probabilities, whether or
not you also have evidence.
(A10) Trade-Off Indifference If, for two possible worlds w′i, w
′
j inW ′,
(i) P(w′i) = P(w
′
j),
(ii) a(w′i)− b(w′i) = b(w′j)− a(w′j), and
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(iii) a(w′k) = b(w
′
k) for all w
′
k 6= w′i, w′j,
then a ∼W ′,P′ b.
This says that, if the utility of one option a exceeds the utility of another
b at one world w′i, but the utility of b exceeds the utility of a by the same
amount at another world w′j, and if you think each of those worlds equally
likely, and if a and b have the same utility at all other worlds, then you
should be indifferent between a and b. That is, b compensates perfectly for
its lower utility at w′i by having the higher utility at w
′
j. So, for instance, if
W ′ = {w′1, w′2}, and you assign equal credence to each world, then Trade-
Off Indifference demands (0, 8) ∼ (1, 7) ∼ (2, 6) ∼ (3, 5) ∼ (4, 4).
Note, however, that this demands a sort of risk-neutrality. After all, we
typically expect that the risk-averse and the risk-inclined will agree on their
evaluation of a risk-free option like (4, 4). But they will disagree on an op-
tion like (0, 8) or (1, 7) that involves risk. But Trade-Off Indifference rules
that out: both must evaluate (0, 8) in the same way, namely, as equivalent
to the risk-free option (4, 4), which they both treat in the same way.
Surely, then, this goes against the Jamesian permissivism about atti-
tudes to epistemic risk that has been the central driving force of my ac-
count so far? I think not. If you were to use a risk-sensitive decision rule
to pick your priors, and then a risk-sensitive decision rule also to pick your
posteriors using your priors, you would double count your attitudes to
risk. This is the answer to Sophie Horowitz’s challenge to this brand of
Jamesian epistemology. Horowitz asks why we should use a risk-sensitive
decision rule at the beginning of our epistemic life, and then a risk-neutral
one thereafter. The answer is that we encode our attitudes to risk entirely
in the decision rule we use to pick our priors. Having picked them using
that rule, we need not and indeed should not include our attitudes to risk
also in the decision rule we use when we appeal to those priors to pick our
posteriors. That would be double counting. It would be as if in the prac-
tical case, we were to encode our attitudes to risk entirely in our decision
rule, and then also encode them a second time in our utility function.
Then we have the following theorem:38
Theorem 8 Suppose ≺, satisfy (A1), (A2), (A3*), (A4), (A8*), and (A10).
Then





And that completes our argument. When you come to a decision armed
with a doxastic state as well as a conative state, you should choose by max-
imising your expected utility. And, as we have seen above, thanks to Gal-
low’s argument, that requires us to update using Bayes’ Rule.




Theorem 9 Suppose Λ = (λ1, λ2, λ3) is a sequence of Hurwicz weights, s is a
strictly proper scoring rule,W = {w1, w2, w3}, and E = {w1, w2}. Then:







among credence functions Q with Q(E) = 1.






does not maximise HΛ(EU(−)) among credence
functions Q with Q(E) = 1.
Proof. Suppose s is a strictly proper scoring rule, ϕ is the associated en-
tropy function, and Ds is the corresponding divergence, as defined in the
proof of Theorem 7 above. Then (x, 1 − x, 0) and (1 − x, x, 0) maximise
HΛ(EU(−)) among C with C(E) = 1 iff x ≥ 1− x and (x, 1− x, 0) min-
imises Ds((λ1, λ2, λ3), (x, 1− x, 0)) among those x > 1− x. Then, as in the
proof of Theorem 7, we appeal to the KKT conditions. We let
f (x) = Ds((λ1, λ2, λ3), (x, 1− x, 0))
= [ϕ(λ1)− ϕ(x)− ϕ′(x)(λ1 − x)] +
[ϕ(λ2)− ϕ(1− x)− ϕ′(1− x)(λ2 − (1− x))] +
[ϕ(λ3)− ϕ(0)− ϕ′(0)(λ3 − 0)]
[ϕ(λ1 + λ2)− ϕ(1)− ϕ′(1)((λ1 + λ2)− 1)] +
[ϕ(λ1 + λ3)− ϕ(x)− ϕ′(x)((λ1 + λ3)− x)] +
[ϕ(λ2 + λ3)− ϕ(1− x)− ϕ′(1− x)((λ2 + λ3)− (1− x))]
g(x) = −x + 1
2









[ϕ(λ1)− ϕ(x)− ϕ′(x)(λ1 − x)] = ϕ′′(x)(x− λ1)
d
dx
[ϕ(λ2)− ϕ(1− x)− ϕ′(x)(λ2 − (1− x))] = ϕ′′(1− x)(λ2 − (1− x))
d
dx
[ϕ(λ3)− ϕ(0)− ϕ′(0)(λ3 − 0)] = 0
d
dx
[ϕ(λ1 + λ2)− ϕ(1)−
ϕ′(1)((λ1 + λ2)− 1)] = 0
d
dx
[ϕ(λ1 + λ3)− ϕ(x)−
ϕ′(x)((λ1 + λ3)− x))] = ϕ′′(x)(x− (λ1 + λ3))
d
dx
[ϕ(λ2 + λ3)− ϕ(1− x)−





Ds((λ1, λ2, λ3), (1/2, 1/2, 0))− µ
= ϕ′′(1/2)(1/2− λ1) + ϕ′′(1/2)(λ2 − 1/2) +
ϕ′′(1/2)(1/2− (λ1 + λ3)) + ϕ′′(1/2)((λ2 + λ3)− 1/2)− µ
= 2ϕ′′(1/2)(λ2 − λ1)− µ
iff
µ = 2ϕ′′(1/2)(λ2 − λ1)
Now, since ϕ is strictly convex, ϕ′′ is strictly positive, and in particular
ϕ′′(1/2) > 0. So, if λ2 ≥ λ1, then let µ ≥ 0, giving (i). And, if λ2 < λ1, then
µ < 0, giving (ii). 2
Theorem 10 Suppose W = {w1, w2, w3} and E = {w1, w2}. Suppose EU is
strictly proper and generated by s. And suppose P = (p1, p2, p3) is your prior
credence function. Then define P′ as follows:









Then P′ is the credence function that maximises ExpP(EU(−)) among credence
functions Q with Q(E) = 1.
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Proof. The posterior that maximises ExpP(EU(−)) among credence func-
tions that assign credence 1 to E has the form (x, 1− x, 0). Let s be a strictly
proper scoring rule. Then, writing si(−) for s(i,−) for the sake of brevity,
ExpP(EU((x, 1− x, 0))) =
p1[s1(x) + s0(1− x) + s0(0) + s1(x + (1− x)) + s1(x + 0) + s0((1− x) + 0)]+
p2[s0(x) + s1(1− x) + s0(0) + s1(x + (1− x)) + s0(x + 0) + s1((1− x) + 0)]+
p3[s0(x) + s0(1− x) + s1(0) + s0(x + (1− x)) + s1(x + 0) + s1((1− x) + 0))]
Now, ignore the constant terms, since they do not affect the minima; and
group terms together. Then we wish to maximise:
s1(x)(2p1 + p3)+ s0(1− x)(2p1 + p3)+ s1(1− x)(2p2 + p3)+ s0(x)(2p2 + p3)
Now, divide through by 2, which again doesn’t affect the minimisation.




p3)+ s0(1− x)(p1 +
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But (p1 + 12 p3) + (p2 +
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p3)+ s0(1− x)(p1 +
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3), as required. 2
In brief...
In the preceding two chapters, I asked how we should use epistemic
utilities to pick our priors. In this chapter, I turned my attention to
picking posteriors. In Sections 6.1-6.2, I considered and rejected a
range of possible approaches. In Sections 6.3-6.4, I settled on an ar-
gument by Dmitri Gallow (2019) that we should pick our posteriors
by maximising expected epistemic utility from the point of view of
our priors, which entails that we should obtain our posteriors from
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our priors by conditioning on our evidence, just as Bayes’ Rule de-
mands.
At first, this approach looks unpromising. After all, we have as-
sumed that all epistemic utility functions are strictly proper, and that
means that each probabilistic credence function expects itself to be
best. But in that case, your probabilistic prior will demand that you
adopt it as your posterior, since doing so maximises expected epis-
temic utility from its point of view; and doing that ignores the evi-
dence you’ve acquired. However, Gallow argues persuasively that
our epistemic utility function should be strictly proper only at the
beginning of our epistemic life. After that, as we acquire evidence, it
should change. At a given time, our epistemic utility function should
treat worlds at which our evidence is true differently from worlds at
which it is false. At worlds at which it is true, the epistemic utility
of a credence function should be whatever our strictly proper prior
epistemic utility function says it is; but at worlds at which our ev-
idence is false, the epistemic utility of a credence function should
just be some constant—the same for each credence function. This is
because, once we acquire evidence, we no longer care about the epis-
temic utility of our crednece function at worlds that our evidence has
ruled out. This adapted epistemic utility function encodes that atti-
tude to those worlds, since it treats all credence functions in the same
way at those worlds. Buildling on an argument that Hannes Leitgeb
and I gave, Gallow then notes that, if epistemic utility is measured
in this way, the posterior that maximises expected epistemic utility
from the point of view of our prior is precisely the one obtained by
conditioning our prior on our evidence (Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010b).
Now, you might wonder why we should choose posteriors using a
risk-neutral decision rule like the expected utility rule. My answer is
that, if we use a risk-sensitive decision rule like GHC to pick priors,
and encode our attitudes to epistemic risk in the Hurwicz weights
we use for that choice, and then we use risk-sensitive rule to pick
posteriors, and encode our attitudes to epistemic risk in that rule,
we would double count our attitudes to epistemic risk. It would be
as bad as if we were to encode our attitudes to risk first in our utilities
in the pragmatic case, and then again in our decision rule.
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7 Answering objections
In the preceding six chapters, I have offered my positive argument for
permissivism about epistemic rationality; more specifically, permissivism
about our credal response to evidence. In this chapter, I defend my argu-
ment against objections that have been raised to permissivism more gener-
ally.
7.1 Permissive rationality and deference
One type of argument against permissivism about epistemic rationality
turns on the claim that rationality is worthy of deference. The argument
begins with a precise version of this claim, stated as a norm that governs
credences. It proceeds by showing that, if epistemic rationality is permis-
sive, then it is sometimes impossible to meet the demands of this norm.
Taking this to be a reductio, the argument concludes that rationality can-
not be permissive. I know of two versions of the argument, one due to
Daniel Greco and Brian Hedden, and one due to Ben Levinstein (Greco &
Hedden, 2016; Levinstein, 2017). I’ll begin with Levinstein’s, since his ver-
sion of the deference norm fixes some problems with Greco and Hedden’s.
I’ll consider David Thorstad’s response to Greco and Hedden’s argument,
which would also work against Levinstein’s argument were it to work at all
(Thorstad, 2019). But I’ll conclude that, while it provides a crucial insight, it
doesn’t quite work, and I’ll offer my own alternative response. And finally
I’ll return to Greco and Hedden’s argument for their norm and explain why
I think it fails.
Roughly speaking, you defer to someone on an issue if, upon learning
their attitude to that issue, you adopt it as your own. So, for instance, if
you ask what I’d like to eat for dinner tonight, and I say that I defer to you
on that issue, I’m saying that I will want to eat whatever I learn you want
to eat. That’s a case of deferring to someone else’s preferences—it’s a case
where we defer conatively to them. Here, we are interested in cases in which
we defer to someone else’s beliefs—that is, where we defer doxastically to
them. Thus, I defer doxastically to my radiographer on the issue of whether
I’ve got a broken finger if I commit to adopting whatever credence they
announce as their diagnosis. By analogy, we sometimes say that we defer
doxastically to a feature of the world if we commit to setting our credence in
some way that is determined by that feature of the world. So, I might defer
doxastically to a particular computer simulation model of Earth’s oceans
on the issue of sea level rise by 2030 if I commit to setting my credence
in a rise of 10cm to whatever probability that model reports when I run it
repeatedly while perturbing its parameters and initial conditions slightly
around my best estimate of their true values.
In philosophy, there are a handful of well-known theses that turn on
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the claim that we are required to defer doxastically to this individual or
that feature of the world—and we’re required to do it on all matters. For
instance, Bas van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle says that you should defer
doxastically to your future self on all matters (van Fraassen, 1984, 1995;
Briggs, 2009). That is, for any proposition X, conditional on your future
self having credence r in X, you should have credence r in X. In symbols:
C(X |my credence in X at future time t is r) = r
And David Lewis’ Principal Principle says that you should defer to the
objective chances on all doxastic matters by setting your credences to match
the probabilities that they report (Lewis, 1980, 1994; Hall, 1994; Thau, 1994).
That is, for any proposition X, conditional on the objective chance of X
being r, you should have credence r in X. In symbols:
C(X | the objective chance of X now is r) = r
Notice that, in both cases, there is a single expert value to which you
defer on the matter in question. At time t, you have exactly one credence in
X, and the Reflection Principle says that, upon learning that single value,
you should set your credence in X to it. And there is exactly one objec-
tive chance of X now, and the Principal Principle says that, upon learning
it, you should set your credence in X equal to it. You might be uncertain
about what that single value is, but it is fixed and unique. So this account
of deference does not cover cases in which there is more than one expert.
For instance, it doesn’t obviously apply if I defer not to a specific climate
model, but to a group of them. In those cases, there is usually no fixed,
unique value that is the credence they all assign to a proposition. So princi-
ples of the same form as the Reflection Principle or the Principal Principle
do not say what to do if you learn one of those values, or some of them,
or all of them. This problem lies at the heart of the deference argument
against permissivism. Those who make the argument think that deference
to groups should work in one way; those who defend permissivism against
it think it should work in some different way.
As I mentioned above, the deference argument begins with a specific,
precise norm that is said to govern the deference we should show to ra-
tionality. The argument continues by claiming that, if rationality is per-
missive, then it is not possible to satisfy this norm. Here is the norm as
Levinstein (2017, 361) states it, where C ∈ RE means that C is in the set RE
of rational responses to evidence E.
Deference to Rationality (DR) Suppose:
(i) C is your credence function;
(ii) E is your total evidence;
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(iii) C(C 6∈ RE) = 1;
(iv) C′ is a probabilistic credence function;
(v) C(C′ ∈ RE) > 0;
then rationality requires
C(−|C′ ∈ RE) = C′(−|C′ ∈ RE)
That is, if you are certain that your credence function is not a rational re-
sponse to your total evidence, then, conditional on some alternative prob-
abilistic credence function being a rational response to that evidence, you
should set your credences in line with that alternative once you’ve condi-
tioned that on the assumption that it is a rational response to your original
total evidence.
Notice, first, that Levinstein’s principle is quite weak. It does not say of
just anyone that they should defer to rationality. It says only that, if you are
in the dire situation of being certain that you are yourself irrational, then
you should defer to rationality. If you are sure you’re irrational, then your
conditional credences should be such that, were you to learn of a credence
function that it’s a rational response to your evidence, you should fall in
line with the credences that it assigns conditional on that same assumption
that it is rational. Restricting its scope in this way makes it more palatable
to permissivists who will typically not think that someone who is already
pretty sure that they are rational must switch credences when they learn
that there are alternative rational responses out there.
Notice also that you need only show such deference to rational credence
functions that satisfy the probability axioms. This restriction is essential,
for otherwise DR will force you to violate the probability axioms yourself.
After all, if C(−) is probabilistic, then so is C(−|X) for any X with c(X) >
0. Thus, if C′(−|C′ ∈ RE) is not probabilistic, and C defers to C′ in the way
Levinstein’s principle demands, then C(−|C′ ∈ RE) is not probabilistic,
and thus neither is C.
Now, suppose:
• C is your credence function;
• E is your total evidence;
• C′ and C′′ are probabilistic credence functions with
C′(−|C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE) 6= C′′(−|C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE)
That is, C′ and C′′ are distinct and remain distinct even once they
become aware that both are rational responses to E;
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• C(C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE) > 0. That is, you give some credence to both
of them being rational responses to E;
• C(C 6∈ RE) = 1. That is, you are certain that your own credence
function is not a rational response to E.
Then, by DR,
• C(−|C′ ∈ RE) = C′(−|C′ ∈ RE)
• C(−|C′′ ∈ RE) = C′′(−|C′′ ∈ RE)
Thus, conditioning both sides of the first identity on C′′ ∈ RE and both
sides of the second identity on C′ ∈ RE, we obtain
• C(−|C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE) = C′(−|C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE)
• C(−|C′′ ∈ RE & C′ ∈ RE) = C′′(−|C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE)
But, by assumption, C′(−|C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE) 6= C′′(−|C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈
RE). So DR cannot be satisfied.
One thing to note about this argument: if it works, it establishes not
only that there can be no two different rational responses to the same evi-
dence, but also that it is irrational to be anything less than certain of this.
After all, what is required to derive the contradiction from DR is not that
there are two probabilistic credence functions C′ and C′′ such that C′(−|C′ ∈
RE & C′′ ∈ RE) 6= C′′(−|C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE) that are both rational responses
to E. Rather, what is required is only that there are two probabilistic cre-
dence functions C′ and C′′ with C′(−|C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE) 6= C′′(−|C′ ∈
RE & C′′ ∈ RE) that you think might both be rational responses to E—that is,
C(C′ ∈ RE & C′′ ∈ RE) > 0. The reason is that Levinstein’s principle
applies to your prior. It doesn’t tell you directly how you should update
upon learning C′ ∈ RE. Rather, it tells you what conditional credences you
should have before learning that. And so, in order to derive the contradic-
tion from DR, Levinstein does not need to appeal to what happens if you
actually learn C′ ∈ RE. He needs only to look at the conditional credences
that you have before learning that. And so at no point does he need to
assume that there actually are two credence functions C′ and C′′ that are
both rational and that disagree even after both condition on them both be-
ing rational. He just needs to assume that you assign a positive probability
to this possibility. And so it is assigning that positive probability that his
argument shows to be irrational. Now, the conclusion that it is irrational to
even entertain permissivism strikes me as too strong, but perhaps Levin-
stein would be happy to accept it.
Let’s turn, then, to a more substantial worry, given compelling voice by
David Thorstad (2019): DR is too strong because the deontic modality that
features in it is too strong. As I hinted above, the point is that the form
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of the deference principles that Levinstein and Greco and Hedden use is
borrowed from cases—such as the Reflection Principle and the Principal
Principle—in which there is just one expert value, though it might be un-
known to you. In those cases, it is appropriate to say that, upon learning
the single value and nothing more, you are required to set your credence in
line with it. But, unless we simply beg the question against permissivism
and assume there is a single rational response to every body of evidence,
this isn’t our situation. Rather, it’s more like the case where you defer to
a group of experts, such as a group of climate models. And in this case,
Thorstad says, it is inappropriate to demand that you set your credence in
line with an expert’s credence when you learn what it is. Rather, it is at
most appropriate to permit you to do that. That is, Levinstein’s principle
should not say that rationality requires your credence function to assign the
conditional credences stated in its consequent; it should say instead that
rationality permits it.
Thorstad motivates his claim by drawing an analogy with a moral case
that he describes. Suppose you see two people drowning. They’re called
John and James, and you know that you will be able to save at most one.
So the actions available to you are: (i) save John, (ii) save James, and (iii) save
neither. And the moral actions are: (i) save John, and (ii) save James. But now
consider a deference principle governing this situation that is analogous
to DR: it demands that, upon learning that it is moral to save James, you
must do that; and upon learning that it is moral to save John, you must
do that. From this, we can derive a contradiction in a manner somewhat
analogous to that in which we derived the contradiction from DR above: if
you learn both that it is moral to save John and moral to save James, you
should do both; but that isn’t an available action; so moral permissivism
must be false. But I take it no moral theory will tolerate that in this case—
no moral theory will be able to break the symmetry between saving James
and saving John, and so uniqueness will require us to save neither, which
no reasonable moral theory will allow.39 So, Thorstad argues, there must
be something wrong with the moral deference principle; and, by analogy,
there must be something wrong with the analogous doxastic principle, DR.
Thorstad’s diagnosis is this: the correct deference principle in the moral
case should say: upon learning that it is moral to save James, you may do
that; upon learning that it is moral to save John, you may do that. You
thereby avoid the contradiction, and moral permissivism is safe. Simi-
larly, the correct doxastic deference principle is this: upon learning that
a credence function is rational, it is permissible to defer to it. In Levin-
stein’s framework, the following is rationally permissible, not rationally
39Perhaps there is a moral theory on which saving one but not the other would involve




C(−|C′ ∈ RE) = C′(−|C′ ∈ RE)
I think Thorstad’s example is extremely illuminating, but for reasons
rather different from his. Recall that a crucial feature of Levinstein’s version
of the deference argument against permissivism is that it applies only to
people who are certain that their current credences are irrational. If we add
the analogous assumption to Thorstad’s case, his verdict is less compelling.
Suppose, for instance, you are currently committed to saving neither John
nor James from drowning; that’s what you plan to do; it’s the action you
have formed an intention to perform. What’s more, you’re certain that this
action is not moral. But you’re uncertain which of the other two available
actions is moral. And let’s add a further twist to drive home the point.
Suppose, furthermore, that you are certain that you are just about learn, of
exactly one of them, that it is permissible. And add to that the fact that,
immediately after you learn, of exactly one of them, that it is moral, you
must act—failing to do so will leave both John and James to drown, and
of course you are certain that this is immoral. In this case, I think, it’s
quite reasonable to say that, upon learning that saving James is permissible,
you are not only morally permitted to drop your intention to save neither
and replace it with the intention to save James, but you are also morally
required to do so; and the same should you learn that it is permissible to
save John. It would, I think, be impermissible to save neither, since you’re
certain that’s immoral and you know of an alternative that is moral; and it
would be impermissible to save John, since you are still uncertain about the
moral status of that action, while you are certain that saving James is moral;
and it would be morally required to save James, since you are certain of that
action alone that it is moral.
Now, Levinstein’s principle might seem to hold for individuals in an
analogous situation. Suppose you’re certain that your current credences
are irrational. And suppose you’re certain that you will learn of only one
credence function that it is rationally permissible. At least in this situa-
tion, it might seem that it is rationally required that you adopt the cre-
dence function you learn is rationally permissible, just as you are morally
required to perform the single act you learn is moral. So, is Levinstein’s
argument rehabilitated? After all, if you really are rationally required to
adopt C′(−|C′ ∈ RE) in this situation should you learn C′ ∈ RE, and if you
are rationally required to adopt C′′(−|C′′ ∈ RE) should you learn C′′ ∈ RE,
then you must have the conditional credences to which Levinstein appeals
to derive his contradiction.
In fact, I don’t think this rehabilitates Levinstein’s argument. Thorstad’s
example is useful, but not because the case of rationality and morality are
analogous; rather, the example is useful precisely because it draws atten-
tion to the fact that they are disanalogous. After all, all moral actions are
116
better than all immoral ones. So, if you are committed to an action you
know is immoral, and you learn of another that it is moral, and you know
you’ll learn nothing more about morality, you must commit to perform the
action you’ve learned is moral. Doing so is the only way you know how
to improve the action you’ll perform for sure. But this is not the case for
rational attitudes. It is not the case that all rational attitudes are better than
all irrational attitudes. Let’s see a few examples.
Suppose my preferences over a set of acts a1, . . . , aN are as follows,
where N is some very large number:
a1 ≺ a2 ≺ a3 ≺ . . . ≺ aN−3 ≺ aN−2 ≺ aN−1 ≺ aN ≺ aN−2
These preferences are irrational, because, if the ordering is irreflexive, then
it is not transitive: aN−2 ≺ aN−1 ≺ aN ≺ aN−2, but aN−2 6≺ aN−2. Now,
suppose I learn that the following preferences are rational:
a1  a2  a3  . . .  aN−3  aN−2  aN−1  aN
Then surely it is not rationally required of me to adopt these alternative
preferences. Indeed, it seems to me that it might even be rationally pro-
hibited to transition from the first irrational set to the second rational set.
But I don’t need that stronger claim. In the end, my original preferences
are irrational because of a small, localised flaw. But they nonetheless ex-
press coherent opinions about a lot of comparisons. And, concerning all
of those comparisons, the alternative preferences take exactly the opposite
view. Moving to the latter in order to avoid having preferences that are
flawed in the way that the original set are flawed does not seem rationally
required, and indeed might seem irrational.
Something similar happens in the credal case, at least according to the
epistemic utility theorist. Suppose I have credence function C where C(X) =
0.1 and C(X) = 1. And suppose the single legitimate measure of epistemic
utility is the Brier score.40 I don’t know this, but I do know a few things:
first, I know that the rationality of credences is determined by features of
their epistemic utility in different possible worlds, and that whatever is
the correct measure of epistemic utility it is truth-directed, so that higher
credences in truths and lower credences in falsehoods are better; further-
more, I know that my credences are dominated and therefore irrational, but
I don’t know what dominates them. Now suppose I learn that the follow-
ing credence function is rational: C′(X) = 0.95 and C′(X) = 0.05. It seems
that I am not required to adopt C′; and again, it seems that I am not even
rationally permitted to do so, though again this latter claim is stronger than
I need. While C is irrational, it does nonetheless encode something like a
40For arguments for this claim, see (D’Agostino & Sinigaglia, 2010) and (Pettigrew, 2016a,
Section 4.4).
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point of view. And, from that point of view, and relative to many many
truth-directed measures of epistemic utility, the C′ just looks much much
worse than C. While I know that C is irrational and dominated, though I
don’t know what by, I also know that, from my current, slightly incoherent
point of view, C′ looks a lot less good than C. And indeed it will be much
less good if X turns out to be false.
So, even in what seems to be the situation in which Levinstein’s prin-
ciple is most compelling, namely, when you are certain you’re irrational
and you will learn of only one credence function that it is rational, still it
doesn’t hold. It is possible to be sure that your credence function is an
irrational response to your evidence, sure that an alternative is a rational
response, and yet not be required to adopt the alternative because learning
that the alternative is rational does not teach you that it’s better than your
current irrational credence function for sure—it might be much worse. This
is different from the moral case. So, as stated, Levinstein’s principle is false.
However, to make the deference argument work, Levinstein’s principle
need only hold in a single case. Levinstein describes a family of cases—
those in which you’re certain you’re irrational—and claims that it holds in
all of those. Thorstad’s objection shows that it doesn’t. I then narrowed the
family of cases to avoid Thorstad’s objection—perhaps Levinstein’s prin-
ciple holds when you’re certain you’re irrational and certain you’ll only
learn of one credence function that it’s rational. After all, the analogous
moral principle holds in those cases. But we’ve just seen that the doxas-
tic version doesn’t always hold there, because learning that an alternative
credence function is rational does not teach you that it is better than your
irrational credence function in the way that learning an act is moral teaches
you that it’s better than the immoral act you intend to perform. But per-
haps we can narrow the range of cases yet further to find one in which the
principle does hold.
Suppose, for instance, you are certain you’re irrational, you know you’ll
learn of just one credence function that it’s rational, and moreover you
know you’ll learn that it is better than yours. Thus, in the epistemic utility
framework, suppose you’ll learn that it dominates you. Then surely Levin-
stein’s principle holds here? And this would be sufficient for Levinstein’s
argument, since, relative to any strictly proper measure of epistemic utility,
each non-probabilistic credence function is dominated by many different
probabilistic credence functions; so we could find the distinct C′ and C′′ we
need to make Levinstein’s reductio go through.
Not so fast, I think. How you should respond when you learn that
C′ is rational depends on what else you think about what determines the
rationality of a credence function. Suppose, for instance, you think that
a credence function is rational just in case it is not dominated, but you
don’t know which are the legitimate measures of epistemic utility. So, for
instance, suppose you think there is only one legitimate measure of epis-
118
temic utility, and you know it’s either the Brier score or the absolute value
score.41 And suppose your credence function is C(X) = 0.1 and C(X) = 1,
as above. Now you learn not only that C?(X) = 0.05 and C?(X) = 0.95 is
rational, but also that it dominates C and is not itself dominated. So you
learn that C? is epistemically better than C at all worlds, and there is no
alternative that is better than C? at all worlds. Then you thereby learn that
the Brier score is the only legitimate measure of epistemic utility. After all,
according to the absolute value score, C? does not dominate C; in fact, C
and C? have exactly the same absolute value score at both worlds. You
thereby learn that the credence functions that dominate C without them-
selves being dominated are those C′ for which C′(X) lies between the so-
lution of −(1− x)2 − (1− x)2 = −(1− 0.05)2 − (0− 1)2 in [0, 1] and the
solution of −(0− x)2 − (1− (1− x))2 = −(0− 0.05)2 − (1− 1)2 in [0, 1],
and C′(X) = 1− c(X). You are then permitted to pick any one of them—
they are all guaranteed to be better than yours. You are not obliged to pick
C? itself.
The crucial point is this: learning that a credence function is rational
teaches you something about the features of a credence function that deter-
mine whether it is rational. And that teaches you something about the set of
rational credence functions—you learn it contains that credence function,
but you might also learn other normative facts, such as the correct measure
of epistemic utility, perhaps, or the correct decision rule to apply with the
correct measure of epistemic utility to identify the rational credence func-
tions. And learning those things may well require you to shift your current
credences; but they need not compel you to adopt the credence function
you initially learned was rational.
Indeed, you might be compelled to adopt something other than that cre-
dence. An example: suppose that, instead of learning that C? is rational and
dominates C, you learn that some other C′ 6= C? is rational and dominates
C. Then, as before, you learn that the Brier score and not the absolute value
score is the correct measure of epistemic utility, and thereby learn the set of
credence functions that dominates yours. Perhaps rationality then requires
you to fix up your credence function so that it is rational, but in a way that
minimises the amount by which you change your current credences. How
to measure this? Well, perhaps you’re required to pick an undominated
dominator C′′ such that the expected epistemic utility of your current ir-
rational credence function C from the point of view of this dominator C′′
is maximal. That is, you pick the credence function that dominates you
and isn’t itself dominated and which thinks most highly of your original
41Recall:
• the Brier score: B(C, w) = −∑X∈F |w(X)− C(X)|2;
• the absolute value score: A(C, w) = −∑X∈F |w(X)− C(X)|.
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credence function. Measuring epistemic utility using the Brier score, this
turns out to be the credence function C? described above. Thus, given this
reasonable account of how to respond when you learn what the rational
credence functions are, upon learning that C′ 6= C? is rational, rationality
then requires you to adopt C?.
In sum: For someone who is certain that their credence function is ir-
rational, learning only that some alternative credence function is rational
is not enough to compel them to move to that alternative; indeed, it’s not
enough to compel them to change their credences at all, since they’ve no
guarantee that doing so will improve their situation. To compel them to
change their credences, you must teach them how to improve their epis-
temic situation. But when you teach them that doing a particular thing
will improve their epistemic situation, that usually teaches them norma-
tive facts of which they were uncertain before—how to measure epistemic
value, or the principles for choosing credences once you’ve fixed how to
measure epistemic value—and doing that will typically teach them other
ways to improve their epistemic situation besides the one you’ve explicitly
taught them. Sometimes there will be nothing to tell between all the ways
they’ve learned to improve their epistemic situation, and so all will be per-
missible, as Thorstad imagines; and sometimes there will be reason to pick
just one of those ways, and so that will be mandated, even if epistemic ra-
tionality is permissive. In either case, Levinstein’s argument does not go
through. The deference principle on which it is based is not true.
While Levinstein’s deference principle avoids certain problems that Greco
and Hedden’s faces, Greco and Hedden do more to justify the sort of defer-
ence that both principles try to capture. Inspired by Edward Craig’s (1999)
account of the role of the concept of knowledge, and following the lead of
Sinan Dogramaci (2012), Greco and Hedden argue for their deference prin-
ciple by appealing to roles that they take the concept of rationality to play
in our lives. They claim that we use this concept to identify individuals
to whom to defer. Knowing that we must gain evidence about the world
not only directly from our experience of it, but also from others, we need
some concept to pick out those others from whom we are happy to learn.
They claim this role is played by the concept of rationality. The deference
principle follows almost analytically.
I have a couple of concerns about this argument. First, if we wish to pick
out people in our community from whom we should be happy to learn,
the concept of reliability serves our purposes better than the concept of
rationality. After all, most philosophers agree that being rational requires
more than being reliable; and yet reliability is all that really interests you if
you wish to defer. So, if you use reliability instead of rationality to badge
those to whom you should defer, you will learn more truths. So, if the
concept of reliability already serves this purpose and indeed does it better
than the concept of rationality, why would we have introduced the concept
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of rationality in the way that Dogramaci and Greco and Hedden claim we
did?
Second, as Greco and Hedden concede, it seems that it is only the con-
cept of epistemic rationality that was introduced for this purpose; the con-
cept of practical rationality does not seem to demand deference, and there-
fore cannot have been introduced for the same purpose. If I know that
you prefer the well-being of your child to the well-being of my niece, and
I learn that you are rational, I am not obliged to defer to you on this. If I
know that you prefer the life of the mind to the life of action, and I learn
that you are rational, I am not obliged to defer to you on this. If I know that
you weigh property rights more than equality in a political system, and I
learn that you are rational, I am not obliged to defer to you on this. If I
know that we would both obtain the same value from successfully climb-
ing Annapurna I, and the same disvalue from an unsuccessful attempt, but
I prefer not to climb it because I’m more risk-averse, and you prefer to
climb it because you are more risk-inclined, and I learn that you are ratio-
nal, I am not obliged to defer to you on this. Why, then, did we introduce a
single concept—the concept of rationality—and then give a quite different
account of it when we apply it to different attitudes?
Greco and Hedden consider this objection. They agree that practical
rationality doesn’t demand deference, and they consider what might lie
behind the difference.
[W]hile there is an objective, agent-neutral standard of correct-
ness for beliefs (namely truth), there may not be an objective,
agent-neutral standard of correctness for preferences. [...] it
may be that preferences are correct only insofar as they line up
with agent-relative facts about goodness, and this is why judg-
ing a preference to be rational doesn’t involve a commitment to
defer to it. (Greco & Hedden, 2016)
One problem with this is that we do not even defer to preferences of those
rational individuals with whom we share the same agent-relative facts about
goodness. That’s what the mountain climbing example above illustrates.
For you and I, the two outcomes—successfully climbing the mountain,
and making an unsuccessful attempt—might have the same agent-relative
goodness; we might value them both equally. But, because of our attitudes
to risk, I prefer one action over another, while you prefer the second to the
first. I might learn this and also learn that you are rational—after all, dif-
ferent attitudes to risk are rationally permitted. But, if I do, I am under no
obligation to defer to you.
Of course, to some extent, this is why I reject deference in the case of
epistemic rationality as well. Yes, you and I might both share the same epis-
temic goals—accuracy, perhaps, or accuracy and understanding together—
and we might both measure how well we are achieving it using the same
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measure of epistemic value. But we might also have different attitudes to
epistemic risk—after all, we follow William James in claiming that this is
rationally permissible. If we do, and if I learn that you are rational, I have
no obligation to defer to you. Indeed, I might well have an obligation not to
defer to you, since your credences aren’t derived by applying Bayes’ Rule
to priors that reflect my attitudes to risk.
7.2 The value question
Rationality is good; irrationality is bad. Most epistemologists would agree
with this rather unnuanced take, regardless of their view of what exactly
constitutes rationality and its complement. Granted this, a good test of
a thesis in epistemology is whether it can explain why this is true. Can
it answer the value question: Why is rationality valuable? And indeed So-
phie Horowitz (2014) gives an extremely illuminating appraisal of different
degrees of epistemic permissivism and impermissivism by asking of each
what answer it might give. Her conclusion is that the extreme permissivist
and the extreme impermissivist can give a satisfying answer to this ques-
tion, or, at least, an answer that is satisfying from their own point of view;
but the moderate permissivist cannot. In Horowitz’s paper, the extreme
permissivist is played by the extreme subjective Bayesian, who thinks that
satisfying Probabilism and being certain of your evidence is necessary and
sufficient for rational priors and updating by Bayes’ Rule is necessary and
sufficient to obtain rational posteriors; the extreme impermissivist is played
by the objective Bayesian, who thinks that rationality requires the uniform
prior and posteriors obtained from it by Bayes’ Rule; and the moderate per-
missivist is played by the moderate subjective Bayesian, who thinks ratio-
nality imposes requirements more stringent than merely Probabilism, but
who does not think they’re stringent enough to pick out a unique credence
function. In this section, I’d like to raise some problems for Horowitz’s as-
sessment, and try to offer my own answer to the value question on behalf
of the moderate Bayesian. Of course, if we think that GHC is the strongest
decision rule that applies to my priors, then extreme subjective Bayesian-
ism is true, at least interpersonally. However, as I mentioned in Section 5.2,
we might wish to strengthen GHC by ruling out some of the most extreme
risk-inclined Hurwicz weights. And in this case, we’ll obtain moderate
subjective Bayesianism. So it behooves us to address Horowitz’s worries.
Let’s begin with the answers to the value question that Horowitz offers
on behalf of the extreme permissivist and the impermissivist.
According to Horowitz, the extreme subjective Bayesian says this: (i)
only by being rational can you have a credence function that is immodest,
where a credence function is immodest if it uniquely maximises expected
epistemic utility from its own point of view; and, (ii) when it comes to your
doxastic attitudes, it’s good for them to be immodest and bad for them to
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be modest.
On (i): Horowitz, like us, assumes that all legitimate epistemic utility
functions are strictly proper, so that every probabilistic credence function
expects itself to be better than any alternative credence function. From
this, we can conclude that, on the extreme permissivist view—that is, the
extreme subjective Bayesian view—rationality is sufficient for immodesty.
It’s trickier to show that rationality is also necessary for immodesty, be-
cause it isn’t clear what we mean by the expected epistemic utility of a
credence function from the point of view of a non-probabilistic credence
function—the usual definitions of expectation make sense only for proba-
bilistic credence functions. Fortunately, however, we don’t have to clarify
this much. We need only say that, at the very least, if one credence func-
tion is epistemically better than another at all possible worlds—that is, if
the first dominates the second—then any credence function, probabilistic
or not, will expect the first to be better than the second. We then com-
bine this with Theorem 1(I) from above, which says that, if epistemic utility
is measured by a stricty proper epistemic utility function, then each non-
probabilistic credence function is dominated. This then shows that, for the
extreme subjective Bayesian, being rational is necessary for being immod-
est.
On (ii): While modesty might be a virtue in the practical or moral sphere,
it is a vice in the epistemic sphere. In the moral sphere, modesty, so long
as it is not excessive, is a virtuous mode of self-doubt; it demands that
you treat the achievements and moral judgments of others as worthy of
respect. In the technical sense in which it is used here in the epistemic
realm, modesty is irrational because it generates situations reminiscent of
those paradoxical beliefs discussed by G. E. Moore, such as ‘It’s raining,
but I don’t believe it is’. Just as Moore’s belief seems irrational, so it seems
irrational both to believe something and to expect that some specific alter-
native opinion about it is epistemically better than yours. And similarly for
credences. It seems irrational both to have a credence in a proposition and
also to expect some specific alternative credence to be better than yours. If
you really do expect that alternative to be better, why are you sticking with
the credence you have? So, according to Horowitz’s answer to the value
question on behalf of the extreme permissivist, being rational is good and
being irrational is bad because being rational is necessary and sufficient for
being immodest; and it’s good to be immodest and bad to be modest.
So much for the extreme permissivist. Let’s turn now to the extreme
impermissivist. Horowitz’s answer to the value question on their behalf
is much briefer: if you are rational, you maximise expected accuracy from
the point of view of the one true rational credence function; if you are irra-
tional, you don’t; the former is good and the latter is bad.
Below, we’ll return to the question of whether these answers are satisfy-
ing. But first I want to turn to Horowitz’s claim that the moderate Bayesian
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cannot give a satisfactory answer. I’ll argue that, if the two answers just
given on behalf of the extreme permissivist and extreme impermissivist are
satisfactory, there is a satisfactory answer that the moderate permissivist
can give. Then I’ll argue that, in fact, these answers aren’t very satisfying.
Horowitz’s strategy is to show that the moderate permissivist cannot
find a good epistemic feature of credence functions that belongs to all that
they count as rational, but does not belong to any they count as irrational.
The extreme permissivist can point to immodesty; the extreme impermis-
sivist can point to maximising expected epistemic utility from the point of
view of the sole rational credence function. But, for the moderate, there’s
nothing—or so Horowitz argues.
For instance, Horowitz initially considers the suggestion that rational
credence functions guarantee you a minimum amount of epistemic utility.
As she notes, the problem with this is that either it leads to impermissivism,
or it fails to include all and only the credence functions the moderate con-
siders rational. Let’s focus on the case in which we have opinions only
about a proposition X and its negation X—the point generalises. As usual,
we represent a credence function C as a pair (C(X), C(X)). And let’s mea-
sure epistemic utility using the Brier score. So, when X is true, the epistemic
utility of (p, q) is −(1− p)2 − q2, and when X is false, it is −p2 − (1− q)2.
Then:
• For r > − 12 : there is no credence function that guarantees you at least
epistemic value r. If you have at least that epistemic value at one
world, you have less than that epistemic value at a different world.
• For r = − 12 , there is exactly one credence function that guarantees
you at least epistemic value r. It is the uniform credence function
(0.5, 0.5).
• For r < − 12 , there are both probabilistic and non-probabilistic cre-
dence functions that guarantee you at least epistemic utility r.
So, Horowitz concludes, a certain level of guaranteed epistemic utility can’t
be what separates the rational from the irrational for the moderate permis-
sivist, since for any level, either no credence function guarantees it, exactly
one does, or there are both credence functions the moderate considers ra-
tional and credence functions they consider irrational that guarantee it.
She identifies a similar problem if we think not about guaranteed accu-
racy but about expected accuracy. Suppose, as the moderate permissivist
urges, that some but not all probability functions are rationally permissible.
Then, Horowitz claims, for many rational credence functions, there will be
irrational ones that they expect to be better than they expect some rational
credence functions to be. Horowitz gives the example of a case in which
the rational credences in X are exactly those between 0.6 and 0.8 inclusive.
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Then someone with credence 0.8 will expect the irrational credence 0.81 to
be better than it expects the rational credence 0.7 to be—at least according
to many many strictly proper measures of epistemic utility. So, Horowitz
concludes, whatever separates the rational from the irrational, it cannot be
considerations of expected epistemic utility.
I’d like to argue that, in fact, Horowitz should be happy with appeals
to guaranteed or expected epistemic utility. Let’s take guaranteed utility
first. All that the moderate permissivist needs to say to answer the value
question is that there are two things that rationality provides: immodesty
and a guaranteed level of epistemic utility. Immodesty rules out all non-
probabilistic credence functions, as we know from Theorem 1, while the
guaranteed level of epistemic utility narrows further. How narrow de-
pends on how much epistemic utility you wish to guarantee. So, for in-
stance, suppose we say that the rational credence functions are exactly
those (p, 1 − p) with 0.4 ≤ p ≤ 0.6. Then each is immodest. And they
are exactly the credence functions on X and X that have a guaranteed epis-
temic utility of at least r = −(1 − 0.4)2 − 0.62 = −0.72. If Horowitz is
satisfied with the immodesty answer to the value question when the ex-
treme permissivist gives it, I think she should also be satisfied with it when
the moderate permissivist combines it with a requirement not to risk cer-
tain low epistemic utilities (in this case, utilities below r = −0.72). And
this combination of principles rules in all of the credence functions that the
moderate counts as rational and rules out all they count as irrational.
Next, let’s think about expected epistemic utility. Suppose that the set of
prior credence functions that the moderate permissivist counts as rational
is a closed convex set. For instance, perhaps the set of rational credence
function is
R = {P = (p, 1− p) : 0.6 ≤ p ≤ 0.8}
Then we can prove the following: if a credence function C is not in R, then
there is an alternative credence function C? in R such that each P in R ex-
pects C? to be better than it expects C to be.42 Thus, just as Horowitz would
have the extreme impermissivist answer the value question by saying that,
if you’re irrational, there’s a credence function the unique rational credence
function prefers to yours, while if you’re rational, there isn’t, the moderate
permissivist can say that, if you’re irrational, there is a credence function
that all the rational credence functions prefer to yours, while if you’re ra-
tional, there isn’t.
Of course, you might think that it is still a problem for moderate permis-
sivists that there are rational credence functions that expect some irrational
credence functions to be better than some alternative rational ones. But
42For the proof strategy, see (Pettigrew, 2016a, Chapter 10), but replace the epistemically
possible chance functions mentioned in that chapter with the rational credence functions in
R.
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I don’t think Horowitz will have this worry. After all, the same problem
affects extreme permissivism, and she does not taken issue with this—at
least, not in the paper we’re considering. For any two probabilistic cre-
dence functions P1 and P2, there will be some non-probabilistic credence
function P′1 that P1 will expect to be better than it expects P2 to be—P
′
1 is
just a very slight perturbation of P1 that makes it incoherent; a perturbation
small enough to ensure it lies closer to P1 than P2 does.
A different worry about the account of the value of rationality that I
have just offered on behalf of the moderate permissivist is that it seems to
do no more than push the problem back a step. It says that all irrational
credence functions have a flaw that all rational credence functions lack.
The flaw is this: there is an alternative preferred by all rational credence
functions. But to assume that this is indeed a flaw seems to presuppose
that we should care how rational credence functions evaluate themselves
and other credence functions. But isn’t the reason for caring what they say
exactly what we have been asking for? Isn’t the person who posed the
value question in the first place simply going to respond: OK, but what’s
so great about all the rational credence functions expecting something else
to be better, when the question on the table is exactly why rational credence
functions are so good?
This is a powerful objection, but note that it applies equally well to
Horowitz’s response to the value question on behalf of the impermissivist.
There, she claims that what is good about being rational is that you thereby
maximise expected accuracy from the point of view of the unique rational
credence function. But without an account of what’s so good about being
rational, I think we equally lack an account of what’s so good about max-
imising expected accuracy from the point of view of the rational credence
functions.
So, in the end, I think Horowitz’s answer to the value question on behalf
of the impermissivist and my proposed expected epistemic utility answer
on behalf of the moderate permissivist are unsatisfying.
What’s more, Horowitz’s answer on behalf of the extreme permissivist
is also a little unsatisfying. The answer turns on the claim that immodesty
is a virtue, together with the fact that precisely those credence functions
identified as rational by subjective Bayesianism have that virtue. But is it
a virtue? Just as arrogance in a person might seem excusable if they gen-
uinely are very competent, but not if they are incompetent, so immodesty
in a credence function only seems virtuous if the credence function itself is
good. If the credence function is bad, then evaluating itself as uniquely the
best seems just another vice to add to its collection.
So I think Horowitz’s answer to the value question on behalf of the
extreme permissivist is a little unsatisfactory. But it lies very close to an
answer I find compelling. That answer appeals not to immodesty, but to
non-dominance. Having a credence function that is dominated is bad. It
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leaves free epistemic utility on the table in just the same way that a dom-
inated action in practical decision theory leaves free pragmatic utility on
the table. For the extreme permissivist, what is valuable about rationality
is that it ensures that you don’t suffer from this flaw.
One noteworthy feature of this answer is the conception of rationality
to which it appeals. On this conception, the value of rationality does not
derive fundamentally from a positive feature, but from the lack of a nega-
tive feature. Ultimately, the primary notion here is irrationality. A credence
function is irrational if it exhibits certain flaws, which are spelled out in
terms of its success in the pursuit of epistemic utility. You are rational if
you are free of these flaws. Thus, for the extreme permissivist, there is
just one such flaw—being dominated. So the rational credences are simply
those that lack that flaw—and the maths tells us that those are precisely the
probabilistic credence functions.
We can retain this conception of rationality, motivate moderate permis-
sivism, and answer the value question for it. In fact, there are at least two
ways to do this. We have met something very close to one of these ways
when we tried to rehabilitate the moderate permissivist’s appeal to guar-
anteed epistemic utility above. There, we said that what makes rational-
ity good is that it ensures that you are immodest and also ensures a cer-
tain guaranteed level of accuracy. But, a few paragraphs back, we argued
that immodesty is not guaranteed to be a virtue. So that answer can’t be
quite right. But we can replace the appeal to immodesty with an appeal
to non-dominance, and then the answer will be more satisfying. Thus, the
moderate permissivist who says that the rational credence functions are ex-
actly those P = (p, 1− p) with 0.4 ≤ p ≤ 0.6 can say that being rational
is valuable for two reasons: (i) if you’re rational, you aren’t dominated;
(ii) if you’re rational you are guaranteed to have epistemic utility at least
r = −0.72; (iii) only if you are rational will (i) and (ii) both hold. This an-
swers the value question by appealing to how well credence functions pro-
mote epistemic utility, and it separates out the rational from the irrational
precisely.
The other way to motivate moderate permissivism is to follow the strat-
egy we’ve been developing throughout this book. The credence functions
that are rational for you are those with maximal generalised Hurwicz scores
relative to your generalised Hurwicz weights. If there are no restrictions
on rational attitudes to epistemic risk, which we encode in our generalised
Hurwicz weights, then we obtain extreme permissivism. For every proba-
bilistic credence function C, there is some sequence Λ of Hurwicz weights
such that C maximises HΛ(EU(−)) for every strictly proper epistemic util-
ity function EU. But, while we are permissive about attitudes to epistemic
risk, we needn’t think that anything goes. Perhaps there are rational re-
strictions on risk attitudes. Perhaps some risk-inclined attitudes are too
extreme or beyond the pale. If so, then there will be probabilistic credence
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functions C for which there are no permissible Λ such that C maximises
HΛ(EU(−)). This gives moderate permissivism. And it simultaneously
furnishes the moderate permissivist with an answer to the value question:
if you are irrational, then there are no rational attitudes to epistemic risk
that rationalise your credences; that is, your credences do not constitute a
rational way to pursue the goal of epistemic value. The moderate permis-
sivist can thereby answer the value question that Horowitz poses.
7.3 Living on the edge of rationality
In her 2018 paper, ’Living on the Edge’, Ginger Schultheis issues a power-
ful challenge to epistemic permissivism about credences (Schultheis, 2018).
The heart of the argument is the claim that a certain sort of situation is im-
possible. Schultheis thinks that all motivations for permissivism must ren-
der situations of this sort possible. Therefore, permissivism must be false,
or at least these motivations for it must be wrong.
Here’s the situation, where again we write RE for the set of credence
functions that it is rational to have when your total evidence is E.
• Our agent’s total evidence is E;
• There is C in RE and our agent knows that C is in RE;
• There is C′ in RE and our agent does not know that C′ is in RE.
Schultheis claims that the permissivist must take this to be possible, whereas
in fact it is impossible. Here are a couple of specific examples that the per-
missivist will typically take to be possible.
Example 1 You have credences only in X and X; and you have
evidence E. The credences it is rational for you to assign to
X in response to E are precisely those in the closed interval
[0.4, 0.7]. But you are not sure of the extent of this interval. For
all you know, it might be any one of the following three inter-
vals: [0.41, 0.7] or [0.39, 0.71] or [0.4, 0.7]. So you are sure that 0.5
is a rational credence in X, but you’re not sure whether 0.4 is a
rational credence in X. In this case:
• RE = {P = (p, 1− p) : 0.4 ≤ p ≤ 0.7}
• C = (0.5, 0.5)
• C′ = (0.4, 0.6)
Example 2 Suppose extreme subjective Bayesianism is true. So
rationality requires only that your credences obey Probabilism;
in particular, it does not require that they obey the Principle
of Indifference. You know that they must obey Probablism, and
128
you know that it is rationally permissible to satisfy the Principle
of Indifference, but you don’t know whether or not rationality
demands it. In this case:
• RE is the set of probability functions;
• C is the uniform distribution required by the Principle of
Indifference;
• C′ is some probability function other than the uniform dis-
tribution.
Schultheis then appeals to a principle that she calls Weak Rationality Domi-
nance. We say that one credence function C rationally dominates another C′
if C is rational in all epistemic possibilities in which C′ is rational, and also
rational in some epistemic possibilities in which C′ is not rational. Weak
Rationality Dominance says that it is irrational to adopt a rationally dom-
inated credence function. The important consequence of this for Schultheis’
argument is that, if you know that C is rational, but you don’t know whether
C′ is, then C′ is irrational. As a result, in our example above, C′ is not
rational, contrary to what the permissivist claims, because it is rationally
dominated by C. So permissivism must be false.
If Weak Rationality Dominance is correct, then, it follows that the per-
missivist must say that, for any body of evidence E and set RE of rational
responses, the agent with evidence E either must know of every credence
function in RE that it is in RE, or they must know of no credence function
in RE that it is in RE. If they know of some credence functions in RE that
they are in RE and don’t know of others in RE that they are in RE, then the
ones of whose membership of RE they are ignorant are irrational according
to Weak Rationality Dominance, and therefore they are not in RE, which
gives a contradiction. But, whatever your reason for being a permissivist,
it seems very likely that it will entail situations in which there are some cre-
dence functions that are rational responses to your evidence and that you
know are such responses, while you are unsure about other credence func-
tions that are, in fact, rational responses whether or not they are, in fact,
rational responses. This is Schultheis’ challenge.
I’d like to explore a response to Schultheis’ argument that takes issue
with Weak Rationality Dominance (WRD). I’ll spell out the response in gen-
eral to begin with, and then see how it plays out for the Jamesian version
of permissivism I’ve been developing in this book.
One route into this response is it note that WRD seems to entail a def-
erence principle of exactly the sort that I objected to in my discussion of
Levinstein and Greco and Hedden above. Recall Levinstein’s principle: if
you are certain that you are irrational, and you learn that a credence func-
tion C′ is rational, then you should adopt C′—or at least you should have
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the conditional credences that would lead you to do this if you were to ap-
ply Bayes’ Rule. We might slightly strengthen Levinstein’s version of the
deference principle as follows: if you are unsure whether you are rational
or not, and you learn that C′ is rational, then you should adopt C′. WRD
entails this deference principle. After all, suppose you have credence func-
tion C, and you are unsure whether or not it is rational. And suppose you
learn that C′ is rational (and don’t thereby learn that C is also rational).
Then, according to Schultheis’ principle, you are irrational if you stick with
C.
Above, I objected to Levinstein’s deference principle, and others like
it, because it relies on the assumption that all rational credence functions
are better than all irrational credence functions. I think that assumption is
false. I think there are certain sorts of flaw that render you irrational, and
lacking those flaws renders you rational. But lacking those flaws doesn’t
ensure that you’re going to be better than someone who has those flaws.
So I think that the rational deference principle is wrong, and therefore
any version of WRD that entails it is also wrong. But perhaps there is a
more restricted version of WRD that is both correct and capable of sink-
ing permissivism about epistemic rationality. Consider, for instance, a re-
stricted version of WRD that applies only to agents who have no credence
function—that is, it applies to your initial choice of a credence function; it
does not apply when you have a credence function and you are deciding
whether to adopt a new one. This makes a difference. The problem with a
version that applies when you already have a credence function C is this:
even if C is irrational, it might nonetheless be better in some situation than
the credence function C′ that you learn to be rational; and it might be that
C assigns a lot of credence to that situation. So it’s hard to see how to moti-
vate the move from C to C′. However, in a situation in which you have no
credence function, and you are unsure whether C is rational (even though
it is) and you’re certain that C′ is rational (and indeed it is), WRD’s demand
that you should not pick C seems more reasonable. You occupy no point
of view such that C is less of a departure from that point of view than C′
is. You know only that C′ lacks the flaws for sure, whereas C might have
them. Better, then, to go for C′, is it not? And if it is, this is enough to defeat
permissivism.
I think it’s not quite that simple. I noted above that Levinstein’s defer-
ence principle relies on the assumption that all rational credence functions
are better than all irrational credence functions. Schultheis’ WRD seems to
rely on something even stronger, namely, the assumption that all rational
credence functions are equally good in all situations. For suppose they are
not. You might then be unsure whether C is rational (though it is) and sure
that C′ is rational (and it is), but nonetheless rationally opt for C because
you know that C has some good feature that you know C′ lacks and you’re
willing to take the risk of having an irrational credence function in order to
130
open the possibility of having that good feature.
Here’s an example, where we represent a credence function C on X and
X as (C(X), C(X)), as before. You are unsure whether C = (0.7, 0.3) is
rationally permissible. It turns out that it is, but you don’t know that. On
the other hand, you do know that C′ = (0.5, 0.5) is rationally permissible.
But C and C′ are not equally good in all situations. C′ has the same accuracy
whether X is true or false; in contrast, C is better than the first if X is true
and worse than the first if X is false. C′ does not open up the possibility
of high accuracy that C does; though, to compensate, it does preclude the
possibility of low accuracy, which the first doesn’t. Surveying the situation,
you think that you will take the risk. You’ll adopt C, even though you aren’t
sure whether or not it is rational. And you’ll do this because you want the
possibility of being rational and having that higher accuracy. This seems a
rationally permissible thing to do. So, it seems to me, WRD is false.
Although I think this objection is sufficient to show that WRD is false, I
think it’s helpful to see how WRD might play out for a particular motiva-
tion for permissivism. Instead of the Jamesian motivation for permissivism
that I have been developing throughout the book, let’s look at the other
risk-sensitive motivation I outlined above while discussing Horowitz’s value
question. Some credence functions offer the promise of high epistemic
utility—those that assign high credence to X and low credence to its nega-
tion will be very good, epistemically speaking, if X is true. However, they
also open the possibility of great epistemic disutility—they will be very bad
if X is false. Other credence functions neither offer great epistemic utility
nor risk great epistemic disutility—the same middling credence in X and its
negation guarantees the same medium epistemic utility whether or not X is
true. Bearing that in mind, you might say that you are more risk-averse the
higher is the minimum possible epistemic utility you are willing to tolerate.
And you might set a threshold r, and say that the options that are rational
for you are those undominated options whose minimum epistemic utility
is at least r.
Now, suppose that you are in the sort of situation that Schultheis imag-
ines. You are uncertain of the extent of the set RE of rational responses
to your evidence E. On the account we’re considering, this must be be-
cause you are uncertain of your own attitudes to epistemic risk. Let’s say
that the threshold of minimum epistemic utility you’re willing to tolerate
is r = −0.98, but you aren’t certain of that—you think r might be anything
between −0.72 and −1.28. So you’re sure that it’s rational to assign any-
thing between 0.4 and 0.6 to X, since doing that has a minimum epistemic
utility above −0.72, but you’re unsure whether it’s rational to assign 0.7
to X, which has a minimum epistemic utility of −0.98. In this situation,
is it rational to assign 0.7 to X? WRD thinks not; I think it is. Among the
credence functions that you know for sure are rational, the ones that give
you the highest possible epistemic utility are: (i) the one that assigns 0.4 to
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X, and (ii) the one that assigns 0.6 to X. They have a minimum epistemic
utility of −0.72, and they open up the possibility of an epistemic utility of
−0.32, which is higher than the highest possible epistemic utility opened
up by any others that you know to be rational. On the other hand, assign-
ing 0.7 to X risks an epistemic utility of −0.98, but it also opens up the
possibility of an epistemic utility of −0.18, which is considerably higher
than is available from the credences you know to be rational. As a result,
it doesn’t seem irrational to assign 0.7 to X, even though you don’t know
whether it is rational from the point of view of your attitudes to risk, and
you do know that assigning 0.6 is rational. This tells against WRD.
There is another possible response to Schultheis’ challenge for those
who like this sort of motivation for permissivism. You might simply say
that, if your attitudes to risk are such that you will tolerate a minimum
epistemic utility of r, then regardlesss of whether you know this fact, in-
deed regardless of your level of uncertainty about it, the rational credence
functions are precisely those that have minimum epistemic utility at least
r. This sort of approach is familiar from expected utility theory. Suppose I
have credences in X and in X. And suppose I face two options whose util-
ity is determined by whether or not X is true or false. Then, regardless of
what I believe about my credences in X and X, I should choose whichever
option maximises expected utility from the point of view of my actual cre-
dences. The point is this: if what it is rational for you to believe or to do
is determined by some feature of you, whether it’s your credences or your
attitudes to risk, being uncertain about those features doesn’t change what
it is rational for you to do. This introduces a certain sort of externalism to
our notion of rationality. There are features of ourselves—our credences
or our attitudes to risk—that determine what it is rational for us to believe
or do, which are nonetheless not luminous to us. But I think this is in-
evitable. Of course, we might might move up a level and create a version
of expected utility theory that appeals not to our first-order credences but
to our credences concerning those first-order credences—perhaps you use
the higher-order credences to define a higher-order expected value for the
first-order expected utilities, and you maximise that. But doing this sim-
ply pushes the problem back a step. For your higher-order credences are
no more luminous than your first-order ones. And to stop the regress, you
must fix some level at which the credences at that level simply determine
the expectation that rationality requires you to maximise, and any uncer-
tainty concerning those does not affect rationality. And the same goes in
this case. So, given this particular motivation for permissivism, which ap-
peals to your attitudes to epistemic risk in a slightly different way from the
way in which our favoured Jamesian version does, it seems that there is
another reason why WRD is false. If C is in RE, then it is rational for you,
regardless of your epistemic attitude to its rationality.
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7.4 The ills of brute shuffling
A final worry about permissivism is that it seems to render permissible a
doxastic version of what Michael Bratman (2012) calls ‘brute shuffling’ in
the context of permissivism about conative attitudes such as desires; or, at
least, it seems unable to explain what is irrational about this behaviour. An
initial pass at the idea is this. There is a restricted range of catalysts for
rational belief change. New evidence is the obvious one—learning new ev-
idence makes it rational to change your belief. But you might also reassess
old evidence, choosing to weight it differently; or you might acquire a new
concept, thereby enriching your conceptual scheme; or you might discover
a logical truth that bears on the relationship between different pieces of
evidence. But most people will agree that the list doesn’t get much longer
than this. And they will surely agree that it is irrational to change what you
believe in the presence of no catalyst at all—no new evidence, no reassess-
ment, no new concepts, etc. We might say that someone who does this
indulges in brute shuffling of their beliefs: ‘shuffling’ because they change
their beliefs; ‘brute’ because there is nothing that precipitates their doing
so.
Now, suppose permissivism is true and there are three rationally per-
mitted responses to our agent’s current evidence—they are the credence
functions C1, C2, and C3. For instance, we might suppose that (i) the in-
dividual has no evidence at all, (ii) he assigns credences to three possible
worldsW = {w1, w2, w3}, and (iii) he has attitudes to risk that are encoded
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Now suppose that he shuffles between these three credence functions in
rapid succession—first C1, then C2, then C3—while all the time gaining no
evidence, gaining no new concepts, and engaging in no reassessment of
his evidence, which is in any case empty. Then we would say that he is
irrational. Yet the permissivist seems unable to say why, since they consider
each of these a rational response to her evidence.
In fact, I think things aren’t as bleak for the permissivist. There are, I
think, two things they can say. First, they might refer back to the argu-
ment for Bayes’ Rule we borrowed from Gallow in Section 6.3. When our
agent moves from C1 to C2 without any new evidence, he does not max-
imise2 expected epistemic utility by the lights of C1. And similarly when
he moves from C2 to C3 without any new evidence. Throughout, his epis-
temic utility function remains the same because his evidence remains the
same. Indeed, because his evidence is empty, his epistemic utility function
is simply EU = EUk>, for some strictly proper EU. So C1 expects C1 to be
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better that it expects C2 to be. So he is irrational when he moves to C2. And
similarly, even if he were to move to C2, then since C2 expects itself to be
best, it would then be irrational to move from C2 to C3.
However, I suspect this won’t entirely satisfy the objector. They might
concede that, for the person who still takes their existing credence function
to be part of the authoritative basis for their decision making, it would be
irrational to do something other than what maximises expected epistemic
utility by its lights. But might he not simply stop taking it to be author-
itative in this way? Might he not simply abandon the prior he picked at
the beginning of his epistemic life—namely, C1—look at the various pri-
ors permitted by his Hurwicz weights—namely C1, C2, C3—and choose a
different one—say, C2—take that instead to be authoritative and choose by
maximising expected epistemic utility with respect to that? And might he
not, in doing so, do nothing irrational?
I think there is a sense in which he might do all of this while avoiding
irrationality. It is the same sense in which I might stop taking my cur-
rent desires—encoded in my current utility function—to be authoritative.
Nearly everyone agrees that rationality permits many different conative
states. You value the life of the mind more than a life of action; I value the
latter more than the former. You value long, intricate, all-consuming life
projects; I prefer to flit from one short, easily-completed project to another.
You prefer a single romantic relationship at the centre of your life; I prefer a
number of platonic relationships. In these cases, your preferences are ratio-
nally permissible, and so are mine. Now suppose that I start my life with a
particular utility function. At a later point, I’m called upon to make a deci-
sion. There is a sense in which I should choose using that utility function.
I’m irrational if I don’t. But, were I to abandon it and pick another from
among those that are rationally permissible, there seems to be a sense in
which there would be nothing irrational about this.
How can we reconcile these two judgments? I think the following pic-
ture is right: The mental attitudes that form the basis of your decision mak-
ing are (i) your doxastic attitudes, represented by a credence function, (ii)
your conative attitudes, represented by a utility function, and (iii) your risk
attitudes, represented by your generalised Hurwicz weights. At the begin-
ning of your epistemic life, you have only the latter two—(ii) utilities, both
epistemic and pragmatic, and (iii) generalised Hurwicz weights. You use
those to pick your prior credences. And, from then on you have credences
as well—that is, you have (i). If your total evidence is E, then your epis-
temic utility function is EUEk , for some strictly proper EU and some k. Now,
at every point after you have picked your priors, you face a choice. You
can continue with the credences, utilities, and Hurwicz weights that you
have at that point. And, if you do that, then you should choose by max-
imising expected epistemic utility at that point. But you can also choose to
abandon any part of your basic mental furniture and start afresh with some
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new permissible piece instead. As we’ve seen, when it comes to choosing
how to update your credences, if you retain your credences and change
only your epistemic utility function, it won’t make any difference to how
you should update—for any strictly proper epistemic utility functions EU
and any evidence E, EUkE will recommend Bayes’ Rule. But you might in-
stead choose to abandon your credences. And you might then choose them
again in line with GHC applied to your Hurwicz weights, just as you did
at the beginning of your epistemic life. Or you might be even more radical,
and abandon not only your credences but also your Hurwicz weights, and
then you might choose them afresh, and then use those to choose your new
priors; and then you might update those new priors on your new evidence.
The choice whether to abandon credences, utilities, or Hurwicz weights,
or to continue taking your current ones to be authoritative, is arational. You
do not make it from a rational perspective, for there is no rational perspec-
tive from which you can; you are deciding whether or not to abandon the
perspective from which you make decisions. But if you choose not to aban-
don it, you thereby commit to using your credences and utilities to make
your next decision.
So there is a way of filling in the story of the brute shuffler on which
he is irrational, and a way of filling it in on which he is not. If he does
not choose to abandon C1 as authoritative for his decision making, and
nonetheless switches to C2 without new evidence, he is irrational. If, on the
other hand, he does choose to abandon C1 and returns to the situation in
which he uses GHC to pick priors, and then picks C2, then he has not acted
irrationally.
Although this account does allow for one sort of brute shuffler who is
not irrational, I think we can explain why our intuitions suggest that they
are always irrational. We might note, for instance, that, when we hear the
description of his credal changes, we assume that he is not someone who
abandons the authority of their existing credences every time. And that’s
because we rarely encounter people doing that in the real world. So, when
we hear the story of the shuffler, we fill it in with the details that make the
shuffling irrational, and thus judge it so.
Why does the real world furnish us with so few examples of people
who abandon their beliefs, desires, or their attitudes to risk? Why do we
so rarely encounter people who replace the very basis of their decision-
making? There are two related reasons. First: Mostly, in our day to day
existence, we live inside our beliefs, our desires, and our attitudes to risk.
We inhabit them. And part of what that involves is taking them to be au-
thoritative. We might question them, of course, and indeed we do every
time new evidence comes in. But when we question them, we use them to
evaluate themselves. When new evidence comes in—perhaps our total ev-
idence is E before and E′ after—and our epistemic utility function evolves
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from EUEk to EU
E′
k′ , our credences evaluate themselves as less than optimal,
and they evaluate the posterior obtained via Bayes’ Rule as the best alter-
native, so we abandon them in favour of that. And when no new evidence
comes in, they evaluate themselves as well—but this time, since the epis-
temic utility function stays the same, they evaluate themselves as best.
This is a less extreme form of questioning than the one that might lead
us to abandon them completely as the basis of our decision-making. We
tend to engage in the latter when something prompts us to live, however
briefly, outside our beliefs, taking a third-person perspective on our own
mental attitudes—looking down on them from above, as it were, and real-
ising something about them that prompts us to reappraise them. This can
happen for a number of reasons. Major psychological crisis might be one.
The realisation that the ways in which you’ve been thinking have led to
serious mental ill health can lead you to reevaluate those ways of thinking.
Another catalyst is the realisation that your attitudes—doxastic, conative,
risk-oriented—are in some way arbitrary. You have them not because you
carefully picked them out, but because of the environment in which you
grew up and the influences exerted on you from outside sources. For many
people, that can drain these attitudes of their authority. And it might even
lead them to abandon those attitudes and set about trying to pick alter-
natives in an autonomous way, which they believe will endow them with
attitudes that they will take to have authority. That is Kant’s hope, at least
for our conative attitudes. I think it is a vain hope myself. There is no fixed
point from which to pick a new basis for your decision-making in a way
that is more authentically yours and autonomously chosen than the one
bestowed on you by your nature and environment. So, if this is your moti-
vation for abandoning your credences, for instance, then I think you will be
disappointed. But we needn’t settle that vast dispute here. My point here
is only that the sort of realisation that tends to motivate creatures like us
to abandon the very basis of our approach to the world and replace it with
something else happens only occasionally in our lives: only through psy-
chological crisis or the vertiginous feeling that these central components
of oneself are arbitrary artefacts of one’s environment or something else
equally dramatic.
The second reason that we don’t often encounter people who abandon
the basis of their decision-making is that to do so takes a great deal of effort,
if it is possible to do intentionally at all. Because we are thinking about the
toy case in which there are just three worlds, it can seem as if it would not
be a major upheaval. But of course real people have credence functions
over many thousands, possibly millions, of possible worlds. To shift all of
these attitudes would be a major undertaking.
In sum, then, I understand the intuitive reaction to the brute shuffling
case. It is an unusual case; the sort of thing we don’t encounter much in
the world. But, when we hear it, we hold fixed the fact that people rarely
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abandon fundamental parts of the basis for their decision-making; we hold
fixed that, when the brute shuffler switches from C1 to C2, he is likely still
taking C1 to be authoritative, and similarly when he moves from C2 to C3.
And if that is the case, he is indeed irrational, and the permissivist can say
why.
For some impermissivists, even this error theory for our intuitive judg-
ment about the brute shuffler won’t suffice. For them, such judgments
carry a lot of weight, and it disqualifies a view, or at least tells very strongly
against it, if it cannot accommodate them. I find that strange. After all,
consider how strong the impermissivist’s claim is. For any body of evi-
dence, they say, there is a unique credal response; among all of the possible
credal responses that satisfy the minimum requirements for respecting that
evidence—all those that assign it and all propositions that follow logically
from it maximal credence—there is a single, privileged one that is the cor-
rect rational response. Due to the efforts of J. M. Keynes, Rudolf Carnap, E.
T. Jaynes, Jon Williamson, Jeff Paris and Alena Vencovska, and others, we
know how difficult it is to identify that privileged response and to argue
that it is privileged (Keynes, 1921; Carnap, 1950; Jaynes, 2003; Williamson,
2010; Paris & Vencovská, 1990, 1997). Why think that our pretheoretical
intuitions about rationality, which apparently entail this extremely strong
position, carry any weight at all?
The situation seems to me analogous to David Hilbert’s intuitive judgment—
shared by many in the European mathematical community of the early 20th
century—that there must be a complete axiomatization of mathematics.
Perhaps that intuition was reasonable. But citing that intuition would have
been a poor argument against a foundation for mathematics on which there
was no such axiomatization—perhaps one on which there are many differ-
ent mathematical universes in which different mathematical statements are
true. Similarly, consider any intuitive judgment made prior to Kenneth Ar-
row’s work in the middle of the twentieth century to the effect that there is a
fully satisfactory and fully general voting system for a democracy. Again, I
don’t mean to deny that such an intuition would have been reasonable. But
since it is an intuitive judgment concerning the existence of a non-trivial,
theoretically complex entity, it’s hard to see why the intuition itself should
carry enough weight to tell against a philosophical position on which there
is no such thing.
The same goes for permissivism. To point out that many of our intu-
itive judgments entail its negation tells us little more than that we indulge
in wishful thinking in this area. We would like there to be a single rational
response to each piece of evidence, but wanting it doesn’t make it so. To de-
feat permissivism, our opponent must present a fully worked out account
of the unique credal state demanded by each body of evidence. It cannot
be refuted by noting that our hope that it is true has infected our intuitive
judgments about rationality.
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7.5 Priors that allow you to learn
We often learn from experience. Sometimes, the evidence we collect tells
us something about the underlying mechanism that produced it, and that
teaches us something about what that mechanism is likely to produce in
the future. For instance, if I don’t know the half-life of a sample of radioac-
tive material, and I then observe its decay over a period, I learn something
about its half-life, and that teaches me something about how I should ex-
pect it to decay in the future. Or if I don’t know whether a particular per-
son is a reliable source of information on a given topic, and I independently
corroborate some of the things they’ve told me about it, I become more con-
fident that they are reliable, and more confident in the other things they’ve
told me. A significant concern about the account I’ve been sketching is
that it permits attitudes to epistemic risk that demand priors that leave you
unable to learn in such situations. I’ll illustrate with a toy example, and
explain what we might say in response.
Before you stands an urn. You know that it’s filled with only green and
purple balls. And you know that there are either exactly three purple balls
and exactly one green ball (U 1
4
), or there are exactly three green balls and
exactly one purple one (U 3
4
). You will now draw one ball and replace it: G1
is the proposition that you draw a green ball on your first draw, P1 is the
proposition that you draw a purple one. Then you will draw another: G2
is the proposition you draw green on the second draw, P2 says you draw
purple. Then the eight possible worlds are:


















Now suppose that you are risk-averse in a particular way—perhaps your





































. Then GHC demands that your



























So your credence that the urn contains just one green ball is 12 , your cre-
dence that the first ball drawn will be green is 12 , and your credence that
the second ball will be green is 12 . But now suppose that you make your

















And so, while your new credence in G1 is 1, your credence is G2 is still 12
(and the same for P2) and your credence in U 1
4




). So, while you have learned something from your first draw, namely,




, and no impact on your credences in G2 and P2. And yet we do
think that it should be possible to learn about the composition of the urn
from our first draw, and also about the outcome of the next draw from the
urn. We think that learning that the first ball drawn was green should make
us more confident that the urn contains three green balls and less confident
that it contains only one, since the former makes our evidence more likely;
and then, having become more confident that the urn contains three balls,
we should be more confident that the second ball drawn will be green.
This is the well-known problem that Rudolf Carnap faced when he tried
to formulate inductive logic by identifying unique rational priors—what
we have called C†, the uniform distribution over the state descriptions of
the worlds, Carnap called m† (Carnap, 1950). The problem has been raised
in the present context by Wayne Myrvold (2019).
The natural solution is to demand that our prior satisfies the Principal
Principle. The idea is this: According to Bayes’ Theorem and Bayes’ Rule, if
C is my prior, then my posterior credence in U 1
4
, upon learning G1, should
be:















The problem with the uniform prior is that it makes G1 independent of U 1
4
and independent of U 3
4
. That is, C†(G1|U 1
4
) = C†(G1) = C†(G1|U 3
4
). The
Principal Principle, in contrast, says that, conditional on the urn containing
one green ball and three purple ones, your prior credence that your first
draw will be green should be 14 —that is, C(Gi|U 14 ) =
1
4 , for i = 1, 2—while
conditional on the urn containing three green balls and one purple one,
your prior credence that your first draw will be green should be 34 —that
is, C(Gi|U 3
4
) = 34 , for i = 1, 2. In other words, conditional on the chances
being a particular way, your credences should match those chances.
Now, suppose we impose this constraint. Then, to determine all our
credences in each world, we need only say how likely we consider each of
the two distributions of balls within the urns. That is, we need only specify
C(U 1
4
) and C(U 3
4
). After all, if C(U 1
4
) = λ, then the Principal Principle
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12−8λ , which is less
than your prior in U 1
4
, which was λ. For instance, if λ = 12 , your prior in U 14
is 12 and your posterior is
1






12−8λ , which is greater than your prior in G2, which was
12−8λ
16 . For instance,
if λ = 12 , then your prior in G1 is
1
2 , while your posterior is
5
8 . So, as we
would like, learning that the first draw is green makes you less confident
that the urn contains only one green ball and more confident it contains
three, and it makes you more confident that the second ball drawn will be
green.
Now, the first thing to note is that GHC can accommodate this. That
is, for any prior Cλ that satisfies the Principal Principle, there are Hur-
wicz weights such that GHC with those weights that permit Cλ. But these
Hurwicz weights will be reasonably risk-inclined. For instance, suppose
C(U 1
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And if this prior is permitted by your Hurwicz weights (λ1, . . . , λ8), then
λ1 + λ2 ≥ 916 . That is, to borrow Myrvold’s turn of phrase, satisfying the
Principal Principle in this case is a risky business—it requires you to put
the majority of your Hurwicz weight on the best and second-best case. And
how risk-inclined the Principal Principle requires you to be becomes more
extreme as the possible objective chances become more extreme. For in-
stance, suppose we know instead that the urn contains either one green ball
and seven purple ones or seven green ones and one purple. In that case, if
I am indifferent between the two hypotheses about the urn’s composition,









































And that requires λ1 + λ2 ≥ 4964 . That’s a very risk-inclined set of Hurwicz
weights!
The above shows that GHC will permit both priors that prevent learn-
ing from experience (e.g. C†) and priors that will demand it (Cλ). But can
we go further? Can we show that rationality requires us to learn from ex-
perience in the way that priors that satisfy the Principal Principle demand?
As we saw in Section 3.3 above, there is an epistemic utility argument
for the Principal Principle. Say that one credence function chance domi-
nates another if each possible objective chance function expects the former
to be better, epistemically speaking, than it expects the latter to be. Then
the argument for the Principal Principle is based on the following fact: If
your prior violates the Principal Principle, then there is an alternative that
chance dominates it; what’s more, there’s an alternative that chance dom-
inates it that satisfies the Principal Principle; and yet further, no credence
function that satisfies the Principal Principle is chance dominated. Add
to this mathematical fact the following decision rule, which we might call
Undominated Chance Dominance: it is irrational to choose an option that
is chance dominated by an alternative that is not itself chance dominated.
And this gives an epistemic utility argument for the Principal Principle.
Take the uniform prior C†, for instance. Then, whichever strictly proper
epistemic utility function you use, it turns out that one of the credence func-
tions that each chance function—the one corresponding to U 1
4
and the one
corresponding to U 3
4
—expects to have higher epistemic utility is C
1
2 , the
prior we described above that satisfies the Principal Principle and assigns
equal credence to the two hypotheses about the composition of the urn.44
So, applied to the choice of priors, Chance Dominance is more demand-
ing than GHC coupled with permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk.
The latter permits the uniform distribution C†, for instance, together with
every Cλ for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1; Chance Dominance permits every Cλ, but nothing
more. How should we respond to this?
We might simply say that Chance Dominance imposes new rational
constraints on the Hurwicz weights that it’s rationally permissible for you
to have. Only those that, when coupled with GHC, permit priors that sat-
isfy the Principal Principle are permitted. As before, I’d prefer to avoid this
sort of restriction if possible. Part of the reason in this case is that, as we saw
above, which priors satisfy the Principal Principle depend on which objec-
tive chance functions are possible. If the chance of green on each draw is
either 14 or
3
4 , then equal credence in each possibility demands one prior;
44To calculate these expected values, each chance distribution must assign a chance to





simply assume here that the function that gives the chances if U 1
4
is true assigns chance 1
to U 1
4
and 0 to U 3
4
, while the function that gives the chances if U 3
4
is true assigns chance 1
to U 3
4




if the chance is either 18 or
7
8 , then equal credence in each possibility de-
mands another. But I don’t think we can require your attitudes to risk to be
sensitive to this.
Nonetheless, while I think Chance Dominance is not rationally com-
pelling in this situation—I think we must admit the rationality of the in-
ductive scepticism embodied in C†—I do think it is something to which we
might appeal when we justify having prior Cλ, if that is indeed the prior
we have. As noted, Chance Dominance can demand priors that are very
risky, and only rationalised via GHC by picking very risk-inclined Hur-
wicz weights. And, as noted earlier in the book, we might be wary of the
rationality of extremely risk-inclined weights. But Chance Dominance can
go some way to justifying these: only by having these weights do we avoid
credence functions that are chance dominated.
A second response points out that GHC is a decision rule designed for
a situation in which probabilities are not available. In the situation we’re
considering, some probabilities are available: they are not our credences,
of course, as we’ve still to pick those; but they are the possible objective
chances. In such a situation, we might amend GHC. GHC says that you
should prefer one option to another if the generalised Hurwicz score of
the first exceeds the generalised Hurwicz score of the second. To calculate
the generalised Hurwicz score of an option a, we order the worlds by the
utilities that option obtains at them, assign those utilities weights according
to their position in that order, and sum up the weighted utilities. So, if
a(wi1) ≥ . . . ≥ a(win)
and your Hurwicz weights are Λ = (λ1, . . . , λn), then
HΛ(a) := λ1a(wi1) + . . . + λna(win)
And GHC says:
(i) your preference ordering should be: a  b iff HΛ(a) ≤ HΛ(b);
(ii) you should not choose option a if there is an alternative option a′ such
that a ≺ a′.
Now, define the generalised chance Hurwicz score of an option a as follows.
Suppose ch1, . . . , chm is the set of possible objective chance functions. Then
we order the chance functions by the expected utilities they assign to a,
assign those expected utilities weights according to their position in that
order, and sum up the weighted expected utilities. So, if
∑
w∈W




and your chance Hurwicz weights are Γ = (γ1, . . . , γm), then
CHΓ(a) := γ1 ∑
w∈W
chi1(w)a(w) + . . . + γm ∑
w∈W
chim(w)a(w)
And the generalised chance Hurwicz principle (GCHC) says:
(i) your preference ordering should be: a  b iff CHΛ(a) ≤ CHΛ(b);
(ii) you should not choose option a if there is an alternative option a′ such
that a ≺ a′.
The attraction of this is that, just as no dominated option maximises HΛ(−),
so no chance dominated option maximises CHΓ(−). And so, when we ap-
ply it to the choice of credences, Theorem 2 tells us that whatever max-
imises the generalised chance Hurwicz score must satisfy the Principal
Principle.
Let’s see what the generalised chance Hurwicz principle says about our
toy example of the urn from above. The two possible chance functions are:
• ch1, which is the chance function if U 1
4
is true and there is just one
green ball, so that ch1(Gi) = 14 ;
• ch2, which is the chance function if U 3
4
is true and there are three green
balls, so that ch2(Gi) = 34 .
Then suppose your chance Hurwicz weights are γ1 = γ and γ2 = 1− γ.
Then:
• if you are risk-averse or risk-neutral, so that γ ≤ 12 , then the credence
function that maximises CHΓ(EU(−)) is C 12 ;
• if you are risk-inclined, so that γ > 12 , then the credence function that
maximises CHΓ(EU(−)) is Cγ.
I’ll be honest—I don’t feel confident in adjudicating between GHC and
GCHC. While I think it’s reasonable to care about the objective expected
epistemic utility of your prior, and while, if you do, it’s clearly worrying to
find out that there’s an alternative that the objective chances expect to do
better than yours for sure, I also think it’s reasonable to care about the ac-
tual utility of your prior, and to be reasonably risk-averse about that. But,
as we have seen, these can pull in different directions. So I think that we
have to accept that it is permissible either to ignore the unequivocal de-
mands of the possible objective chances, or to ignore the risk of actual low
epistemic utility—that is, it is permissible either to use GHC or GCHC. If
that’s right, then inductive scepticism of the sort encoded in C† is permissi-
ble, but so are priors like Cλ that permit learning in the ordinary, Bayesian
way.
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7.6 Clifford’s shipowner, conspiracy theories, and choosing for
others
Perhaps the most natural place to look for the final objection to our Jame-
sian approach to rational belief is in the essay to which James’ ‘The Will to
Believe’ is a response, namely, William Kingdon Clifford’s 1877 paper, ‘The
Ethics of Belief’ (Clifford, 1877 [1999]). And the most famous objection in
that paper comes from Clifford’s example of the shipowner. Here it is in
Clifford’s words:
A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. He
knew that she was old, and not overwell built at the first; that
she had seen many seas and climes, and often had needed re-
pairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that possibly she was
not seaworthy. These doubts preyed upon his mind, and made
him unhappy; he thought that perhaps he ought to have her
thoroughly overhauled and refitted, even though this should
put him at great expense. Before the ship sailed, however, he
succeeded in overcoming these melancholy reflections. He said
to himself that she had gone safely through so many voyages
and weathered so many storms that it was idle to suppose she
would not come safely home from this trip also. He would
put his trust in Providence, which could hardly fail to protect
all these unhappy families that were leaving their fatherland
to seek for better times elsewhere. He would dismiss from his
mind all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty of builders
and contractors. In such ways he acquired a sincere and com-
fortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and sea-
worthy; he watched her departure with a light heart, and benev-
olent wishes for the success of the exiles in their strange new
home that was to be; and he got his insurance-money when she
went down in mid-ocean and told no tales.
What shall we say of him? Surely this, that he was verily guilty
of the death of those men. It is admitted that he did sincerely
believe in the soundness of his ship; but the sincerity of his con-
viction can in no wise help him, because he had no right to believe
on such evidence as was before him. He had acquired his belief not
by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling
his doubts. And although in the end he may have felt so sure
about it that he could not think otherwise, yet inasmuch as he
had knowingly and willingly worked himself into that frame of
mind, he must be held responsible for it.
While Clifford’s essay preceded James’, we can nonetheless extract an ob-
jection to a Jamesian picture from Clifford’s example. According to the
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Jamesian, you might think, the shipowner’s high credence in the seawor-
thiness of his vessel must be rationally permissible; and yet using that cre-
dence when he decided to put the ship to sea with so many people on board
was immoral. And this violates a maxim that says: if you choose in a ratio-
nally permissible way using rationally permissible credences and morally
permissible utilities, then your choice is morally permissible.
There are a number of things to clarify here before we can proceed.
First, it isn’t clear from Clifford’s example exactly how the shipowner
came to have the high credence that his boat was seaworthy. Did he retain
his prior and choose to ignore some of the evidence that he had so that, con-
ditional on that impoverished evidence, his prior assigned high credence to
the ship’s safety, even though it would have assigned low credence to the
ship’s safety conditional on the total evidence? Or did he replace his origi-
nal prior with a new prior and retain his total evidence so that, conditional
on his total evidence, this new prior assigned high credence to its seawor-
thiness? According to the version of Jamesian epistemology that I have
been developing in this book, only the latter is rationally permissible. A
posterior obtained from your prior by conditioning only on some proper
part of your evidence will not maximise expected epistemic utility as it is
defined in Gallow’s argument, which we presented in Section 6.3 above.
Second, even if we think the shipowner’s high posterior credence in
the ship’s safety arose because he replaced his prior and updated the new
one on his total evidence, the way Clifford tells the story, it’s clear that the
shipowner changes his mind not because of some Damascene conversion or
moment of crisis, but because of a conscious effort on his part to manipulate
his own opinion in a way that would more greatly profit him but would
put many lives at risk. And, as we noted above, the Jamesian approach
for which I have been arguing permits an arational choice to change your
prior from one time t to the next t′, but it does not permit you to choose to
change it by a standard expected utility calculation in which you continue
to consider your credences at t authoritative for your choice of credences
at t’. After all, providing your current credence function is certain of your
total evidence, it will always think that changing without new evidence
is irrational. And yet that is what the shipowner does. Effectively, it is
as if he takes a pill at t that will make him confident at t′ in the ship’s
seaworthiness, and he chooses to do this at t when he has a low credence
in the ship’s seaworthiness—or certainly a low enough one that he should
not be sending her to sea. So, again, if this is the case, then the Jamesian
is not obliged to consider the shipowner’s credences rational, and we can
pinpoint his immorality to time t, when he has low credence in the ship’s
safety, but manipulates his future self into having higher credences, and
indeed credences high enough that they will lead him to put the ship to
sea.
So, in order to make Clifford’s challenge to my version of Jamesian epis-
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temology stick, we need a slightly different example. We need a case in
which a risk-inclined individual assigns a high prior to something that then
leads them to make a decision that exposes many others to a risk of harm,
where they would not have made this decision had they had a more risk-
averse, less extreme prior.
One place we might look for such examples is among conspiracy theo-
rists. After all, as Rachel Fraser (2020) points out, Jamesian epistemology is
a natural lens through which to understand some conspiracist thinking:
If James is right that epistemic risk aversion is a matter of taste
rather than of rational compulsion, then it is not obviously irra-
tional to believe that the royals killed Diana on extremely scant
evidence. If someone’s worse fear is missing out on true beliefs,
then urging them only to believe claims for which they have
good evidence is pointless. Sure, if you only believe things for
which you have good evidence, you are less likely to have false
beliefs. But you will also miss out on a lot of true ones. In other
words: for someone with a conspirator’s attitude to epistemic
risk, believing in line with the evidence would itself be irra-
tional, just as it would be irrational to order vanilla ice-cream if
what you really want is chocolate. Those who think conspiracy
theorists are too credulous think conspiracy theorists overesti-
mate the strength of evidence for their theories. But this need
not be so: they might correctly assess that their evidence is weak
but take it that even weak evidence makes belief a bet worth
taking. (Fraser, 2020)
Thus, the conspiracist is a risk-inclined Jamesian believer with priors that
assign a lot of credence to their favoured conspiracy theory. As is often
noted, most conspiracy theories include not only an account of certain events
or certain political structures that offers an alternative to the official or
mainstream account, but also an account of how the conspiracy posited in
this alternative account has been and will be covered up, and how the pop-
ulation has been and will be deceived about its existence and manipulated
to ignore or dismiss it with misleading evidence. The result is that most
publicly accessible evidence that non-conspiracists would take to confirm
the official explanation in fact has no power to disconfirm the conspiracy
theory for the conspiracist, since the conspiracy theory itself makes such
evidence as likely as the official explanation does—“Well, isn’t that exactly
what you’d expect them to say if they were covering up Roswell?”; “Well,
of course they’d choose an unassuming pizza parlour—what could be more
natural?”. So, just as their prior in the conspiracy theory is high, so is their
posterior after updating that prior on the evidence. So, for instance, an anti-
vaxxer might believe not only that Bill Gates has secreted nanotechnology
inside the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus vaccines that will help him manipulate
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those who receive them, but they will also believe that various government
and medical officials are aware of this and are colluding with Gates, so that
when we hear those officials pronounce in favour of the safety and efficacy
of the vaccines, that evidence will do nothing or very little to lower the
conspiracist’s credence in Gates’ malevolent plan—“Well, yes, that medical
officer has proved trustworthy in the past, but that’s because he’s playing
the long game; he’s been getting us to trust him so he can pull this off”.
So now let’s consider such an individual. They begin with a high prior
credence in their vaccination conspiracy, and they update that on their evi-
dence, which does something to reduce their high prior but not much, since
the theory to which they assign that prior makes likely exactly the evidence
that non-conspiracists would find disconfirming. Now, of course, most,
perhaps all, actual conspiracy theories that circulate in the real world are
either internally inconsistent or strictly inconsistent with the evidence. But
they need not be. It is perfectly possible to construct a consistent conspiracy
theory that has the capacity to accommodate most apparently countervail-
ing evidence. After all, we are used to positing something structurally anal-
ogous in the philosophy of science, where we take a successful theory and
construct an alternative one that is empirically equivalent to the first, or at
least accommodates all evidence gathered in favour of the original theory
so far. Here, the official explanation corresponds to the original theory, and
the conspiracist’s alternative corresponds to the empirically equivalent al-
ternative theory. Indeed, as Rachel Fraser points out, Descartes’ sceptical
hypothesis, which posits a malicious demon hellbent on deceiving me, is
the original conspiracy theory in philosophy.
So, if our hypothetical anti-vaxxer assigns a high prior to her consistent
but false conspiracy theory, and updates it on her evidence using Bayes’
Rule, and ends up with a slightly lower but still high posterior, our Jame-
sian must consider her credences rationally permissible. Now suppose that
she acts on those credences. Convinced that she is saving people from
Gates’ malicious control, she sabotages a vaccination centre, destroying
their stock of the vaccine and delaying by a month the vaccinations of 1,000
elderly or other high risk people in the local area. Of these, fifty end up con-
tracting COVID-19 and two die from it. I think many will say, as Clifford
said of the shipowner, that this person’s action was immoral, and she is
morally responsible for the subsequent deaths.
So, again, we have a conflict with the maxim stated above, which says
that actions chosen rationally on the basis of rationally permissible cre-
dences and morally permissible utilities issues are themselves morally per-
missible. How, then, might the Jamesian respond?
Here’s the response I favour. We’re used to thinking that, when we
make choices that affect others, we’re morally obliged to take into account
the values and goals and desires of those others. Now, as well as taking into
account the desires and values and other conative attitudes of the people
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whom your decision might affect, it seems to me that we should also take
into account their attitude to risk.45
Hiking in the Scottish Highlands one day with my friend, the mist
comes down.46 To avoid getting separated, we rope ourselves to one an-
other and agree I’ll go ahead on the narrow path, taking the lead and mak-
ing decisions about our route. At one point, I must choose whether to con-
tinue our ascent, giving us the chance of attaining the summit but risking
very serious injury, or begin our descent, depriving us of the possibility
we’ll reach the top but removing any risk of harm. My friend and I have
been hiking together for years, and I know we share exactly the same util-
ities for the possible outcomes—we value reaching the summit exactly as
much, and similarly for avoiding injury; and we disvalue missing out on
the summit exactly as much, and similarly for sustaining injury. But I also
know that we have radically different attitudes to risk. While I am very
risk-inclined, he is very risk-averse. Were he to face the choice instead of
me, I know he’d choose to descend. It seems immoral, I think, for me to
choose on behalf of the two of us to continue our attempt on the summit.
How morality requires us to take the risk attitudes of others into ac-
count is, of course, a thorny question, just as is the question how morality
requires us to take the conative attitudes of others into account. There do
seem to be some distinctive features of the case of risk.47 Firstly, it seems
that more risk-averse individuals carry greater weight.48 Suppose that it
was my friend who had taken the lead on the mountain path. When they
reached the fork in the route, I suspect we would be happy to say that
they’d be morally permitted to follow their own attitudes to risk and em-
bark upon the descent. I doubt that the principle is as simple as this: choose
as if you were the most risk-averse in the group of affected parties. After
all, I think a single very risk-averse person in a population of risk-neutral
people should not end up dictating all of the ethical choices that affect that
population. But something in this vicinity might be correct.
In any case, if we are morally obliged to take into account the risk atti-
tudes of others in practical matters when facing a choice that affects them,
might we not also be obliged to take into account their attitudes to epis-
temic risk in setting the credences we use to make such decisions? And
might this not account for the immorality of the anti-vaxxer’s assault on
the vaccination centre. If she knows that all the individuals affected by the
decision shared her view, I think we’d be more inclined to see her action as
morally permissible. The problem is that she did this based on priors that
45For other treatments of this claim, see (Buchak, 2017; Blessenohl, 2020; Rozen & Fiat,
ms; Thoma, ms).
46For a fascinating philosophical discussion of rational attitudes to risk in the context of
mountaineering, see (Ebert & Robertson, 2013).
47Blessenohl (2020) argues that there can be no satisfying general account of such choices.
48Rozen & Fiat (ms) offer an argument for certain instances of this general principle.
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take significant epistemic risks; and these epistemic risks are unlikely to be
tolerable to almost any of the people affected—the sort of risk-inclined at-
titude that leads the anti-vaxxer to assign her high prior in her conspiracy
theory is pretty rare. So, however much she inhabits those beliefs, she must
recognise that they are the product of particular attitudes to epistemic risk
that few people share. And she is morally obliged to take that into account
when she makes her decision whether or not to destroy the vaccine sup-
ply. So, according to this, our anti-vaxxer’s credences may be rational, but
acting on them in the way she does is immoral.
I think the foregoing explains why the Jamesian is right to think that it’s
possible to have rationally permissible credences on which it is immmoral
to act. But there is another worry in the vicinity. According to a view that
has been gaining considerable support recently, it is possible for an individ-
ual’s belief to harm, and thus perhaps to be immoral, even if the individual
does not act on it. For instance, according to a number of philosophers, a
belief that a particular individual lives up to a negative stereotype about
one of the demographic groups to which they belong might harm that per-
son even if having the belief is based on sound statistical evidence (Basu,
2018; Basu & Schroeder, 2019; Basu, 2019). Suppose I know that, of the 200
academic staff in some part of my university, only one is a women; and I
know that, of the 200 administrative staff, 150 are women. And now sup-
pose that, when I visit that part of the university for the first time, I meet the
single academic who is a woman in the lobby area as I enter. And suppose
that, before she introduces herself, I form the belief that she is a member
of the administrative staff. Then, according to these philosophers, I harm
her. Similarly, then, we would expect a belief in a false conspiracy theory to
harm members of any group, whether a whole race or ethnicity or gender
or sexual orientation or religion, that it falsely maligns by wrongly attribut-
ing to them evil intentions, morally repugnant desires, and monstrous ac-
tions, even if the conspiracist believer were never to act on those beliefs.
Antisemitic conspiracy theories furnish a frighteningly common example
here.
Of course, as with the anti-vaxxers’ conspiracies, antisemitic ones that
actually circulate in the real world are typically internally inconsistent and
inconsistent with accepted evidence. But, as before, it is possible to for-
mulate versions that are internally consistent and that contain sufficient
internal protection against existing evidence that non-conspiracists would
count as strongly disconfirming. So the Jamesian must grapple with the
fact that a high prior credence in such a theory is rationally permissible
on their account, as is a slightly lower but still high posterior credence—
again, slightly lower because presumably the protection against falsifying
evidence is not total; some of the countervailing evidence has some effect
on reducing the prior credence, but not much. But if this is the case, it is
rationally permissible to believe some of the vilest, most toxic conspiracy
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theories that people have constructed. And if, as Basu and others argue,
such beliefs can harm whether or not they issue in harmful actions, then it
is possible to have epistemically rationally permissible credences that are
extremely harmful.
In the end, I think the Jamesian must accept this. But it is open to them
to say that, epistemically speaking, these beliefs are rationally permissible,
while morally speaking, they are despicable and repugnant. And it is then
open to them to say that, all things considered, we should not have these
beliefs, because the level of moral depravity outweighs the rational permis-
sibility.
In brief...
In this final chapter, I considered five objections to permissivism
about epistemic rationality.
The first, given voice by Daniel Greco and Brian Hedden (2016) and
also Ben Levinstein (2017), begins with the claim that we should de-
fer to rationality. That is, at least if we aren’t sure whether our own
current credence function is rational, or if we are certain that it is
not, then if we learn of an alternative credence function that it is ra-
tional, we should adopt it as our own. The objection then proceeds
to show that, if permissivism is true, it is impossible to satisfy this
norm of deference coherently. I respond by denying the norm of def-
erence. For the epistemic utility theorist, if you are ignorant of some
fact about rationality—such as the fact that a particular credal state
is rationally permissible—then you must be ignorant of an axiolog-
ical fact about how to measure epistemic utility or a normative fact
about how to pick credal states on the basis of their epistemic util-
ity. Learning that a particular credal state is rational thus teaches
you something about one or other or both of these, and therefore
something about what is rationally permitted. But this will typi-
cally not mandate that you must adopt as your credal state the one
that you learned was rational. It might permit a number of differ-
ent responses; or it might mandate that you respond by adopting a
different credal state that your newly-acquired evidence about the
grounds of rationality has also revealed to be rational.
The second objection is due to Sophie Horowitz (2014) and chal-
lenges the permissivist to say what is valuable about rationality. I
respond that the epistemic utility theorist is particularly well placed
to answer this question. For them, credences are irrational if they
are flawed in certain ways as means by which to pursue the goal
of epistemic value. They are rational if they lack these flaws. It is
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clear, then, why they are valuable—epistemically valuable credences
are, by their nature, valuable; and rational credences are appropriate
means by which to pursue epistemic value.
The third objection comes from Ginger Schultheis (2018), who begins
by noting that nearly all permissivists will think there are situations
in which you are partially ignorant of which credal states are ratio-
nally permissible, knowing of one that is rationally permissible that
it is, and not knowing of another that is rationally permissible that
it is. But, Schultheis argues, such a situation is impossible. She con-
tends that it is never rational to adopt a state that you don’t know is
rational when there is another that you do know to be rational—she
calls this principle Weak Rational Dominance. I respond by objecting
to this principle. I note that not all rational credal states are equally
good in all situations—they exhibit different virtues in different cir-
cumstances. I argue that even if I am not sure whether one state is
rational, I might rationally opt for it instead of one I know to be ra-
tional because in some circumstances it has a virtue that the one I
know to be rational always lacks, and I’m willing to take the risk of
irrationality to secure the possibility of that virtue.
The fourth objection, offered by Wayne Myrvold (2019) to my earlier
work on epistemic risk, notes that our account permits priors, such
as the uniform prior, that do not allow you to learn from experience
in the ways we think you should. In the end, I think these priors, and
the inductive scepticism they embody, must be permitted, however
little we like the consequences of adopting them. But, unlike in my
earlier work, they are not now mandated.
The fifth and final objection I consider comes from W. K. Clifford’s
essay, ‘The Ethics of Belief’ (1877 [1999]). Since our account results
in such a wide interpersonal permissivism, an individual with very
risk-inclined Hurwicz weights will be permitted to assign so high
a prior credence to a conspiracy theory that, even after rationally
incorporating the countervailing evidence, they will end up with a
high rational posterior in that theory. And yet it seems immoral for
them to act on that credence. In our example, it seems immoral for an
anti-vaxxer with high credence that a particular vaccine is harmful
to destroy stocks of it, even though that action is expected to do the
most good from the point of view of their credence. Does this cast
doubt on the rationality of this credence? I argue that it does not. In
the practical case, we are happy to say that, when I make a decision
that will affect other people—such as the decision to destroy vaccine
stocks—morality requires me to take into account their attitudes to
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pragmatic risk. I argue that the same holds true of their attitudes to
epistemic risk. It is for this reason that the anti-vaxxer is morally re-
quired not to destroy the vaccine stocks—if they do so, they impose
their own attitudes to epistemic risk on the people whose lives their
decision will affect; and while that doesn’t affect the rationality of
their credences, it does affect the morality of acting on them.
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8 Summing up
According to epistemic utility theory, the rational credal states are those
it would be rational for you to pick were you presented with a choice be-
tween all the possible such states. To make such a choice, you’d need: (i)
a way of measuring the purely epistemic value of each credal state at each
way the world might be, and (ii) a decision rule that separates out the ra-
tional choices from the irrational ones on the basis of that epistemic value.
To epistemic utility theory, we added William James’ permissivism about
attitudes to epistemic risk. Noting that we could not obtain permissivism
by encoding our attitudes to epistemic risk in our measures of epistemic
value, we turned instead to the decision rule we use to pick our credal
state. We argued that, when we pick our prior credences, we should use a
decision rule that encodes our attitudes to epistemic risk. In particular, it
should be a decision rule from the family GHC: that is, we should repre-
sent our attitudes to risk by generalised Hurwicz weights and then pick a
prior that has maximal generalised Hurwicz score relative to those weights.
This gives us wide interpersonal and narrower intrapersonal permissivism
about prior credences. When we come to pick our posteriors, on the other
hand, we should use our priors along with the risk-neutral expected util-
ity rule and an epistemic utility function suited to our evidence. After all,
we’ve already encoded our attitudes to risk in the decision rule we used
to pick our priors, and we’re appealing to those priors to make this choice.
This leads us to update our priors on our evidence using Bayes’ Rule to
give our posteriors. And this gives wide interpersonal and narrow intrap-
ersonal permissivism about posteriors.
So where do we go from here? As always, there’s much still to do.
(1) We might explore how to extend the framework described here:
(a) We might ask how the approach works in the infinite case, where
we lift our restriction to finite sets of possible worlds.
(b) We might ask what the consequences of the approach are when
we apply it not to credences but to beliefs, or other doxastic
states.
(2) We might ask whether the way I have incorporated our attitudes to
epistemic risk into the account is the only way this might be done.
You might think, for instance, that you could incorporate some por-
tion of our attitudes to risk into the decision rule we use to pick our
priors and some portion into the rule we use to pick our posteriors.
What different verdicts about permissivism would that give?49
49For important work in this direction, see (Campbell-Moore & Salow, 2020, ta).
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(3) I’ve found sadly little to say about which attitudes to risk we should
consider rationally permissible. We can be very permissive about
such attitudes without countenancing all of them. But where, if any-
where, to draw the line? I feel confident, though, that wherever that
line lies, it will include within it sufficiently many permissible atti-
tudes to risk that they will entail permissivism about credal rational-
ity.
(4) I have also said almost nothing about the implications for social epis-
temology, except in response to the Cliffordian objection above, where
I suggested that the epistemically risk-inclined should not use their
extreme priors when making decisions that will affect a group of in-
dividuals who are epistemically risk-averse.
There are many questions in social epistemology on which the ideas
in essay bear. I’ll mention only two from network epistemology:
(a) What are the advantages and disadvantages of different distri-
butions of attitudes to epistemic risk throughout a population?
Is it good to include some risk-inclined individuals in your epis-
temic group, even if you are yourself epistemically risk-averse?
And does this provide an answer to Clifford’s conservatism?50
(b) While I have focused on individuals who have attitudes to epis-
temic risk, perhaps groups do as well, and perhaps risk-inclined
groups will prefer epistemic networks with different structures
from those that risk-averse groups will choose.
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